


WORLD PARLIAMENT – FACT OR FICTION?

On the feasibility of world parliamentary models

Emma Stina Andersson

University of Helsinki
Faculty of Social Sciences
Political Science: world politics
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HELSINGIN YLIOPISTO
HELSINGFORS UNIVERSITET
UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI

Tiedekunta/Osasto – Fakultet/Sektion – Faculty
Faculty of Social Sciences

Laitos – Institution – Department
Department of Political and Economic Studies

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Emma Stina Andersson

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Cosmopolitan ideals have been on the philosophical agenda for several millennia but the end of the Cold War started a new discussion on state sovereignty, global democracy, the role of international law and global institutions. The Westphalian state system in practice since the 17th century is transforming and the democracy deficit needs new solutions. An impetus has been the fact that in the present world, an international body representing global citizens does not exist. In this Master's thesis, the possibility of establishing a world parliament is examined. In a case analysis, 17 models on world parliament from two journals, a volume of essays and two other publications are discussed. Based on general observations, the models are divided into four thematic groups. The models are analyzed with an emphasis on feasible and probable elements. Further, a new scenario with a time frame of thirty years is proposed based on the methodology of normative futures studies, taking special interest in causal relationships and actions leading to change. The scenario presents three gradual steps that each need to be realized before a sustainable world parliament is established. The theoretical framework is based on social constructivism, and changes in international and multi-level governance are examined with the concepts of globalization, democracy and sovereignty.

A feasible, desirable and credible world parliament is constituted gradually by implying electoral, democratic and legal measures for members initially from exclusively democratic states, parliamentarians, non-governmental organizations and other groups. The parliament should be located outside the United Nations context, since a new body avoids the problem of inefficiency currently prevailing in the UN. The main objectives of the world parliament are to safeguard peace and international law and to offer legal advice in cases when international law has been violated. A feasible world parliament is advisory in the beginning but it is granted legislative powers in the future. The number of members in the world parliament could also be extended following the example of the EU enlargement process.

Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords

Futures studies, scenario, model, world parliament, parliamentary assembly, United Nations, European Parliament, global citizen, global democracy, cosmopolitanism, globalization, sovereignty, normative, retreat of the state, international law



HELSINGIN YLIOPISTO
HELSINGFORS UNIVERSITET
UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI

Tiedekunta/Osasto – Fakultet/Sektion – Faculty
Valtiotieteellinen tiedekunta

Laitos – Institution – Department
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Keskustelua kosmopoliittisista ihanteista on käyty vuosituhansien ajan, mutta vasta kylmän sodan päättyminen sysäsi liikkeelle uuden diskurssin valtiosuvereenisuuden ja globaalin demokratian haasteista, kansainvälisen oikeuden roolista sekä globaaleista instituutioista. Perinteinen valtiojärjestelmä, joka on voinut 1600-luvulta, on muuttumassa ja samalla demokratiavaaje kaipaa ratkaisuja. Maailmassa ei tällä hetkellä ole maailman kansalaisia edustavaa järjestöä, mikä lisää muutoksen tarvetta. Tässä pro gradu -tutkielmassa tarkastellaan, missä määrin maailmanparlamentin toteuttaminen on mahdollista sekä minkälaisia ongelmia ja haasteita perustamiseen liittyy. 17 mallin aineisto pohjautuu kahteen tieteelliseen aikakausjulkaisuun, esseekokoelmaan sekä kahteen muuhun julkaisuun. Tutkielmassa tehdään yleisiä havaintoja malleista ja ne on jaettu neljään temaattiseen ryhmään. Mallien ja skenaarioiden tarkastelussa kiinnitetään huomiota toteuttamiskelpoisuuteen ja mahdollisiin elementteihin. Lisäksi luodaan uusi kolmenkymmenen vuoden skenaario normatiivisen tulevaisuudentutkimuksen metodien perusteella. Tässä metodissa korostetaan kiinnostusta kausaalisiin riippuvuussuhteisiin ja toimiin, jotka johtavat muutokseen. Skenaariossa esitetään kolme vaihetta, joiden tulee kunkin toteutua, jotta pysyvä ja kestävä maailmanparlamentti voidaan perustaa. Teoreettinen viitekehys pohjautuu sosiaalikonstruktivismiin, sekä muutoksia kansainvälisessä ja monitasoisessa hallinnassa pohditaan globalisaation, demokratian ja suvereenisuuden käsitteiden kautta.

Toteuttamiskelpoinen, houkutteleva ja uskottava maailmanparlamentti voidaan perustaa vaiheittain hyödyntämällä demokraattisia ja oikeudellisia periaatteita, järjestämällä vaalit sekä hyväksymällä parlamentin jäseniksi aluksi ainoastaan demokraattisia valtioita, parlamentaarikkoja, kansalaisjärjestöjä ja muita ryhmiä. Maailmanparlamentti tulisi perustaa Yhdistyneiden Kansakuntien ulkopuolelle, sillä uusi elin välttäisi nykyisen YK:n tehottomuuden. Maailmanparlamentin tärkein tavoite on edustaa kansalaisia globaalilla tasolla, taata rauhan ja kansainvälisen oikeuden säilyminen sekä tarjota oikeudellista neuvoa tapauksissa, joissa kansainvälistä oikeutta on rikottu. Toteuttamiskelpoinen maailmanparlamentti on aluksi neuvoa-antava, mutta myöhemmin sille myönnettäisiin lakiasäätäviä valtuuksia. Myöhemmässä vaiheessa parlamentin jäsenistöä voitaisiin myös laajentaa Euroopan unionin esimerkin valossa. Tutkielman lopussa havainnollistetaan aiheen jatkokehittelyä.

Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords

Tulevaisuudentutkimus, skenaario, malli, maailmanparlamentti, parlamentaarinen kokous, Yhdistyneet Kansakunnat, Euroopan parlamentti, globaali kansalainen, globaali demokratia, kosmopolitanismi, globalisaatio, suvereenisuus, normatiivinen, valtion väkijärjestäminen, kansainvälinen oikeus

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Abbreviations

| | |
|-------|---|
| AU | African Union |
| BBC | British Broadcasting Company |
| CONGO | Council of Non-Governmental Organizations |
| CSE | Confederated States of Earth |
| CSOP | Commission to Study the Organization of Peace |
| CTT | Currency Transactions Tax |
| EC | European Community <i>or</i> Election Commission |
| ECSC | European Coal and Steel Community |
| EMU | Economic and Monetary Union |
| EP | European Parliament |
| EU | European Union |
| FPA | Foreign Policy Analysis |
| GPA | Global Parliamentary Assembly |
| HDI | Human Development Index |
| ICC | International Criminal Court |
| ICJ | International Court of Justice |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| IPE | International Political Economy |
| IPI | Inter-Parliamentary Institution |
| IPU | Inter-Parliamentary Union |
| IR | International Relations |
| KDUN | Committee for a Democratic United Nations (originally from German: <i>Komitee für eine demokratische UNO</i>) |
| LI | Liberal International |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NGO | Non-governmental organization |
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| PACE | Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council |
| TCE | Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNCA | United Nations Corporate Assembly |
| UNGA | United Nations General Assembly |
| UNLAA | United Nations Local Authorities Assembly |
| UNPA | United Nations Parliamentary Assembly <i>or</i> People's Assembly |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| WB | World Bank |
| WFM | World Federalist Movement |
| WP | World Parliament |
| WPA | World Parliamentary Assembly |
| WPS | World Parliament Secretariat |
| WTO | World Trade Organization |

1. Introduction

W. Warren Wagar discusses the world of the future in his book *A Short History of the Future* (first edition published in 1989, with the later editions of 1992 and 1999 adding post-Cold War elements) on the next two hundred years until the Small Revolution of the late 22nd century. Wagar (1999, 41-42) writes that “[the Vienna conferees, in light of the historic 2001 agreement] met again in the same city in 2026. They now elected to take a step toward true world government by reconstituting the United Nations as the Confederated States of Earth and the countries within the various zones of special influence as trust territories of the CSE. (...) All were severely tested by the depression that started in 2032, but (...) the world order did not begin to break down until 2040.” Wagar introduces The Catastrophe of 2044 – a nuclear conflict between Europe and the United States ending in a Socialist world government – is on an absolute scale not comparable to the imagination of science fiction novels. Although Wagar reclaims dystopian elements in his story about the future, he eventually reveals his utopia hundred years after the nuclear disaster. In 2140, global elections are held and constitutional law is restored. In that sense normality is achieved but the costs have been tremendous.

Based on lessons learned from science fiction novels and Wagar’s plot, what eventually remains is the never-ending trial of finding a better life and solutions to ultimate questions concerning human life and nearly everything. Unfortunately this sometimes results in major disasters, since one’s desires might conflict with the ones of fellow humans. The presence of the Cold War burden is evident in Wagar’s account, which is not very striking since the book was written during the Cold War. The Cold War constellation is still present, and the Soviet Union seems to have survived the 20th century and still exists in the reality of the story. What is astonishing is the issue of a major disaster taking place on Earth and leading to forms of cooperation of further deterrence between world powers. The ultimate question is whether we can arrive at a plausible future space without undergoing catastrophes.

In this Master’s thesis, the aim is to discuss models of the world parliament as future scenarios and analyze their feasibility based on the prevailing reality.¹ In the analysis, 17 models are examined from which only a few count as scenarios. The selection of the data for the thesis was based on the discussion of global democracy, international law and parliamentary assemblies. The material that forms the 17 models of the thesis consists of two journals, *Global Society* (2006) and *Widener Law Review* (2007), a volume

¹ The aim is not to conduct a comparative study between the models. However, weaknesses, strengths and interpretative differences on global democracy and world politics may be discussed comparatively.

of essays by the Center for UN Reform Education, *A Reader on Second Assembly and Parliamentary Proposals* (2003), and two publications by the Committee for a Democratic United Nations (KDUN, a think tank based in Berlin), *The composition of a Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations* and *Developing International Democracy – For a Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations* by Andreas Bummel (2010). The individual models will be divided into four thematic categories based on their outline of the world parliament.

A scenario is a causal process that leads to a conclusion and results, whereas a model or a proposal only pictures a possible option for reaching the issue at hand. The mathematical models under consideration in this thesis are not scenarios. In summary, models answer HOW questions and scenarios imply both the HOW and the WHY. In a strict sense, only scenarios can be considered feasible, although the distinction is looser in the analysis. Also the models give insightful background information for the discussion of the world parliament. Feasibility refers here to the degree of realization and credibility, i.e. what kind of a world parliament could be plausible and possible taking certain matters into consideration. The second aim is to form a conclusive normative scenario, using the material provided by the models under analysis. The scenario considers both short-term and long-term alternatives of a world parliament. Feasibility is interlinked with the concept of time span. The aim is to conceptualize a future world parliament with the time frame of thirty years: within three decades, obtainable and probable measures can be taken in the cycle of approximately ten years. Thirty years is the absolute minimum time for the realization of a world parliament according to gradual steps in the present circumstances. Models of dystopian character are the opposite of feasible scenarios. From a normative perspective, any feasible scenario considering a possible future within a few decades should not be dystopian. Otherwise the world parliament might remain short-lived.

In the contextual sense, the goal is to review the impact of cosmopolitanism, globalization and global democracy on state sovereignty in the theoretical framework. This discussion forms the background for the analysis and the feasibility aspect. Ten research questions of this study have been formulated:

- 1) What makes a normative scenario feasible, credible and desirable?
- 2) How much cosmopolitan ideals can be invested in the world parliament?
- 3) What functions and jurisdiction could a global body occupy, how does it receive its powers from sovereign entities and should the world parliament be located inside or outside the UN system (causal reasoning)?
- 4) What are the powers and the structural extent of the parliament as a global actor?
- 5) Which issues are possible future challenges of the world parliament and which elements of international law enable and hinder the establishment of this body?
- 6) In what extent would the establishment of a feasible world parliament change the ways of global democracy, citizen representation and also the role of nation-states?

- 7) Should citizens have the right to vote for individual parliamentarians directly, and should the parliament employ national quotas or other restrictive mechanisms?
- 8) Why would governments, parliamentarians, NGO's, prominent individuals, the corporate sector and others invest their expertise in the constitution of a new global institution?
- 9) Is the retreat of the state theory fictional or factual and in what sense has the modern state transformed towards a postmodern statehood?
- 10) How much transformation of the Westphalian system is needed to establish a world parliament?

These main questions are general guidelines of the thesis but they imply secondary considerations that are also discussed. The premise of the thesis is that a global parliament is necessary. Therefore, the ontological issue of whether or not it should be established in the first place is not relevant. Reflecting on the future of the world parliament, the assumed loss of sovereignty for the nation-states poses an interesting challenge for organizations primarily based on bilateral relations. The hypothesis is that the role of the state is in transformation as portrayed by multi-level governance.

The methodology of the thesis is based on futures studies. As the emphasis is on the feasibility of a world parliament², considerations of a world government are excluded. However, at times the two might overlap. The models on world parliament are unique and do not constitute common starting points. Some of the models take a stand on the United Nations (UN) system in the sense that the global parliament is seen as part of the UN apparatus, especially the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), whereas others take a more macro perspective on the world system as such. Futures studies is a broad field, but in this thesis, the main emphasis is on the normative aspect of futures studies, since the purpose is to present potential platforms for the future (see Mannermaa 1986, 45). This thesis belongs to the prospective group of futures studies, because the scenarios are intended to offer realizable forms of the world in the future. According to prospective scenarios and futures studies in general, the future cannot be anticipated or predicted like fortune-tellers do, but proposals on the potential form of it can be made. Thus, futures studies may be personal and imply wishful thinking for the researcher. In the end, everyone reads between the lines from a wishful perspective: one anticipates what one wishes for the future to take actual forms. Therefore, feasibility is connected to desirability. One should keep in mind that scenarios and models can also function as warning mechanisms, and offer philosophical advice for the reader to ponder upon. Scenarios are solutions to uncertainty: although the future as such is unpredictable, it may be formed from the possible scenarios. There is only one possible future in the real world, but it may be influenced by current considerations of the future. In this thesis, the future serves as the learning mechanism for the individuals inhabiting this

² In this thesis, the concepts of *global parliament* and *world parliament* are used as synonyms, although individual models may differ in the substance of the parliament.

planet in the 21st century. Futures research is fascinating, since the opportunities are vast and the boundaries thin and room is left for idealism. The challenge remains in the scientific nature of the subject. It is important to accurately study scenarios in depth, to consider their impact and to view the future as a source filled with opportunities. One must, nonetheless, remain distant from too much wishful and “anything goes” ways of thinking.

Since the beginning of the new millennium the UN has entered a phase of renewal. The end of the Cold War in 1991 constituted a new beginning for the discussion on the role of state sovereignty, global democracy and the United Nations reform. The ending of the ideological bipolarity of the world has enabled democratic projects to gain deeper ground. It might be that the bipolar world system hindered the proposals to set footing, and as time progressed, the UN system established in 1945 became the norm, difficult to amend in the fragmented world of the 21st century. Still, future scenarios written in times of multi-polar world hegemonies differ from the ones portrayed during the Cold War. The advantage of the present day scenarios is that they are not bound by the so-called simple burden of the Cold War, but the task is at the same time more difficult in the fragmented world order. Several models on the reform of the UNGA have been designed, ranging from a federalist world parliament into international virtual parliaments or a WTO Parliamentary Assembly. The debate on parliamentary assemblies and a global parliament is wide and often philosophical. In the UN context, differing versions of the reform of the UNGA have been presented: some emphasize a People’s Assembly, others a Parliamentary Assembly or the dimension of a world parliament. All these versions stress alternative viewpoints on the form of global parliamentarianism. Enhancement of global democracy in the multi-polar world, however, is not intended in a narrow sense: the worldwide democracy is not a self-evident project. Liberal democracy has not reached its final point, as the American author Francis Fukuyama (1992) roughly states in his book *The End of History and the Last Man*. Democracy continues to develop and find new paths, but democracy is not arbitrary. Someone always channels its flow and it does not exist without the guidance by persons. The perspective of the thesis is both actor-oriented and system-oriented, since the two are interlinked.

Another debate concerns the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) as a potential candidate for the second chamber in the UN. The IPU, with its long history in parliamentary cooperation between states, could eventually lead the UN to a different direction than the ones campaigning on the United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA). Nonetheless, the IPU itself has not given any input into its potential future role as a second

chamber of the UNGA. Some of the more recent models have concentrated on the feasibility of a global parliament outside the UN realm, therefore making the parliament more flexible, and somewhat imaginative, when not restricted by existing boundaries. This is mostly true of the models in the *Widener Law Review*. Any form of global parliament, be it UN-related or not, will affect other organizations and most importantly, the global perspective at large.

This thesis consists of six chapters. Following this introduction, the second chapter contains the theoretical and methodological framework with terminological considerations and major concepts of the thesis. The first part of the second chapter discusses cosmopolitanism and the methodology of futures studies, whereas the second part consists of the examination of international and multi-level governance in the context of globalization, democracy and sovereignty. The third and fourth chapters form the analysis of the models, the fourth mainly focusing on the feasibility of the scenarios. The fifth chapter considers the question of what is possible to achieve in the current circumstances within the next thirty years. Chapter six consists of conclusions and suggestions for further research are also presented at the end of the thesis.

2. Theoretical framework

In this chapter the aim is to illustrate the main theoretical concepts, futures research as a methodological tool as well as the background for the analysis. The larger picture behind the idea of a world parliament needs a complementary background based on cosmopolitan thinking, changes in state behavior and the larger context in world politics. The assumption is normative since scenarios and models mirror issues that are anticipated from the future, thus making the future world desirable. The beginning of this chapter is devoted to futures studies and its impact on scenario making and to the cosmopolitan framework. In the sub chapters terminology and concepts regarding the change in statehood receive considerable attention. It is important to give a detailed account of the images peculiar to statehood as specific to the current period, since only by understanding the facets and characteristics of the present day can an accurate picture of the future be formed. The formation of any global institution requires the consent given by sovereign entities. Therefore changes in the Westphalian state apparatus will receive the attention it deserves, although the analysis here is intended as background information. The methodology and initial theory are adopted from futures studies, but supplementary theoretical tools are adopted from a larger pool of world politics.

To get a comprehensive picture of the relationship between the present and the future, Nassim Nicholas Taleb's outlining of the Black Swan problem should be discussed. "How can we know the future, given knowledge of the past; or, more generally, how can we figure out properties of the (infinite) unknown based on the (finite) known? (...) What can a turkey learn about what is in store for it tomorrow from the events of yesterday? A lot, perhaps, but certainly a little less than it thinks, and it is just that 'little less' that may make all the difference." (Taleb 2008, 40) This offers an interesting thought, although futures studies is not linked to predicting based on induction. According to Taleb, a Black Swan³ is an event composed of three attributes. "First, it is an *outlier*, as it lies outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility. Second, it carries an extreme impact. Third, in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence *after* the fact, making it explainable and predictable." (Ibid., XVII-XVIII) Using the turkey as a further protagonist, the animal could calculate the possibilities of its future that may

³ The discovery of the very first black swan after the "discovery" of Australia presented a surprise not only to ornithologists, but to the problem of generalization. "It illustrates a severe limitation to our learning from observations or experience and the fragility of our knowledge. One single observation can invalidate a general statement derived from millennia of confirmatory sightings of millions of white swans. All you need is one single (and, I am told, quite ugly) black bird." (Taleb 2008, XVII)

imply outliers and partial predictions on its further path. It makes assumptions about the future based on past experiences, until Thanksgiving. (Ibid.) The Black Swan is a challenge, since some parts of it can be exploitable, although the world parliament does not present a challenge of a rare, retrospectively predictable and extreme impact. Futures studies implies a degree of cumulatively significant shocks that shake our beliefs and justify changes and reforms to current norms. For laypersons, a world parliament might seem hardly probable as it has never existed before. For many in the field of world politics, feasible elements point to the possibility of a global body, both in the philosophical, legal and political sense. The continuity of history is applied to make assumptions about the future, and this is precisely what binds the future considerations of a world parliament to its probable origins in the past and the present.

Science fiction novels may make harsh discoveries and invent the most improbable solutions the human mind can come up with, but nevertheless, the future is bound by its origins, its history. Within the next thirty years, everything is not possible, and potentially the form of a future world parliament is one of small steps, making some people disappointed and others pleased. For an optimist and open-minded person, however, small steps are nevertheless steps, no matter their size. The possibility of any steps offers fruitful content to believers in the gateway theory: small steps can lead to bigger steps and after a certain amount of steps having been taken, a bigger picture is discovered, making the steps in the beginning look small in comparison but important considering their impact. For positivists, this kind of research might pose a severe problem, since the methods, hypotheses and theories adopted by futures researchers might not be testable and deductively applied afterwards. This being said, futures studies implies a personal aspect. The scenario in chapter 5 would probably not be reproduced by someone else. Using the same attributes one might derive different conclusions.

In the modern world of today, *where be dragons?*⁴ They are conspicuous by their absence from the practice of managing risks and uncertainty. It is becoming increasingly clear that they lie all around us: on the fringes of institutional boundaries, outside the silos of academic disciplines, beyond the risk metrics so carefully calculated... In each instance they are the unacknowledged blind spots, spanning scientific, geographical, temporal and institutional boundaries but unrecognised due to the challenges they represent to our human desire for order and control. (Elahi 2010, 2)

According to Elahi (ibid.), a Black Swan portrays an unpredictable and improbable event that bears a massive impact on the status quo. In this sense, establishing a world parliament might at the first glimpse seem unrealistic but considering its necessity in the longer term, the very idea of it becomes more acceptable. In the current world, it is ne-

⁴ The phrase *here be dragons* (HIC SVNT DRACONES) signified dangerous and unexplored territories in maps. See more on *here be dragons* in Elahi 2010. The social science equivalent of *here be dragons* is turned into *here lurk dragons* by Tetlock 2005, 3.

cessary to think about the concept ‘world’. Obviously, with the knowledge provided by current science there is only one planet Earth but on the macro level there are several worlds. So it is vital to picture the world that is referred to in this thesis. This theoretical chapter will not consider the essence and nature of a world parliament. However, a conceptualization has to be reached in order to get a grasp of the world one refers to. For which ‘world’ is a world parliament intended and to whom? A liberal cosmopolitan person naturally inhabits a different world than a fundamentalist Christian or Islamist. In a multi-polar world society normative ideals conflict with each other, since everyone eagerly pursues an image of the ideal world according to one’s own standards. This thought is meant for the reader to ponder upon, not to be distracted altogether, although the reality is such that in the end, everything is political and one often reads between the lines as one wishes. Elahi continues (ibid., 6) that human psychology, institutional frameworks and scientific convention have all plotted in order to remove *here be dragons* from the human collective consciousness. She states that

[w]hile the medieval world recognised both the concept and the value of ‘Here be Dragons’, science, based on the principles of observation and experiment, approaches the issue of indeterminate uncertainty from a different standpoint. The very essence of science is the notion of conjecture and test. Science cannot provide certainty – at its core is the current best working hypothesis. At any time new data can emerge to refute current theories and require them to be modified. In principle, science is therefore a dynamic process, accepting and encompassing fallibility, evolving as more accurate theories replace earlier ones. However, the success of scientific thinking in driving rapid and radical technological innovation and the accompanying economic growth has meant that in practice it has become almost impossible to challenge the trajectory of scientific endeavour and the inherent risks the new technologies it spawns might pose. (Ibid.)

Future can be seen in the light of *here be dragons* due to its uncertain nature. It is an imaginary “final frontier” in the sense space is, although space is spatially and geographically more reachable than what the future will ever be. The fact that it only stays in the realm of unreachable elements makes it more fascinating, because future is always one step ahead and can only be approached on a day-by-day basis, making the former future part of the present day, thus leaving space for new futures. In this thesis, the present day is pictured as an arena where the future is laid out in an open-minded room where presumably the unthinkable may become factual, in some circumstances. Since the question of the nature of the world parliament concerns the nature of the state system, a few thoughts will be given to this consideration. The debate on state sovereignty, a possible world parliament or a reformed UNGA is largely comprised of the cosmopolitan view point on the world and what ought to be, rather than what is. The federalist movement as a special area of cosmopolitanism has a long tradition when considering institutional forms above the traditional state system. Taking these conditions into consideration, cosmopolitan thinking is both theoretical and political, since in

the case of the latter it strives for the institutionalization of global citizens and the establishment of a world parliament. Before deepening into the methodological background of futures studies, I briefly examine normative international relations theory, which can be divided into cosmopolitan and communitarian thinking. To examine cosmopolitanism before tools of futures studies is reasoned by the issue that the methodology is better understood when the upper layer of the topic – i.e. the cosmopolitan theory on the global sphere – is already revealed. In order to answer why cosmopolitanism matters in the first place, one has to go back in history. For many that share the cosmopolitan world view, a world parliament represents the ultimate culmination point, the future goal that has been envisioned since ancient times. Therefore, cosmopolitan consideration receives the first theoretical space it deserves here.

2.1 Cosmopolitanism in world politics

The cosmopolitan vision, (...), is more about the future than the past. It is predominantly not about what the world of nation-states was like but what the world is becoming and how our consciousness is changing with it. (Fine 2007, 17)

Traditionally, inter-state relations are the core element of international relations theory. According to Chris Brown (1992, 3-4), normative international relations theory acknowledges moral and ethical dimensions in international relations and between states and communities. The problem arising from a theory that is labeled normative is the fact that it also implies an existence of non-normative theories. However, as this is a disciplinary matter, the purpose of this thesis is not to take a stand on this. In order to simplify the understanding future scenarios on the world parliament, the concepts ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘communitarian’ must be clarified. Cosmopolitan theory⁵ should be separated from communitarian normative theory. Cosmopolitan theory can be called normative philosophy: it considers questions of political existence from a normative perspective. Brown argues that state centricity emerged “from the collapse of medieval feudalism.” (Ibid., 5) Later in history, the concept of ‘state’ was replaced by the sovereign state. Normative theories acknowledge the importance of the scope of justice, which can be applied to both international and domestic politics. (Ibid., 6-7)

The cosmopolitan/communitarian divide relates directly to the most central question of any normative international relations theory, namely the moral value to be credited to particularistic political collectivities as against humanity as a whole or the claims of individual human beings. Communitarian thought either denies that there is an opposition here, or is prepared explicitly to assign central value to the community; cosmopolitan thought refuses this central status to the community, placing the ultimate source of moral value elsewhere. Some cosmopolitan thinkers believe that there ought to be one political community coextensive with mankind, but the cosmopolitan position is perfectly

⁵ For the cosmopolitan model of democracy, see David Held’s account in Appendix 1.

compatible with the pragmatic acceptance of a world of divided jurisdictions, and (...) the term 'cosmopolitan' is [here] *never* used to refer exclusively to adherents of a world-government position. (Ibid., 12-13)

This is a more general representation of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. Cosmopolitanism can also be defined as a counterbalance for nationalism. As Fine (2007, IX.) puts it, it is remarkably important to understand that the idea of cosmopolitanism existed centuries and even millennia before nationalism. The ancient Greeks were the first to start the conversation about cosmopolitan thought, but also later thinkers, such as Immanuel Kant, have continued the dialogue on the potential forms of global governance. Fine defines cosmopolitan social theory as

[a theory that] reconstructs the history and traditions of social theory in terms of its universalistic concept of society, the recognition of differences within a universalistic frame, and the critique of methodological and political nationalism. (Ibid., X)

Fine uses the term 'cosmopolitan *social* theory' because he sees that it combines cosmopolitanism and social theory in social sciences. Cosmopolitanism implies a degree of a social form of right, a sense of consciousness which signals the capacity to the concept both imaginatively and reflectively. (Ibid., XI-XIII) Within international relations, cosmopolitanism emerged after the fall of the Berlin wall. The so-called new cosmopolitanism criticizes realism for rationalizing the system of state sovereignty, which is in fact historically specified and normatively conditioned. New cosmopolitanism regards the modern state system as being surpassed. "Its basic intuition is that many of the assumptions of the Westphalian model are still operative in international relations today but that the conditions for the reconstruction of international relations along cosmopolitan lines are now ripe." (Ibid., 4) Here Fine's account is close to Sørensen's on the transformative nature of the current state system.

On the one hand, the modern state represents both the public interest and the interests of individuals within the state. It could be characterized as a status quo system in the sense that it does not wish the society to alter too radically as a system. On the other hand, the cosmopolitan vision, as Ulrich Beck advances it, emphasizes the future instead of the past. It is about the form of the world and the possibilities for changes. (Ibid., 17) Fine has underlined the theory as having the 'ism' taken out of cosmopolitanism. By this he emphasizes the need to address cosmopolitanism as a research agenda rather than an idea or wishes for the future. (Ibid., 133-134) He accentuates cosmopolitanism as a theoretical discipline rather than a mechanism for change or political dogmatism. Fine combines cosmopolitanism with political philosophy which is common for cosmopolitanism when regarded through normative lenses. Fine's version of cosmopolitanism and his critique of the powerlessness of new cosmopolitanism differ from David

Held's cosmopolitan model. This is not highly surprising since the approaches are different: Fine examines cosmopolitanism as a form of social action, while Held connects cosmopolitanism with the improvement of democracy.

A third account of cosmopolitan tells the story of the individual perspective in cosmopolitan philosophy. Christopher Bertram (2007, 75) refers to John Rawls' theory of justice, and the individual access to an important set of goods and morally significant capabilities all rely on favorable political arrangements. "The goods in question are those associated with being a functioning citizen of a democratic community and the capacities are the Rawlsian ones of being able to form, pursue, and revise one's conception of the good and of a sense of justice. (...) A complete theory of justice should contain an account of how people come to acquire and retain a commitment to its principles. Arguably, a theory that simply postulates universal principles without showing how they might be realized and maintained is otiose." (Ibid., 75-76)⁶

Cosmopolitan projects can be viewed in a liberal⁷ light, pursuing a worldwide understanding between various peoples. There are, nonetheless, other factors that influence the current discussion on a world parliament or parliamentary assemblies. Georg Sørensen (2003, 14-15) separates three differing views: realistic, liberal and critical ones. According to him, the debate is concentrated on the output between liberals favoring the retreat of the state and realists who are state-centric. The critical theory is mainly interested in international political economy and historical sociology. Sørensen (ibid., 161-162) illustrates that the modern state, born in the peace accord of Westphalia in 1648, has undergone transformation. He states that the world is now postmodern and still under correction. The liberal trend, here of most relevance, considers that inter-state relations have become more complex than what they were and arenas of interaction have multiplied, relations taking place on different levels. "International relations increasingly look like domestic politics with a composite array of issues and coalitions. (...) The transition (...) is driven much more by groups, individuals and organizations in society than it is driven by states. (...) Another strand of liberal thinking focuses more on the role of international regimes and institutions as drivers of the transition from modern to postmodern statehood." (Ibid., 167-168) Sørensen notes that liberals still assume a role for the state but that other actors, such as individuals, groups and organizations stemming from the societies as well as international organizations, are now primary. (Ibid., 168)

⁶ Bertram's account is more in depth than what can be here referred to.

⁷ E.g. the Liberal International (LI), founded in 1947, has been a keen proponent of international solidarity. See more in the LI's internet pages http://www.liberal-international.org/default.asp?ia_id=1108.

One issue that has to be borne in mind is the fact that there exists an heterogeneity of the governed on the intra-state level. Bienen et al. (1996) discuss this and note that international governance comprises all political, social and cultural groups which leads to minimally shared values. However, the requirements for a collective identity are lower than at the national level since the national control covers a large part of authority issues. Thus, this does not apply to the legitimacy problem that arises when the international governance has to solve identity challenges. Bienen et al. suggest that states and individuals can be subjects to the supranational systems. Rights and duties apply to both of the groups and their preferences should be determinate when decisions are made at the global level. Accountability will only be achieved if the individuals' voice is heard. Nowadays, as only states are members in the UN, individuals could – while the border between national and international politics is not clear anymore – contribute to the democratization of the UN in a new way, because in the present conditions it still is the legitimate global arena.

When considering yet never experienced global institutions, the structure of the current form of states and international governance must be acknowledged. Thus, I now turn to examine the liberal model presented by Sørensen (2003, 59-62). How do liberals view the transition from national government to multi-level governance? What will happen to democracy in the multiform policy phase? In compliance with the liberals the international dimension demands more than inter-state cooperation. There have been serious changes at the political level following globalization. Territorial borders have become dispensable, allowing border-crossing infrequently in comparison to the modern period. According to Sørensen, liberal observers accentuate three major developments in cross-border collaboration. First, they highlight the accumulation of inter-state relations, meaning cooperation in intergovernmental organizations. Sørensen refers to UN institutions that have significantly influenced the development of international law in areas of human rights and minority issues. Second, trans-governmental relations have expanded, for example in the form of environmental regulations and standard-setting. External relations have thus been widely replaced by other intervening mechanisms. Third, transnational relations have also expanded in the form of non-state actors: individuals and the civil society at large, including international non-governmental organizations now cooperating with and alongside states.⁸

⁸ For further reading on the peoples versus states, see Rawls, John (1999): *The Law of Peoples*; with "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited". Cambridge & London. Especially see chapter *Why Peoples and Not States*, pp. 23-30.

Sørensen (ibid., 62) notes that global public policy networks increasingly influence governance. He distinguishes three separate aspects of governance: *governance by government*, a traditional hierarchy model, *governance with government*, where governments engage in negotiations with other actors, and finally *governance without government*, where state interference has been excluded from the decision-making process. Radical scholars supporting the retreat of the state assert that when globalization gains strength, the two last-mentioned forms will gradually replace the first one. Another approach can be summed up as the global polity view. Here, governments become entangled with complex networks of international organizations and many non-state forces gain ground in the process. (Ibid., 63-64) Sørensen draws the conclusion that since the liberals, the realists and the critical theorists all focus on different areas of the transformation process, in the end their input is relevant. However, at the same time, they are all exclusive. When considering a world parliament in the future, the feasibility is connected to non-political aspects as well, such as technology and innovations. Sørensen states that without the significance of technological innovations and communications technology, the transformation would be irrelevant, but they cannot in themselves explain the developments in international fields. Technology is always used by humans and in this sense it enables the flow of transformation. “Without innovations in transport technology, communications technology and the ability to split up complicated production processes into segments which are then scattered worldwide, the transformation to postmodern statehood could not take place. (...) Technology has to be put to use by actors; left alone it plays no role, present or not. (...) Once states have established the appropriate conditions, [other] groups, individuals and organizations from society step in.” (Ibid., 170) This applies for the drivers of market forces as well. States possess the role of supervisors, and take an active role in times of crisis. This does enhance the power of the realists, since realists have not taken the fact into account that societal actors and market forces also affect states. They are not immune to the influence from internal and external forces. The dependence of states on other actors and vice versa explains the transition from modern to postmodern states. (Ibid., 170-171) Interdependence is one of the key issues when analyzing the best forms possible to establish a world parliament. The impact of still existing nation-states must be acknowledged. But neither can the role of non-state actors be neglected, since the permanence of the traditional state-centric appearance is not self-evident.

Held (1995) proposes a cosmopolitan democratic model. In reference to his vision of an authoritative assembly, he argues that the creation of this assembly is unavoidable.

It would be an institution of democratic nations, little by little getting other nations involved as well. Although the implementation of supranational law is difficult, the creation of this kind of an assembly would have significant normative implications. According to Held, democracy will in the future be likely to concentrate on the international or global domain. In his terms globalization is a dialectical process where local transformation matters as much as any other local transformation. (Ibid., 273-279) Held's theory offers good hints on what issues the world parliament should work on.

The cosmopolitan democratic model needs a political space. Forces, such as transnational movements, agencies and institutional initiatives are pursuing the establishment of that space. The movement under the umbrella of cosmopolitan democratic model strives for greater coordination and accountability of those forces that govern global resources and rule transnational public life. Held's model encompasses liberal virtues and other peacefully oriented views, such as the peaceful settlement of disputes, demilitarization, human rights, fundamental freedoms and rights, sustainable development and cultural reciprocity etc. The resources and capabilities that Held's model pursues are not at hand, it would be misleading to expect to gain them in a short period of time. Nevertheless, the commitment to a change is already a step forward, towards these benevolent goals. Held asks whether the cosmopolitan model is able to seize "the organizational resources – procedural, legal, institutional and military – to alter the dynamics of resource production and distribution, and of rule creation and enforcement, in the contemporary era[.]"(Ibid., 283) It does not possess these capabilities, but it does possess the mechanisms of democratic accountability which can help it access these capabilities. The strengthening of democratic rights and the commitment to develop regional and international court systems symbolize the effort towards an improved democratic field. Individuals could sue their governments for rights violations, giving power to the global level. Held argues that regional and global rules and procedures would aid to accomplish legitimacy not governed by states. Held notes that general grass root activism cannot alone solve the problems associated with global governance, since the grass root level is not organized in itself and there are multiple organizations opposing each other's views. (Ibid., 281-283)

Held's 'embedded utopianism' signifies that both – what is currently available and what might be – must be taken into account. One must begin with the existing paradigms and proceed to the ones that one desires from political institutions, forms, principles and processes. "[C]osmopolitan democracy (...) places at its centre the principle of autonomy. To argue for this theory is to locate the political theorist as advocate, seek-

ing to advance an interpretation of politics against countervailing positions. While advocacy is without guarantees, the very indeterminacy of this state of affairs creates the possibility of a new political understanding.” (Ibid., 283-286) By settling down to appreciate the prevailing, one caves in on the possibility for change and new forms of governance. In that case, current problems – conflicts, catastrophes and warfare – are continuing and the realist view on security will not be replaced by comprehensive security, emphasizing environmental, social and political issues as security challenges and rejecting security issues as solely ones between states.

2.2 Methodology of futures studies

Futures research is a broad field and there are multiple interpretations on what its inner core is. In this chapter the aim is to make general remarks about futures research and select the elements that best fit to describe scenario writing. To give a good start kick, consider Philip E. Tetlock’s (2005, 199) account of expert political judgment. The method of scenario writing will be handled in depth in the end of this chapter. Tetlock examines scenario experiment and the limits of open mindedness from a skeptic point of view. He notes that “scenario exercises are not cure-alls. (...) One might despair over the utility of the scenario method for improving probability judgments about possible futures but still hope the method will check biases in how people judge possible pasts. [S]cenario exercises can check hindsight bias and occasionally improve forecasting accuracy by stretching our conceptions of the possible. (...), it is easy to overdo it when we start imagining ‘possible worlds’. Taking too many scenarios too seriously ties us into self-contradictory knots. (...) Good judgment, then, is a precarious balancing act. We often learn we have gone too far in one direction only after it is too late to pull back. Executing this balancing act requires cognitive skills of a high order: the capacity to monitor our own thought processes for telltale signs of excessive closed- or open-mindedness and to strike a reflective equilibrium faithful to our conceptions of the norms of fair intellectual play.” (Ibid., 199-202 and 214-215) The importance to be aware of biases is important, also when proposing alternatives for the future.⁹

In their account on foresight methodology, Fuller & Loogma (2008, 71-72) adopt a social constructivist perspective to make conclusions about knowledge-creating activities. This is the basis for my thesis as well, to interpret futures research as a methodolo-

⁹ For an answer on the criticism posed for futurists, see Tony Stevenson (2008): *Imagining the future: Ideas for change*. In: *Futures*, Vol. 40, No. 10, pp. 915-918. For an insightful account of the ethics of futures thinking, see Turnbull, David (2010): *Rethinking moral futures*. In: *Futures*, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 149-153.

gy by implementing social constructivist tools. According to Fuller & Loogma, symbols are remarkable communication mechanisms when knowledge about futures is created. Symbols can be meaning, decisions, texts, images, objects and symbolic actions, but also trend lines, images, models, and the ubiquitous scenarios are the stock-in-trade of foresight activities. “Any foresight methodology, i.e. any attempt to validate the design of knowledge creation, should reflect the way that meaning emerges as thoughts and ideas, discourses and texts, anticipations and decisions, about the future.” (Ibid., 72) The main interest is to perceive how meaning is understood and how one acts on it. Whenever symbols are employed in reference to objects in the social world, symbols are constructed. Instead of the ontological reality, constructivism focuses on the constructed reality. Fuller & Loogma bind constructivism as part of the framework of symbolic interaction theory, which emphasizes the explanatory power of order and change in observations of everyday life and the interactions between persons. Processes of communication and interaction enable persons to make sense of their social world and to construct structures. The premise of symbolic interaction theory is that “the world is never experienced directly, but through the ideas that we hold about it, and that these are communicated through symbols. Such symbols are not representative of reality in the sense of direct correspondence; their meaning constitutes interpreted reality.” (Ibid.) This brings us back to statements discussed earlier on the power of interpretation.

As a conclusion, Fuller & Loogma (ibid., 78) state core elements of foresight methodology. To them, foresight is both the mechanism for social construction and social construction itself. The perspective adopted by foresight methodology should make claims to knowledge by explicitly taking account of the following ten features:


- 1) Construction of time within the context of the study at hand;
- 2) power manifest in representational choice;
- 3) performative power of symbolic representations;
- 4) mode by which domain knowledge is produced;
- 5) meaning generated by the community that engages, and what performative power such engagement has;
- 6) degree to which the production of meaning must be embedded in its constituency, in relation to the responsibility taken for subsequent actions;
- 7) performative power of social discourse and challenges to self and community identity;
- 8) dominant discourses and languages through which participation in the generation of knowledge actually occurs;
- 9) interaction between knowledge and action;
- 10) values that accompany the interpretation of meaning. (Ibid.)

Foresight and prediction are not parts of the same coin: foresight bases its core elements into observing the social life and making it into both a concept and a practice. It is something that the everyday practice calls a “hunch”, whereas prediction is envisaging the path the future will take. There is a big difference between a possibility and an ultimate option, like there is a difference between “might” and “will be”.

Futures research implies a variety of odd termini, like Black Swan, *here be dragons* or weak signs from which the last concept will be dealt with later in this chapter. Elahi (2010, 2) draws the attention to yet another concept, i.e. Post Normal Science (PNS). She characterizes the fiercely debated nature of PNS by high stakes, uncertain facts, disputed values and urgent decisions. With PNS the peer acceptance is low or non-existent. For the analysis of a world parliament, this is important since it clearly does not represent the goal of the majority of people, so with the establishment of a parliament on a global scale would pose changes of major multitude to the global citizens. Merryl Wyn Davies (2010, 9) continues on the same line by asking whether postnormal times are there already in the global age. She takes up the criticism of 'postnormal' being a West-centric concept as stated by others. Whether postnormalists outnumber others now or whether postnormal times are at hand is a matter of debate. What she emphasizes as being crucial is the agreement on the need for an ethical framework of values and virtues that can be employed to overcome human problems and construct alternative futures. Alternative futures imagination and creativity help to reach this high goal.

Hiltunen (2007, 256-257) distinguishes between two types of weak signs (or weak signals) in her article, namely early information and first symptoms. Early information means that the frequency of signals or the visibility of signals is small, while the number of events or issues is also small. There is a low correspondence level between the previous facts, so it is difficult to interpret the sign, therefore making the sign weak. This category includes new innovations or inventions. The second category is called first symptoms. The signals of the event are numerous and visible, but it is more difficult to interpret the sign. This could be an unaccustomed change in somebody's behavior. The change itself is recognizable, but for us it is not necessarily clear what it means for the future. Figure 1 shows the two different types of weak signs.

Figure 1. Two kinds of weak signs: first symptoms and early information.



Source: Hiltunen (2007, 257)

Then, what about the relationship between cause and effect in the context of scenario analysis? There has to be a connection between the conclusions made based on utopian proposals on how to form an institution that has not seen a day light in the human history. Wendell Bell (2004, 84) emphasizes causal knowledge and empirical fact. Although there is a factual context available here – the matter under which circumstances and in which form a world parliament can be established – the empirical side of the deal is more challenging. Later Bell (*ibid.*, 86) suggests that means also have consequences. He criticizes ethical theory for consequentialism where the focus is on the consequences or end states and the means simply function as instruments. Bell offers the advice for futures researchers on how to realize that means can embody many consequences. Such consequences can be weighted and ethically evaluated before any decision or action on them. “Deliberation can include whether or not we *ought* to use a particular means to achieve a specified end given the way in which it will affect our other desires or the well-being of other people. (...) The means-ends relationship, of course, may not be a simple one. For example, something may be pursued both as a means *and* as an end (...) There is, additionally, always the danger that a means may come to be regarded as ‘good-in-itself’ rather than simply as a means, (...). The causal relationship on which [the evaluation of ‘ought’ assertions] rests are subject to test and possible refutation against current scientific theory and data.” (*Ibid.*) Although this view is of importance for the methodology of futures studies, Bell comes to the conclusion that eventually the means-ends model fails to examine norms of society, desires and ends. Therefore, it is not an adequate method of moral reasoning. (*Ibid.*, 86-87)

To shed more light on what is happening in futures research in this context, let us consider ethical value judgments. In utopian thought, one begins with an hypothesis based on an ideal future and concludes with measures to be adopted in order for the future to be of the “X” sort, be it a world where only heavy metal music is allowed or where the human encounter happens through sign language, to name a few examples. The relationship between ethics and the future is self-analogous: in some form they always imply each other’s presence. The part of the ethical consideration of greatest relevance for scenario analysis that Bell mentions is ethical utilitarianism. He (*ibid.*, 96) depicts ethical theory seen with utilitarian glasses as a means of reaching the greatest happiness or good for the greatest number of people. Alternatives are measures against their future results is the basic idea behind “ethical utilitarianism”. Future is thus formed of the consequences adopted in the past.

The problem with this kind of ethical theory and normative value judgments is that interpretations are given great significance. Any consideration based on so-called “truths”, as in political or religious fundamentalism, is dangerous because the world within the future is interpreted for the whole human kind. It is important to remember WHO makes value judgments on the future and for WHAT purposes. WHY questions are usually the tricky ones, so it is necessary for the scenario writer to include passages in the scenario on why the utopian values depicted in it should be adopted. One should not be shocked by interpretations, since no matter individual conduct, humans always engage in interpreting events, also the future, and this is inescapable and should therefore not be doomed completely. In this sense future scenarios are in no traditional sense revolutionary. This is less important if the scenario is not based on a political program or party platform but considers broader lines, e.g. in the case of global democracy and challenges of globalization and the lack of current democratic institutions. Scientific scenarios answer to different questions than political propaganda, since the science-based scenario does not try to convince the reader of the desirability and good options of the scenario but of the feasible aspects. The future is not portrayed as the mystical unknown but as a realizable world with certain new and old elements. And, unlike the opportunities in science fiction, the future scenario must be feasible without the inclusion of supernatural, magical or secret powers of people. This goes without saying that the boundaries posed by reality make scientific scenarios less imaginative but the more interesting, since they could be feasible.

According to Bell (1997, 5-6 and 41), futures studies demystify the future and adopt systematic and rational methods by observing the real world. Futurists use creative and intuitive measures to make logical conclusions of the reality. These are the ideal values for conducting futures research. The counterpart of futuristic methods is divination, i.e. predicting. Bell also notices limits and conditions essential to some future scenarios. According to the “standard” model where a simulation is presented on the future, often no major changes are assumed. However, the same models might contingently overshoot and “predict” the collapse of the world system. Usually this concerns food production, industrial output and population growth. Bell (*ibid.*, 73-75) then goes on to analyze purposes of futures studies. In his account, futurists are interested in knowledge: what can or could be (the possible), what is likely to be (the probable), and what ought to be (the preferable) – thus futurists concentrate on exploring alternative futures. When assessing scenarios, all of these three elements should in the best possible way be present. As in the case of Wagar (1999) and other scenarios where major changes to ei-

ther for the better or worse take place, alternatives can also serve as warnings. Bell sees the purposes of futures studies in discovering or inventing, examining and evaluating, and proposing possible, probable and preferable futures. Bell binds the task of a futurist in a right, if not an obligation, to engage in the political and social order where futures research is enabled, within the limits of respecting human dignity and protecting the human rights of the subjects in question. That way the futurist becomes an element in the cycle of political processes by supporting freedom of speech, inquiry, and information. These are all elements of free societies, and Bell notes that in an Orwellian world governed by the Big Brother, ideology and lies, futures research would not be at all possible, probable or preferable. Bell lists nine major tasks of futures studies, and gives later key assumptions (underlying beliefs) and general assumptions (foundational beliefs) for studying futures. The major tasks as well as the key and general assumptions are found in Appendix 2 as a compiled summary on the core elements. Bell's account is lengthy, so attention is only paid to the main elements.

Bell (ibid, 129-139) gives an elaborative account of the time frame. Time is a necessary element when analyzing and writing scenarios and models. According to current standards, time is continuous (instead of being composed of discrete units), linear and unidirectional (instead of it being circular or cyclical). Although there may be cycles as part of nature, biology and human societies (refer to Kondratieff's cycles in the global economy), cycles are not a type of time. "They are changes in events, activities or processes that occur in or with or during time. They are repetitive temporal sequences of phenomena. The *identical* time is never lived over again and the same *identical* event never occurs again." (Ibid., 131) A third element of time is that it is irreversible, in the sense that it only has one direction and that is forward and not backward. Fourthly, Bell engages in considering two conceptions of time: the one being labeled as A-series (past-presence-future), the other as B-series (before-after). A-series was long considered the individual experience and definition of time (subjective), whereas B-series was objective and scientific. In the end, they are not two different kinds of time but simply two ways of viewing the same phenomenon. As the last concept of time, Bell mentions the "extended present". In the astronomical sense, time moves relentlessly on.

Clock time keeps ticking or pulsating away. Both invite a conception of the present that is only the briefest of moments, a knife-edge between the past and the future, between the last tick and the next tock. (...) Yet living beings – at least human beings – seldom actually experience the present as knife-edged. Rather, we tend to experience an 'extended present' that includes not only the knife-edge of the present, but also the immediate future and immediate past, some duration of time on either side of the passing moment as well. (Ibid., 139)

On scenarios as methods of futures studies, Bell (ibid., 316-317) states that scenarios can be born to life by using any and all of the specific methods in futures studies.

Here the interest is in qualitative scenarios that provide alternative images of the future for whole societies both globally and nationally. In the end, scenarios tell stories about alternative possibilities for the future and allow people to reflect on them and explore reactions by others. Futurists apply their creativity and imagination and make use of their personal experiences, knowledge and capacities for speculation. The “data” can be drawn from futurists’ reflections or personal observations, beliefs, and values, and the realization of historical changes. There are few limits for scenarios, so they can basically be a mixture of creative writing, science fiction and fantasy. The alternative in the scenario includes a possible version of the future and a probability under various conditions. What is evident is the account of desirability of the alternative, and a scenario may give implicit or explicit recommendations as far as present choices and actions are considered, or what ought to be done in order to anticipate certain outcomes. It may be a stunning image of a totally abominable vision of the future, a nightmare of such a dreadful magnitude that people will take actions to prevent it ever from happening.

Mika Mannermaa (1986, 20-24) refers to the first person to use the term “futurology”, Ossip K. Flechtheim, and the strong normative touch Flechtheim implied in futures studies. The purpose of futurology is to influence in the sense that a better future waits us in the end, a place where past problems have been solved. A good criterion to measure the goodness of futures research is to identify culmination points. Mannermaa (ibid., 42-48) reminds that there is not a general theory of futures, so the correlation between events is hypothetical. For him, scenarios are hypothetical chains of events that are constructed in order to pay attention to causal processes and end points. Mannermaa refers to Herman Kahn’s and Anthony J. Wiener’s study *The Year 2000* (1967). What is of interest is the categorization of scenarios. Scenarios can be divided into two groups, both including two sub groups. The two groups are projective and prospective scenarios, the former including tendency and frame scenarios, the latter normative and contrastive scenarios. Here attention is paid to prospective scenarios including the normative scenario. Prospective scenarios imply a desired state of future which is expressed through realizable goals. Most evident for normative scenarios is the aim to produce a picture of a possible and desired future, and the assumption is that from the very beginning one can anticipate the group of defined goals. Although the perspective is turned upside down, since the picture is taken from the future towards the presents, in this thesis the perspective is from the present to the future. This view makes the description of a world parliament more feasible and the single steps and processes can be elaborated on an easier scale.

Based on these considerations on futures studies, the analysis and the new scenario are formed. Bell provides essential information on the nature and assumptions of futures studies, and both he and Mannermaa give valuable comments on the inner core of scenarios and what they try to influence. Other accounts offer information concerning the bigger picture behind futures studies, or detailed information on some specific issues of futures studies. In the next chapter, concepts and termini will be elaborated.

2.3 Terminology

Terminology matters and it is essential to realize that concepts such as globalization, federalism, realism or multi-level democracy should not be taken for granted. Their meaning is based on the interpretation of individuals, groups and academic circles, and they are objects of a continuous debate. Liberalism, realism, critical theory and others are politically loaded and their message might be used for political or ideological purposes. The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the methodology and theory for the consideration of the world parliament problematique and the over-encompassing debate included in the consideration of world parliament, i.e. the future for states, the globalization debate and the form democracy could take in the future. The discussion is linked with the renewal of traditional bilateral forums, the ones states are traditionally used to cooperate on. To open up this further, it means that sovereignty can, in the light of developments with a possible world parliament, become questionable.

Constructivism was already referred to in the context of futures research. It can be regarded as structural idealism, as pictured by Alexander Wendt (1999). Since constructivists are interested in units, levels, structures and different agents, the structures and agents in this thesis are both individuals and nation-states. The world parliament cannot be evaluated without the input by national actors, since a parliament requires the consent given by actors with certain powers invested in the present day context. A scenario needs the discussion of the future for the state system. Wendt presents the “states systemic project”, where states form the units in opposition to non-state actors, such as individuals, citizens’ movements or multinational corporations. This is closely related to the systems theory, which generally regards that states do not exist in complete isolation from each other. However, the states systemic project regards that its objects can be studied autonomously from other units in world politics. Although the approaches are close, they imply contrasting information. (Wendt 1999, 7-14)

According to Wendt, constructivism assumes “that the structures of human association are primarily cultural rather than material phenomena, and against rationalism that

these structures not only regulate behavior but construct identities and interests. [In this approach] culture is a condition of possibility for power and interest explanations.” (Ibid., 193) The state system has been under the domination of realism, but one has to borne in mind that the states systemic theory is by definition not realist in the way world politics is being viewed. Wendt argues that states embody actors and can be represented as so-called people and that they possess anthropomorphic qualities, such as desires, beliefs and intentions. The states can be portrayed through four specific objectives. Firstly, states can be seen as bodies, reducible to its parts. Wendt regards this as problematic, since states imply a relationship to societies. Secondly, the objective gives states life, since it identifies motivations and national interest. Thirdly, states have identities (corporate, type, role and collective) and interests (objective and subjective). Fourthly, states have four needs, such as physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem. (Ibid., 194-198) Nonetheless, no matter how problematic the states systemic theory is, it still implies a realist vision of the relationship between states. This could be portrayed as an invented tradition in the realist vision, since the Westphalian statehood is not historically old and the nation-states are even younger. Nationalism can be categorized in a similar way, since it embodies invented parts that begin to develop with time when the traditions are passed to other generations. Valerie M. Hudson (2007, 31) offers a different view by stating that “(...) *it is impossible to explain or predict system change on the basis of system-level variables alone*”. Foreign policy analysis (FPA) complements traditional international relations theory by introducing an actor-specific perspective. The objective is to look below the nation-state level of analysis and pursue multi-causal explanations. The core lies in the decision-making process of leaders, individuals, attitudes, and contexts influence change in society. (Ibid., 30-32) Although Hudson looks at the nation-states and their inner events, her theory can on a larger scale be applied to the state system. There is always someone or some persons who influence decision-making, so the state itself is barely a social construction formed by individuals. During the previous centuries, the state has become an invented tradition and it has received personified characteristics.

In order to understand the nature of cosmopolitanism, one must examine the nature of the state system and especially sovereignty. Sovereignty is usually divided into internal and external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty aims to regard the state as the supreme concentration of political authority in a society. States can make final binding political decisions, which individuals, corporations or associations cannot make. This is seen as a right to act so, since other states recognize the state and give it the authority to

act on behalf of its citizens. The rights are based on a legal assumption rather than on political issues. Although popular sovereignty could eventually undermine state sovereignty, since the people have the right to revolt if the state acts are illegitimate. However, a democratic state still holds a *de facto* sovereignty because it is designed to enforce laws and decisions for the society. One important discussion around sovereignty involves the question whether sovereignty can be divided. The contemporary version holds that it can be disaggregated by functions, levels or issue areas. The Weberian tradition conceptualizes sovereignty as a property of a structure, even if it was property of state actors. Here the individuals and the bureaucracy make up the state, i.e. they form an organizational structure that is unified as a group. This makes the modern version of sovereignty difficult to locate, since it is not apparently structured in one location. (Wendt 1999, 206-208)

The external concept of sovereignty signifies the lack of any external authority above the state, such as other states or international law. As a summary, this is constitutional independence. However, international interdependence affects states as they become subjects of external constraints through their actions. “This creates a gap between their *right* to do what they want and their ability to *exercise* that right, but it does not mean that outsiders have ‘authority’ over states. Authority requires legitimacy, not mere influence or power.” (Ibid., 208) States that recognize each other do not tend to conquer each other, because the recognition implies a willingness to let other states enjoy their freedom of right. According to Wendt, sovereignty does not necessarily presume a society or system of states. Empirical statehood does not need *de jure* existence. “Recognition confers upon states certain powers in a society of states, but freedom from external authority *per se* does not presuppose it.” (Ibid., 209) The concept of sovereignty has changed during recent decades. Although globalization is not a fixed term, global issues, actions and transformations have affected the nature of state autonomy and sovereignty. The recognition of the sovereignty of another state does not guarantee good inter-state relations, neither can the role of individuals, the civil society nor multinational corporations be interpreted traditionally, as merely subjects to states.

The current concept of nation-state is rather weak, since it implies a national unity in a state. The states are more or less ethnically and nationally mixed, so nation-states are not relevant as terms. However, nation-states imply a level of thought that must be included here, because in a historical perspective the concept ‘nation-state’ is interesting and gives insight into the elaboration of sovereignty. In this thesis the concept of ‘state’

is referred to as an equal to the concept of ‘nation-state’; state is considered a general concept and no actual state is exemplified.

‘Reform’ refers to the enhancement of democratic processes by reducing heavy administration and increasing direct democracy in reference to the individuals. Reform is usually linked with a positive change. There is not one single definition of reform, since scenarios elaborate the term in differing ways. International democracy, on the other hand, is often regarded through negative lenses. This implies that sovereignty is viewed as an absolute and attempts to challenge it are seen as endangering a well preserved entity of states. It should nevertheless be borne in mind that it implies several positive features. The fact that I am examining the possible positive aspects of supranational institutions and questioning the role of states at the same time does not imply that there would not have been successes in the national democracies of states. But the approach here is not directed towards the states as members of the international community. National democracies work well in the present conditions, but there are parts of the process that deserve criticism. When individual freedom has been delimited, the actions have been mainly orchestrated by state governments. My perspective is between the need for individual justice and the state-centered interests, thus this thesis studies the difference of emphasis, importance and priority.

2.4 Conceptual changes in international and multi-level governance

How should the difference between international and multi-level governance be understood? International includes the reference in itself: it simply means between nations i.e. states. However, as Sørensen argues (2004, 59-60), international economy and technology increasingly influence states across national borders. States are traditionally regarded as possessors of sovereignty, their own freedom and the concept of non-interference in the internal matters of other individual states. Here, the term ‘international’ bears the significance of states as sovereign if also in close connection to other states. In contrast, multi-level governance is used in a broad sense: it signifies political, economic, non-governmental as well as governmental cooperation or connection between different individuals. Multi-level governance also encompasses cultural and societal actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) and citizens’ movements. The EU serves as an excellent example of multi-level governance. Debate concerning the strengthening of multi-level governance is often connected to the debate on the weakening of states, and this is intertwined with the goal of establishing a parliamentary assembly or a world parliament. The idea of a retreat of the state is of great relevance,

since it directly questions the role of states and concerns the possibility whether there should or could be a new global institution.

In reference to the theory of the shift from modern to postmodern statehood, Sørensen (2003, 11-14) examines the development of the people into citizens. The development had an impact on the transformation of regional entities into a modern state. Before the modern state, persons were subjects of various authorities, subjected to the feudal order or to the church. However, as the power and the authority began to concentrate on the King and his government, the persons became direct subjects. The transformation from subjects into citizens occurred gradually. The modern, also called the Westphalian state, came to its conclusion around 1950 in Western Europe and in Northern America. Predominant for the modern state were a centralized government, defined territory with a community of citizens and a national economy (see Table 1).

| Table 1. The modern state | |
|----------------------------------|--|
| Government | A centralized system of democratic rule, based on a set of administrative, policing and military organizations, sanctioned by a legal order, claiming a monopoly of the legitimate use of force, all within a defined territory. |
| Nationhood | A people within a territory making up a community of citizens (with political, social and economic rights) and a community of sentiment based on linguistic, cultural and historical bonds. Nationhood involves a high level of cohesion, binding nation and state together. |
| Economy | A segregated national economy, self-sustained in the sense that it comprises the main sectors needed for its reproduction. The major part of economic activity takes place at home. |

Source: Sørensen (2003, 14)

According to Sørensen, realists emphasize the great hegemony that could control the flow of events. Once the appropriate conditions are established, societal groups, individuals, organizations and corporations could join the effort. States would function as supervisors of the progress. For liberals, this view might show a strong inclination towards realism. However, what realists have not considered is that societies and markets also affect states. Economic globalization and the intensified interdependence between societal actors compel states to change. Deepened international cooperation signifies an increased role for international institutions, as anticipated by liberals. (Ibid., 170-171) We are not in a final phase of the state transformation. The transformative process is not finished and therefore we cannot be sure about the change and the form that the postmodern state will eventually take. The nature of state transformation and the eagerness of state actors to yield power is an important asset for a world parliament because a parliament with strong powers is still interdependent on the state system.

The postmodern state, on the other hand, is in progress, since it is not entirely clear what has replaced the modern state in the transformation period. The postmodern state is a summary of the changes that have been apparent during the decades following the

Second World War (see Table 2). The postmodern state portrays the government affected by multi-level governance on several levels – the supra-national, international, trans-governmental and transnational – while supra-national elements influence the nationhood and the economy is integrated into cross-border networks. (Ibid., 161-163)

| Table 2. The postmodern state | |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| Government | Multilevel governance in several interlocked arenas overlapping each other. Governance in context of supranational, international, transgovernmental and transnational relations. |
| Nationhood | Supranational elements in nationhood, both with respect to the ‘community of citizens’ and the ‘community of sentiment’. Collective loyalties increasingly projected away from the state. |
| Economy | ‘Deep integration’: major part of economic activity is embedded in cross-border networks. The ‘national’ economy is much less self-sustained than it used to be. |

Source: Sørensen (2003, 162)

2.4.1 Globalization and democracy

The semantic arbitrariness, as Holton (1998, 11-12) pictures it, can be bypassed by the way the concepts are constructed in reference to that with which they are contrasted. Sørensen’s (2003) definition of globalization is broad, including “the expansion and intensification of economic, political, social and cultural relations across borders. (...) The process of globalization is pushed by several factors, including economic, technological, political and social ones. Globalization is both a cause and a consequence.” (Ibid., 23) Sørensen sees a division into globalization believers and skeptics. The former believe that globalization already has changed the current world in economic and social aspects. Scholars who believe in the retreat of the state theory fall into this category. The latter regard globalization as nothing new, since it has progressed for decades. The state-centric scholars mainly belong to this group. (Ibid., 25)

Holton (1998, 80-84) asks whether economic globalization might make states outdated. This could be happening but the main interest is directed towards influence from non-market forces. Therefore, globalization should not only be seen in economic terms. Holton also poses the question whether the nation-state is finished. If national sovereignty has never been absolute and unconditional, then the influence of contemporary global processes on the undermining of national sovereignty must be dealt with care. “If absolute sovereignty never existed, what exactly about sovereignty is being undermined?” (Ibid., 84) Holton does agree, however, that this question does not eliminate the argument that globalization in fact has challenged national sovereignty. According to him (ibid., 85-107), globalization affects both state sovereignty and the nation inside state borders. The absolute sovereignty might have become a myth but globalization

might undermine the sovereignty of the state. Holton draws the conclusion that nation-states have not come to an end and that they still hold the strings of power monopoly within the politics of globalization. Therefore, globalism cannot be viewed only as an inter-state matter but as a game of multiple actors.

According to Held (1995, 16-17), traditional national democracy has been challenged by regional and global interconnectedness. The role of national political systems weakens as governments cannot exclusively determine their citizens' needs. Held argues that "quasi-regional or quasi-supranational organizations, such as the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) diminish the range of decisions open to given national 'majorities'." (Ibid., 17) The distribution of power is shared by several centers that each aim at determining the role of democracy and politics. Held accentuates that one has to look at the terms of power, authority and accountability in a new light – terms that are traditionally connected with the nation-state. States are a myth in a sense. Established states date back only to the 17th century when the Thirty Years' War came to an end and the Peace of Westphalia was signed in 1648. National constitutions that legitimized the power of the governments were not introduced until roughly the 18th century.

Held (1995, 272) asks how cosmopolitan democratic law is to be maintained. Those who participate in democratic processes should be the guardians of democratic law and several institutions could determine the outcome and processes of politics. Cosmopolitan democratic law should be enshrined by constitutions of national and international parliaments or assemblies. International courts play a great role in securing the rights of individuals, as they can influence governments when individual liberty is violated. This system could be summed up as a checks-and-balances rotation. The international courts would supervise the conduct and actions of separate governments and thus increase democracy. Held takes up the idea of establishing transnational legislative and executive powers in both regional and global spheres. He aims at creating regional parliaments and the enhancing the already existing ones, such as the European Parliament. He poses the possibility of having transnational referenda on contested issues in politics. (Ibid., 272-273) Held leaves the individual with a large degree of influence. To increase the supervision of national governments, he proposes the call for an authoritative assembly where all democratic states and agencies participate.

It is important how we conceive globalization. This thesis focuses on the non-economic aspects of globalization, the political and ideological globalization, if it exists at all. Despite this, economy and globalization cannot be completely separated. Scholte

(2003, 84-85) defines globalization through four concepts. It can be understood as internationalization, which refers to the growing interdependence between various people. Globalization can also be seen as liberalization, forwarded by the neoliberals. This is, however, redundant, since liberalized trade was typical for times before the globalization debate. The third concept is of globalization as universalization, referring mainly to cultural exchange. The fourth one is the picture of globalization as westernization in reference to post-colonial imperialism and homogenization. Hirst & Thompson (2003, 98-105) challenge economic globalization as a possible myth which has been put forward by the discussion on globalization itself. The internationalized economy currently at hand is not unprecedented. They argue that the economic system is less open and integrated than the system that existed from 1870 to 1914.

Hardt & Negri (2003, 116-117) state that along the economic aspects of globalization a global order has emerged, which they call a new structure of rule. This is a political-juridical matter that directly involves sovereignty. Empire, on the other hand, is a political subject that regulates global exchange and governs the world as a sovereign. Hardt & Negri do not share the argument that sovereignty would have become controlled by economic factors and would have declined. Some observers regard the political and economic elements of globalization as competing forces, the economy finally freeing itself from political control. They argue that sovereignty has reformed itself and formed a new global logic of rule, called the Empire. They specify that empire and imperialism are not synonyms. Imperialism is most often understood as European colonialism, whereas an Empire emerged at the end of modern sovereignty, in contrast to imperialism. "Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command." (Ibid., 117)

The dilemma still remains: who commands and who supervises the commands? Hardt & Negri participate in the discussion of the USA becoming an empire. Although in reality, the empire is often blood-stained, its purpose should be dedicated to perpetual and universal peace outside of history. Globalization is not a single object but a bundle of possibilities, multiple processes in need of reorganization. The forces responsible for sustaining the Empire are also capable of establishing a counter-Empire, an alternative with own political organizations and global exchanges. Hardt & Negri state that strug-

gles have been already present to construct a real alternative for Empire and the alternative might not be territorially limited either. (Ibid., 117-119)

Johan Galtung (2000, 143-145) calls the ongoing global projects with the term 'world-building'. This resembles the concepts of 'state-building' or 'nation-building' which global citizens are more familiar with. In the last few centuries, humankind has been involved in building democracy and human rights. The latter have bypassed the former state- or nation-building phases. "The introduction of democracy was also a clever effort to solidify coherence by adding consent – protecting the state construction with the argument that 'the majority is always right'." (Ibid., 144.) However, there are several problems with democracy in general and with global democracy. The democracy that single states make up does not sum up in global democracy. According to Galtung, the world system can still be described as feudal or hierarchic-anarchic because great powers posit excess military and political power. He argues that people should have invested in the nation-building project 200 or more years ago, before projects on human rights and democracy. If they had completed the former, the number of democracies would have been smaller compared to the current system. Galtung is pleased that this did not happen, but democracy and nation-building occurred in parallel, and that we now have a reality within clearly defined tasks. However, since the Second World War, both of the projects have been secondary compared to economic growth. (Ibid., 145) Galtung is mainly concerned with the development of the UN apparatus, but what is especially important, is the question of how to institutionalize global democracy.

Galtung's guidelines for the improvement of global democracy include proposals for the different levels of authority, the local, national and the international. He proposes a Second Assembly for people (UNPA) close to the General Assembly, a Third Assembly for corporations (a UNCA) and a Fourth Assembly for local authorities (a UNLAA). Galtung's UNPA would possess rights to enact laws, budgets and appointments. Only the UNPA would have decision-making power, whereas the Third and the Fourth Assemblies were mainly of consultative nature. Galtung also introduces a Fifth Assembly for NGO's (CONGO). He has provided a list with some answers for a potential non-territorial world citizen who would like to be admitted to a UN Assembly. (Ibid., 153-156) The list offers a practical solution for democratic deficit and the improvement of these deficits. It also draws the attention to issues that are important when thinking about democratic reforms and future scenarios.¹⁰

¹⁰ More on Galtung's reasoning in Kuper, Andrew (2004): *Democracy Beyond Borders*. Justice and Representation in Global Institutions. New York.

- 1) Is the organization internationally representative? Does it have members in sufficiently many countries distributed over a sufficient number of continents, preferably also across cultural and political as well as geographical, divides?
- 2) Is the organization sufficiently democratic? Is the leadership of the organization accountable to its members, and can it be changed through a process of election?
- 3) Is the organization concerned with basic human needs and rights? Or is the focus on the rather narrow interests of rather special groups?
- 4) Is the organization capable of reflecting world perspectives, rather than having a perspective which is only regional, or even national? And if so, is this reflected in the power distribution inside the organization (...)?
- 5) Does the organization have a certain permanence? Or is it rather ephemeral, something that easily withers away? (Ibid., 156-157)

Examining the points separately, they each favor certain target groups, be it multi-national states (point 1), democracies (point 2), addressing general human solidarity (point 3), focusing on world interests (point 4) and favoring permanence (point 5). Corporations should also join the effort of institutions to undergo a democratic process. As a word of warning, Galtung argues that if the states fail to notice the link between globalization and democracy, state sovereignty may be overtaken and passed by other systems. (Ibid., 157-159) The space of sovereign states has become avoidable while new spaces adopt their place. As an example, international economy is in some degree at odds with the modern state system. According to Murphy (1996, 107-108), social and environmental developments confront the economic system as incompetent to face the reality. He catches the attention to the challenges for the existing order that are manifested at different scales and in overlapping spaces. State nationalism has proliferated, making global challenges even more difficult. (Ibid., 110-111)

2.4.2 Sovereignty in a changing environment

As elaborated above, the definition of sovereignty implies a strong legal reference: indisputably, sovereignty is a major issue of international public law. According to Hensel (2004, 37-38), sovereignty has been seen as deriving from a god in the historical discourse. It has also been connected to the authority of the ruler exercising power over the subjects. The contemporary concept of sovereignty is referred to *de facto* and *de jure* elements of sovereignty. The main social scientific interest is the concept of sovereignty as a social construction.

Sovereignty, (...), is an inherently *social* concept. States' claims to sovereignty construct a social environment in which they can interact as an international society of states, while at the same time the mutual recognition of claims to sovereignty is an important element in the construction of states themselves. (Biersteker & Weber 1996, 1-2)

The social construction of sovereignty is important, since the theoretical background is based on social constructivism. As nationalism, also state and sovereignty are products

of a discourse, constantly subordinate to change and transformation. This concerns the role of state as identity and institution. (Ibid., 11)

Sørensen (2003, 112-116) examines the problem of sovereignty from multiple perspectives. Sovereignty is portrayed as a social construction on legal principles. It contains the rules that define political authority and set the context for relations between states. However, what happens to sovereignty as a consequence of the substantial changes in statehood? It is argued that constitutional independence will remain in place. However, at the level of regulative rules, meaning the rules by which actors actually play the sovereignty 'game', sovereignty has developed in new ways. It is misleading to talk about the end of sovereignty, but some change has occurred, especially in the EU. The regulative rules of the modern sovereignty game, non-intervention and reciprocity, have been reformed. This is evidenced in the context of supranational governance where systematic interference in the domestic affairs has taken place. The state appears to be challenged by many quarters, including global market forces, international institutions and popular movements. Sørensen argues that the institution of sovereignty has changed in postmodern statehood. Multi-level governance is quite the opposite of non-intervention – the traditional 'golden rule' of sovereignty – but a rather systematic intervention in national affairs by international or supranational institutions. States accept this because they get something in return, a measure of influence on the domestic affairs of other states. (Ibid., 114-121)

Susan Strange (1996, 197-199) binds the question of sovereignty together with the problems of global governance. She argues that global governance is lacking an opposition. Not a single non-state authority that has authority status is democratically governed. The corporate world consists of a hierarchy, not of a democracy. The cartels, insurance businesses and the mafias are not interested in democratizing effects. Strange calls for a force to check the "arbitrary or self-serving use of power" (Ibid., 198). Only world elections could initially take the role of a force of the alternative opposition. Although Strange's theory of the lacking opposition is of economic nature, its key ideas are relevant for the study of sovereignty. Besides being interested in the dispersion of power in the global economy, she also pays attention to the society in the need for an authority. The individuals, for whom the dispersion of authority might be unclear, have to bear the burden of what Strange calls Pinocchio's problem. It refers to the relationship between the individual and the state. "The strings that held each of us to the nation-state [are] like the strings that were attached to Pinocchio, making him the puppet of forces he could neither control nor influence. [When he magically turned into a real boy

at the end of the story], he had no strings to guide him. He had to make up his own mind what to do and whose authority to respect and whose to challenge and resist.” (Ibid., 198-199)

What Strange suggests is that we have to pose ourselves questions about global governance. Since the current world system consists of conflicting forces of authority, we are indeed facing Pinocchio’s problem. Where are the strings that are holding us together? Where do we place or locate allegiance, loyalty and identity? The allegiance is sometimes directed towards a government of a state and sometimes towards a social movement operating across territorial frontiers. Since the end of the Cold War, we are facing a system where a new absence of absolutes reigns. Our conscience is the only guide that can lead us. (Ibid.) Perhaps neo-medievalism can be a solution. This can be evident if cosmopolitanism proceeds on a concrete level and in what extent the campaign on the world parliament is executable. According to Strange (ibid.), typical for neo-medievalism is shared sovereignty, supranational or trans-local governance that gain ground as well as diversified regulatory organizations.

Global democracy, globalization, the formation and transformation of sovereignty, potentially arising Empires or counter-Empires, and legal paradigms are all part of the aggregate or the niche where a possible world parliament is to be fitted within. These abstract issues are all part of the same cake: by removing one slice the completeness of the whole cake is changed. For this reason, all of the above mentioned issues of world politics have been mentioned, although some are more relevant than others when considering a world parliament.

In the next chapter, the focus is turned towards case scenarios and models on a global institution. The models are various in their content, but they all acknowledge some forms of global representation, considering legal, institutional, political, democratic and sovereignty-related issues. After they are analyzed with methods from futures studies, a compiled scenario of my own will be established, based on the story line of the coming thirty years, the nature of a world parliament and its powers as a global actor. As a further supplement, Appendix 3 offers solutions on how to interpret and evaluate world parliament proposals. The purpose of Troy Davis’ solutions is to clarify the understanding of the proposals for the reader, and not to act as a guideline for the examination of the proposals as such.

3. Case analysis: models of a new global platform

3.1 General observations on the models

In this chapter, altogether 17 individual scenarios¹¹ from the time period 2003-2010 will be elaborated. Andreas Bummel and Joseph E. Schwartzberg have two individual models, and Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss have their individual scenarios and a combined one. The proposals of Bummel and Schwartzberg are included under one model for each, whereas Falk and Strauss employ 3 scenarios altogether. In the end of chapter 4.2, Table 4 presents a summary of the 17 proposals elaborated in chapter 4.1. The scenario in chapter 5, however, follows standards set by the theory and methodology of futures studies. In the analysis, attention is given to the following remarks:

- 1) The article's content and the feasibility aspect of the proposal.
- 2) The general need for a world parliament in the global arena.
- 3) The main initiators of change in the global arena and the world parliament.
- 4) Technical and realistic considerations on how to establish a world parliament.
- 5) The approach of the article and the methodology adopted by it.

In chapter 4.2, the feasibility of the content in reference to a potential or non-potential world parliament is evaluated. Overall attention is given to the political aspects of a world parliament instead of the global economic system.

The idea of cosmopolitanism existed before nationalism, dating back to ancient Greece, and cosmopolitanism found room in Kant's writings in the late 18th century (Fine 2007, IX). With the closure of the Cold War, the debate on the UN reform gained renewed ground, and when the UN celebrated its 50th anniversary in 1995, proposals were published. At the time of the anniversary, few theoretical debates had been started, as Bienen, Rittberger et al. (1996) state. Most of the proposals were detailed suggestions on the form of democracy in the UN. The latter half of the 1990's was interested in two versions of reform, the one emphasizing states and the other promoting individuals as the subjects of democracy. The 21st century has witnessed proposals made for a world parliament outside the UN context.

A few remarks on the sovereignty are also in order. Andreas Hasenclever et al. (1996) note that "[s]overeignty as an institutional concept is inextricably related to the

¹¹ The fact that precisely these 17 models were selected is based on the assumption of relevance and framing. Other models could have been included, but since the time and space of a Master's thesis is limited, only a certain number of scenarios could be included in the analysis. Originally, the material consisted of over 20 proposals. In the end, some of the excluded ones did not take any stand on global institutional considerations, or they were more generally discussing international organizations without including an analysis of a world parliament (WPA/WP), GPA, UNPA or other institutions. Some of the proposals were political pamphlets instead of academic articles, so they were excluded. The 17 models consider issues of global assembly and parliamentary proposals, or envision new forms of global democracy and the role of international law. The length of the models was not decisive but the content played a crucial role.

territorial and hierarchical organization of rule [*‘Herrschaft’* in Max Weber’s sense] in the modern state system. (...) Outside a state’s territory, and in its relations to other states, anarchy reigns.” Hasenclever et al. also contribute to the discussion on sovereignty by introducing the term ‘new medievalism’. By this they implicate that

[i]n such a system, units are so fragmented and so penetrated or dependent, the borders between the domestic and the international are so blurred, and authority-relations are so dehierarchized, that it is impossible to speak of ‘sovereignty’ in any empirically tangible sense. [This is] based, (...), on the observation that sovereign state authority is increasingly transferred to international organizations as well as to nongovernmental organizations and transnational corporations, (...). [I]t is viewed as the result of ‘globalization’, i.e. the fact that transnational, above all economic, actors are increasingly able to allocate significant values beyond the reach and control of state actors. (Ibid.)

The theory of new medievalism assumes that the liberal model loses significance in relation to globalization with the emancipation of the transnational civil society. Hasenclever et al. ask what model of international organization is best suited for the post-modern international system. In the medieval system, two so-called “world organizations” existed, the Holy Roman Empire and the Roman Catholic Church. Hasenclever et al. take a stand on the UN reform rather than on a world parliament. For them the UN projects are similar to the models of “Global Manager” and “Global Counsel”. The Empire was devoted to possess the highest secular power in the Western hemisphere and the Church declared to be the highest spiritual authority, both holding important political powers in their own time. The writers criticize the establishment of the UN as a Global Counsel; they envisage that this role presupposes a unitary world citizenship, which is hard to realize. (Ibid.) On the other hand, the current cosmopolitan debate revolves either around the UN context or the world parliament and often the discussion neglects each other. The KDUN distributed a proposal paper on the UNPA to hundreds of decision-makers in September 2004 with the aim of restarting the political discussion on the UNPA. During the spring and summer 2005, the Liberal International (LI) and the European Parliament showed their support for the UNPA. The LI strives for a consultative status with secondary semi-autonomous body according to the Article 22 of the UN Charter. The EP favors a UNPA with genuine rights and control mechanisms.

Table 3. List of models

| No. | Author/s | Title | Book/Journal/Publisher |
|-----|--|---|---|
| 1 | Falk, Richard & Strauss, Andrew (2003) | Toward Global Parliament | A Reader on Second Assembly & Parliamentary Proposals |
| 2 | Heinrich, Dieter (2003) | Extension of Democracy to the Global Level | A Reader on Second Assembly & Parliamentary Proposals |
| 3 | Laurenti, Jeffrey (2003) | An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come | A Reader on Second Assembly & Parliamentary Proposals |
| 4 | Levi, Lucio (2003) | Globalization, International Democracy and a World Parliament | A Reader on Second Assembly & Parliamentary Proposals |
| 5 | Roche, Douglas (2003) | The Case for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly | A Reader on Second Assembly & Parliamentary Proposals |

| | | | |
|----|---|--|--|
| 6 | Schwartzberg, Joseph E. (2003 and 2004) | Overcoming Practical Difficulties in Creating a World Parliamentary Assembly (WPA) <i>and</i> Revitalizing the United Nations | A Reader on Second Assembly & Parliamentary Proposals and other material |
| 7 | Bummel, Andreas (2010a and 2010b) | The composition of a Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations <i>and</i> Developing International Democracy – For a Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations | KDUN |
| 8 | Onesta, Gérard (2010) | From a European to a World Parliament | KDUN |
| 9 | Archibugi, Daniele (2007) | Can Democracy Be Exported? | Widener Law Review |
| 10 | Baxi, Upendra (2007) | Towards a General Assembly of Peoples: Notes for Conversation | Widener Law Review |
| 11 | Falk, Richard (2007) | What Comes After Westphalia: The Democratic Challenge | Widener Law Review |
| 12 | Franck, Thomas (2007) | Speech: One Man One Vote Or One Man One Goat: Reflections on Democracy in the Global Arena | Widener Law Review |
| 13 | Johansen, Robert C. (2007) | The E-Parliament: Global Governance to Serve the Human Interest | Widener Law Review |
| 14 | Kennedy, David (2007) | Speech: Assessing the Proposal for a Global Parliament: A Skeptics View | Widener Law Review |
| 15 | Patomäki, Heikki (2007) | Rethinking Global Parliament: Beyond the Indeterminacy of International Law | Widener Law Review |
| 16 | Strauss, Andrew (2007) | On the First Branch of Global Governance | Widener Law Review |
| 17 | Marchetti, Raffaele (2006) | Global Governance or World Federalism? A Cosmopolitan Dispute on Institutional Models | Global Society |

As was suggested earlier, the concept of model and scenario are contextually different. Less than half of the original 17 models can be labeled scenarios, whereas the rest are either mathematical or thematic models. Only scenarios can be referred to as feasible, although chapter 4.2 also considers the impact of the models as well.

3.2 Models for a new world order

3.2.1 Global democracy and governance

This chapter examines the models by Bummel, Falk & Strauss, and Archibugi. They illustrate both UNPA and WP related proposals. The perspective is directed from above, considering large scale issues rather than details. Therefore, global democracy and aspects of governance receive considerable attention.

According to Andreas Bummel, the world parliament is not realistic and could not be established in the present conditions. He is concerned that neither the UN nor any other global organization possess formal parliamentary bodies, not even with advisory capacity. Against this democratic deficiency, Bummel suggests the establishment of the UNPA. He is head of the German-based KDUN and an active member of the UNPA online campaign. (Bummel 2010a, 9-10) He calls for the inclusion of the world citizens into the UN activities. The UNPA would serve as a new quality with the stronger repre-

sentation of individuals in an international environment. As the first step, the UNPA could be established as a subsidiary body of the General Assembly or as a specialized agency. In this initial phase the UNPA would consist of national parliamentarians. “In later steps, the UNPA’s sphere of influence should be extended to the institutions of the UN system and the economic and financial institutions through a similar gradual affiliation. (...) the UNPA could finally be incorporated into the UN with the status as main body.” (Bummel 2010b, 16-17) The work of the UNPA would be formed through plenary, commission and party sessions and they would be held in open sessions, in close collaboration with the civil society and government representatives.

[T]he UNPA formally could be established underneath the threshold of Charter reform in two ways. The first option would be to establish it through a decision of the UN General Assembly under Article 22 of the UN Charter as semi-autonomous subsidiary body. (...) Option two would be to establish it as an independent specialized agency on the basis of an international treaty and a subsequent co-operation agreement on the mutual relations with the United Nations. (...) Article 57 of the Charter [is] not applicable since this rule affects a relation with the Economic and Social Council and therefore would imply undesirable thematic limitations. (Ibid., 23)

The establishment through an independent international treaty would demand a diplomatic conviction of the majority of countries. However, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been established through an independent international treaty, so this could also theoretically apply to the UNPA. The second option could also be achieved through the first option, resulting in a specialized agency, which would be easier than to directly form a new international institution. (Ibid.; see also Appendix 4)

In the second account, Bummel (2010a, 7-8) reconsiders his models on the UNPA. According to him, the way the international community responded to the global financial crisis and the failure of the UN Conference on Climate Change in December 2009 in Copenhagen showed that “the UN suffers from a sharp contrast between its large and small member states and that its current design is unable to offer a working solution to bridge this divide”. (Ibid., 9) He offers models A to D as solutions to the improvement of the UN system and the introduction of the UNPA as a representative intergovernmental body of autonomous delegates, not government diplomats. The delegates should be chosen from within and by political groups existing in national legislatures. An example is provided from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Bummel does not discard the possibility of direct elections, but rather sees them as the result of a later stage, when a transition has taken place. The delegates in a UNPA would be organized according to multifaceted political, national and regional groupings. If a country has no political groups, the UNPA delegates could be chosen by parliament directly. However, the independence of delegates should arise from their personal judgment and conscience. Governments should not be able to influence their decision-making and voting

powers. Problems arise from states without multi-party systems or weak legislatures. Some proponents have suggested even-sized electoral districts to a world parliament but Bummel considers this as not viable from a pragmatic point of view. (Ibid., 12-16)

It is recommended that the determination of the number of seats per country in a UNPA should be based on the principle of “degressive proportionality”, corresponding to the example of regional parliaments and parliamentary assemblies. [It] allows to achieve a reasonable balance between the principles of democratic representation on the one hand and of the equality of states on the other. (...) The models are all designed in a way that they do not exceed an upper limit of around 800 seats. One of the basic purposes of a UNPA is to reflect the political plurality of the population of the UN member states. In consideration of this, a minimum of two seats is allocated to every country, one to be selected by the majority, the other by the minority in parliament. (Ibid., 7)

In models (A) to (D), Bummel considers potential ways to allocate seats to countries. Model (A) illustrates proportional distribution, model (B) the square root formula, model (C) considers population, UN dues and sovereignty as developed by Joseph E. Schwartzberg (see chapter 3.2.3), and model (D) adopts the view by the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP) according to population, UN dues and sovereignty (1970). An important asset of the models concerning the distribution of seats is that an upper limit of the total number of seats must be considered, and that population size is an indispensable criterion. An interesting part of Bummel’s account is the international poll conducted in 15 countries on behalf of the BBC in 2007. The poll included the question “How likely would you be to support a Global Parliament, where votes are based on country population sizes and the global parliament is able to make binding policies?” According to the poll, only three states – Dubai, India and South Africa – showed high interest in the majority of responses. The overall picture however showed insufficient popular support. Important for all the four models is that a majority of delegates would come from countries classified by Freedom House foundation as “electoral democracy”. Interesting is here the difference to Falk and Strauss, as evidenced later in this chapter, in giving weighing measures also to non-democratic states. Bummel suggests that in the case of autocratic regimes with one-party systems, the delegates would act with the instructions gotten from their home governments. (Ibid., 21-24)

To give a closer idea of the four models Bummel (2010a, 25-31) analyzes, here a more indebt presentation of them. Model (A) calls for proportional distribution. It assumes that all UN member states participate and the number of delegates is fixed at 800, from which 384 seats are distributed on the principle of equality, meaning two for each country, while the remaining 416 seats are allocated according to the share in the world population. This model gives China, India, USA, Indonesia and Brazil 26.39 percent of the total amount of seats. In model (B), the Square Root Formula as devised from Lionel Penrose’s method (1946), the total number of seats is 732. The model is based on

the calculation that “it is possible to measure the probability that an individual vote or a bloc of votes changes the outcome of a decision that is made by majority rule” (ibid., 27). Model (B) adopts the same five countries with the largest shares of seats, but the total share of seats is lower than in model (A), 14.7 percent. Model (C) considers population, UN dues and sovereignty and it is based on Schwartzberg’s development. This model results in 800 seats in total, and the USA, and the members of the G8, G20 and the EU would receive the highest combined of seats compared to the other formulas. The five countries with the largest share of seats would be the USA, China, Japan, India and Germany, giving a more Western touch in comparison to models (A) and (B). The last model (D) considers same issues as model (C) but according to the CSOP. Here, the total number of seats would reach 675 seats, and the original ceiling of 25 members in the CSOP model would thus be abolished. Asian countries, China and India as well members of ASEAN would share the lowest number of seats compared with the other three models. The five largest share holders of the seats would account for 14.64 percent of seats (USA, China, Japan, India and Germany).

Next, Bummel (ibid., 32-40) considers the democratic character of the Assembly. When examining a UNPA, a fear arises that pseudo-parliamentarians would be selected to the assembly and take instructions by their democratically illegitimate governments. The question thus arises in what extent authoritarian governments could get a foothold of the UNPA, and whether they would be able to form a majority in the assembly. The problem is that there is no consensus on the measurement and definition of democracy. Bummel refers to the rating by Freedom House, the only source to include all UN members in its assessment. The criteria Freedom House employs include the following:

- 1) A competitive, multiparty political system;
- 2) Universal adult suffrage for all citizens (...);
- 3) Regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy, reasonable ballot security, and in the absence of massive voter fraud, and that yield results that are representative of the public will;
- 4) Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigning. (Ibid., 32-33)

Also, electoral democracy requires that the last presidential elections and/or last legislative elections must have been free and fair. According to the analysis by the Freedom House, 88 of the 192 UN member states are “free”, 57 “partly free” and 47 “not free”. As a further aspect, political groups within a state must come to a conclusion on how to distribute the country seats. After the initial first step of determining the number of seats for each country, a country must be broken down to the political level in the respective parliament. As an example, as of 2010, the US Democrats would according to model (A) receive 12 seats and the Republicans 9 seats of the total of 21 seats. According to

this reasoning, also regional parliaments and parliamentary assemblies at the national level could dispatch delegates. (Ibid., 33-37)

Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss (2003, 12) assume that there is a serious lack of direct democracy in a globalizing world. As Bummel is more interested in the form and the way the UNPA could eventually be established, Falk and Strauss are in the 2003 account of the opinion that only the cooperation between the civil society and the business world leads to a legitimate representative body. Because the authority of the assembly would be rooted in the global citizenry, “it could refute the claim that states are bound only by laws to which they give their consent”. (Ibid., 15) The assembly is seen as a protector of international norms and standards, since there is nowadays a lack in regard to reliable implementation mechanisms.

Because elected delegates would represent individuals and society instead of states, they would not have to vote along national lines. Coalitions would likely form on other bases, such as world-view, political orientation, and interests. (...) Some business leaders would certainly oppose a global parliament because it would broaden popular decision-making and likely press for transnational regulations. But others are coming to believe that the democratic deficit must be closed by some sort of stakeholder accommodation. (...) Many business leaders today (...) agree that democratization is necessary to make globalization politically acceptable throughout the world. (Ibid., 16-17)

But are the large corporations willing to approach the politically more acceptable world through civil society or rather with states, is another question. New diplomacy is also needed which means innovative collaboration between civil society and states. The Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court were positive successes in the 1990's and were results from a similar cooperation. (Ibid., 17-18)

Falk and Strauss assume that there is no need to establish the assembly through a formal treaty process. Governments might undermine the power of the establishment without any formal treaty. They trust on the power of the media which would question the opposition by the states. Another option is to base the assembly on a treaty. But also using the second option, the civil society would organize the negotiations around the establishment of an assembly and through a public relations campaign try to get the states to sign the treaty. The business sector would be included in the consultations in the organizing committee. Falk and Strauss place great confidence in the strength of individuals, since they are the forces persuading their governments to sign the treaty. As more states would sign the treaty, international pressure would help others to sign. The assembly would over time be incorporated into a constitutional framework. As the assembly gains more support, its formal powers would have to undergo a redefinition. The assembly could eventually be merged with the UNGA and therefore lead to a bicameral legislation system in the UN. (Ibid.) Accordingly, the signing process would gradually become customary law.

Because leaders can't lead if followers won't follow, the political character of societies are determined by how citizens collectively choose to condition their willingness to follow. (...) In order to function effectively, societies need to institutionalize the coordination of actions and no society has yet figured out how to do so without delegating at least limited decision-making powers. At the level of organizing global society, citizens on matters of common global interest have almost exclusively come to accept the obligation to follow the legal commands of national authorities as opposed to global authorities. (Strauss 2007, 347)

In his later account, Strauss (*ibid.*, 347-348) gives a more detailed account on how to establish a Global Parliamentary Assembly (GPA). The world society would be different if citizens had equal voting powers to decide on the selection of global authorities. Therefore, Strauss introduces the first branch of global governance, and by that he refers to a world parliament. He approaches the GPA with four models that all include one common denominator: that the GPA should be initially a largely advisory rather than a fully legislative body with binding powers. He reasons that "postponing the day in which the GPA will have significant legislative powers enhances its political viability because it encourages those who are presently powerful to focus more on the organization's abstract neutral benefits than on how it might negatively impact their short-term political interests". (*Ibid.*, 348) With time the GPA could evolve from its initial role as an advisory body into a "real" parliament. In the future, it could hold hearings and issue reports in cases of malfeasance by other international organizations, carry a moral weight and provide a political forum, be an intermediary between the representatives to work out legislative compromises. The parliament could eventually become a global authority, and gradually its powers could be increased by its elected representatives. Under the present conditions, there is no global institution having the world's citizenry as its constituency. The UN is an organization for the society of states. The present international system misses a large component of effective governance. One idea is for the GPA to take a central role between the citizens and the various international organizations. The biggest challenge, however, is the fact that even a body with an advisory role is difficult to establish under current conditions. (*Ibid.*, 349-350)

Strauss (*ibid.*, 350-354) presents four models on how to approach the GPA. The first model (A) concerns the amendment of the UN Charter articles 108 and 109. This is the classical road to form a GPA. The process at the UN level to reform its bodies has shown that the road is rocky. The 2005 reform attempts were not successful, and none of them included the requirement to amend the UN Charter. To convince two-thirds of the UN membership of the need to amend the Charter is not easy, and ratification of the amendment is even more challenging, not to mention the securing of affirmative votes by the reluctant veto-holding powers in the Security Council. Still, as Strauss concludes, this model can be seen as the most legitimate. The second model (B) would create the

GPA as a subsidiary organ by the UNGA according to article 22 of the UN Charter. The article empowers the UNGA to establish a subsidiary organ when deemed necessary to perform its vital functions. This approach is supported by the KDUN. Although this approach might provide a roundabout way around the UN Charter amendment process, political difficulties still remain. A parliament could exceed the wording of a subsidiary organ and also the legal questionability of calling a parliament necessary to perform functions of the UNGA.

The International Court of Justice has announced that the UNGA cannot “delegate powers to a subsidiary organ that it does not itself possess or are not implied as consistent with the overall structure of the Charter. Since the General Assembly does not have the power to represent directly the citizens of the world, and the United Nations is structured under the Charter as an interstate organization, opponents of the project could challenge the General Assembly’s powers to create a parliament.” (Ibid., 352) The KDUN suggests that the parliamentary assembly would be composed of representatives of national parliaments with direct popular elections in the future, and that all UN members could send their representatives to the parliament no matter their democratic or undemocratic origins. According to Strauss, the idea by the example of the EP bears dangers: if national parliamentarians begin as the actors in the initial parliament, eventually they could feel as owners of the parliament and be reluctant to shift the parliament towards directly and independently elected representatives. Without the popular elections and thereby given legitimate powers to the parliament, the body would be hardly taken seriously or noted at all. If each UN member state was able to send their representatives to the parliament, it would undermine the credibility of a well-functioning democratic organization as an alternative to authoritarianism. (Ibid., 350-354)

Model (C) composes of the civil society organizing elections, meaning that actors from international civil society establish a provisional structure for the parliament and organize as well as carry out elections. In the beginning, the parliament would claim an unofficial body and the popular mandate would empower it. To initiate the establishment process, a panel of prominent political and moral figures, former heads of state, Nobel Peace Prize winners and other figures could be formed. In their final conference, the panel could adopt a more political role needed for the establishment of the parliament. The civil society would organize elections in all countries where free campaigning is allowed and where elections are not banned and political conditions are favorable. This model implies serious political, logistical and financial (esp. funding issues) implementing challenging. It is the model that Strauss and Falk originally favored. There

are no pre-existing structures for a collective decision-making infrastructure concerning civil society. The project would be politically more manageable if existing political parties participated along the civil society actors. (Ibid., 354-358)

The fourth model (D) implies an interstate stand-alone treaty process between willing pioneers, i.e. internationally progressive states. Strauss states that even twenty to thirty economically and geographically different countries could establish a world parliament. These countries would agree on the voting system and the electoral districts, and most of all form a legal structure for the parliament. The parliament could later be expended by countries willing to meet the standards and obligations set by the then parliament. The most important aspect would be that citizens are allowed to vote representatives to the parliament in free and fair elections. Strauss claims that a parliament established along a stand-alone treaty where the membership base is not the one of the UN might not be the most novel one. The parliament could cooperate with the UN by entering into a relationship agreement with the world organization. In this sense, Strauss sees the GPA as a parliament strengthening and not replacing the UN. Given time and space, the GPA could in cooperation with the UNGA evolve into a truly bicameral legislative system capable of producing binding legislation. Model (D) is the most promising of the four models Strauss presents. He sees that those countries that truly support a GPA would form a democratically best suitable parliament. Later, the GPA could put pressure on countries that could no longer withhold the right of their citizens to vote in the globally elected parliament. At that point, these countries could not be in a position to compromise the integrity of the GPA, and would join the body according to its own democratic standards.¹² (Ibid.)

Falk (2007, 243-244) complements Strauss with a more theoretical and background-defining method. He gives the face to the ongoing global problems and the difficulty of establishing a true global governance structure, namely a global people's assembly. According to him, the concept of "world government" is associated with the movement striving for "world federalism", often interpreted as utopian or a way to reach global tyranny. Global governance is seen softer, at the interface between realism and liberalism, and tightly based on the Westphalian world order emphasizing sovereign states. There is need for a normative framework because practical issues demand to be solved – climate change, polar melting, deforestation, transnational crime, international business cooperation, and economic globalization. As the actual models of GPA are covered by Strauss in the same issue of *Widener Law Review*, Falk concludes his article by recom-

¹² Refer to the EU enlargement procedure.

mending thorough education of citizens. This implies educating the youth to learn about an engaged citizenship in the 21st century, and including pedagogy of peace and human security as part of the school systems. “The essence of global democracy involves a shift in expectations from a geopolitics of force to a geopolitics of dialogue and persuasion. (...) Hope begins when we have the moral courage to transcend what seems possible by what seems necessary and desirable. [T]he changing parameters of debate on climate change, facing that ‘inconvenient truth,’ [sic!] is an encouraging sign of an emerging receptivity to an acceptance of constraints on behavior for the sake of a humane future.” (Ibid., 253)

Daniele Archibugi (2007, 283 and 289-294) approaches the world parliament debate from a unique perspective. His article does not offer a scenario, but poses questions for consideration. Many powerful political systems, be it Catholic, Protestant, Monarchic, Republican, Communist or Fascist regimes have tried to impose their system upon the one of others and this has caused problems. He compares exporting democracy with the establishment of a world parliament. Exporting democracy was an American dream, he summarizes, and the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq serve as good examples of democracy exportation. “The error embedded in the crazed desire to export democracy concerns only the means, not the ends. If the ends are legitimate, what then are the instruments that democratic states should utilize?” (Ibid., 289) Both the export of democracy and the idea of a world parliament imply the increasing of the level of democracy on Earth. Democracy export assumes that the ends compose of cooperation, peace, and ultimately democratic values, however, the system lacks the commitment to apply the norms and values of democracy at the global level. Those deciding on what is democratic are prepared to resort to apply means in conflict with the very democratic values and procedures in question. Governments use power and have the means to resort to military powers. “The proposal of a world parliament (...) assumes that a new institution directly representing the citizens of the world will also act as an instrument to achieve democratization inside those countries that are not yet democratic. The main factor here at stake is persuasion. [T]he life of a World Parliament will not be dependent on the founding governments, but rather on their own people.” (Ibid., 293) However, the establishment of a world parliament may best serve in the aftermath of the Iraqi war when democracy is defended and renovated through persuasion and dialogue.

3.2.2 Federalist perspectives

This chapter examines the models by Levi, Onesta and Marchetti. Lucio Levi (2003, 54-55), a member of the Executive Committee of the World Federalist Movement (WFM) and the Federal Committee of the Union of European Federalists, states that globalization has been mainly viewed in its economic aspects but the political dimension of globalization has been neglected. According to Levi, the border between civil society and state has shifted.

Here lies [with the gaining in power of NGO's, multinational corporations, criminal or terrorist organizations] the root of decline of the sovereign state that will be overcome only through the establishment of new forms of statehood at the world level. (...) The response of governments to globalization has been to pursue international cooperation, not because it is their inclination, but because they have no other choice. (...) It is a formula that hides the illusion that a solution to the main international issues can be based on mutual consent among sovereign states. Federalism is the antithesis of the international approach. Its strength lies in the alternative goals of world government and international democracy. However distant and though they can be pursued gradually, these goals are the answer to the need to control globalization and to start the process of establishing peace among nations through law. (Ibid., 55-56)

Levi states that the reform of the UN can only be achieved gradually as a long-term goal. However, the goal to reform the UN is not a goal in the far distance but an applicable one. Of all the states in the world, over half have adopted a democratic system. But democracy alone is not strong enough to prevent the authoritarian regimes to retard the process of democratization. Levi uses the EP as an elaborate testing field of international democracy. Nonetheless, not only authoritarian governments can hinder the development of subjugating globalization under democratic control, but also the USA will not have its power being undermined by international organizations and civil society. The fact that a government is democratic is not necessary sufficient as the example of the USA illustrates. Levi calls for a center of power to oppose the American resistance for a worldwide change. The European unification and integration serves as a center of power. The Europeans have overcome the nation-state and can take over some of world responsibilities that the USA has thus far wielded. As Europe itself has to speak with one voice, it has to form a federalist form of governance inside Europe. After the adoption of federalism in its own continent, Europe could widen the process over to other regions and at world level, including global organizations. Levi's footing is in the UN representing the world citizens, not the states. (Ibid., 56-61) He asks whether the UNPA is still an adequate form of governance in the globalizing world. He exemplifies the direct elections of parliamentarians to the EP as a campaign headed by the European federalists. Since globalization removes the borders between national and international politics, the UNPA could be insufficient in responding to the demands of international de-

mocracy. The UNPA has centered on the parliamentarians which does not count to mobilizing the world citizens and is in conflict with the current actions of civil society.

Green MEP and federalist Gérard Onesta (2010, 33-35) gives the example of the European Parliament in overcoming challenges during intergovernmental systems. He refers to the UNPA project as the solution to the diplomatic stalemate at the UN level. The UNPA could follow the example of the EP in a proportional representation: this would balance the political and demographic weight of each country and the amount of seats in the assembly. Initially, the UNPA would be established according to the same chronological order as the EP was formed, by giving it first indirect powers. The UNPA would be formed by national delegates (parliamentarians) and eventually lead to direct universal suffrage, which changed the course of the EP in 1979 when it was granted EC wide suffrage.

Our political and social conceptions are Ptolemaic. The world in which we live is Copernican. (Marchetti 2006, 287; originally quoted in Reves, Emery [1947]: *Anatomy of Peace*. Harmondsworth, p. 37)

Raffaele Marchetti begins with a quote from the federalist Reves that gives a good overview of the idea to consider large-scale changes in the still somewhat Westphalian world order. Marchetti participates in the debate by defending cosmo-federalism based on the freedom of choice, the principle of justice for individuals and he is devastated by the lack of effective citizen participation at the global level. According to him, the most optimal choice is decentralization to increase opportunity and centralization to avoid exclusion. He presents two models of democracy, cosmopolitan democracy and cosmo-federalism. There is a deep gap between the rulers and the ruled: the ruled citizens cannot exercise their freedom of democratic rights and freedom of choice in global institutions. The first model, cosmopolitan governance, is a temporary project that lacks long-term plans. It implies a multi-level, decentralized and complicated governance structure with manifold centers where states possess relatively high powers. Marchetti takes up the example of the UN reform. An additional chamber of the UNGA would only have consultative status and restricted representation. The chamber would be formed by a regional voting system. What is striking is that any kind of UN reform would inevitably fail in terms of political inclusion. Only those actors that are relevant for a problem at hand are allowed to vote, and this does not decrease exclusion. Many states would be automatically excluded from the center of attention, and the individual participation is almost absent. Since many states are not democratic in the first place, large shares of the population would feel excluded. (Ibid., 287-299)

The second model of cosmo-federalist principles has a background in the UN reform aiming at a federal system. “While a major concern for many federalists was peace, the primary concern for the present version of cosmopolitanism is the maximisation of social well-being. As this is determined to be attainable only through the enhancement of individual choice possibilities, it is necessary to obtain the political empowerment to enable political agents to self-legislate on all aspects of their lives.” (Ibid., 299) This model assumes a central power and federative communities based on the double loyalty and the principle of subsidiarity. Marchetti considers both the feasibility and desirability aspects of cosmo-federalism. Feasibility is linked to global threats that threaten common interests. This considers mainly technical issues and practical difficulties. In aspiring justice one has to bargain with efficiency. Considering the desirability aspect, there is a fear that a global government would lead to homogeneity or even tyranny. In this model, the principle of universal suffrage would apply, and a federalist global institution would tackle global issues, without the states withering away. International law would be overriding, so in this sense the states would give part of their jurisdiction to a global institution. However, states would only have to accept those decisions made according to majority voting. Individuals would gain double citizenship – the national and the cosmopolitan. Human rights would become legally binding, and those committed of global crime would be held responsible for their acts. In order for this model to function, a global charter would be needed so that the global body would have jurisdiction. Eventually, the model aims at establishing a world government. The voting share would be based on “a universal democratic voting system, according to which the national representatives’ quotas are measured according to a function made up of diverse elements including population, state recognition (in order to safeguard small countries), and proportionate and actual financial contribution to the UN system”. (Ibid., 303) Also this model sees the non-democratic states put under pressure to adopt more democratic measures. At the point when states have adopted democratic voting procedures at the domestic level, can democratic elections be called for an assembly with the task of reforming the UN Charter. Marchetti does not exclude the fact that the initial actors in the assembly would only be democratic states. (Ibid., 299-305)

3.2.3 Pragmatic reform proposals

This chapter examines the scenarios by Heinrich, Schwartzberg, Patomäki and Johansen. According to Dieter Heinrich (2003, 71-73), the UNPA serves as a symbol of a new world order in the future. The citizens of the world cannot be excluded from the

reform of the UN. The UNPA would be representing the world community of individuals sharing similar expectations and interests. This is foremost a moral duty to cover the problems of the present day. Individuals free from governmental control would issue questions from a global perspective, free from *raison d'état*. The UNPA could be formed by former parliamentarians, able to cope among other things with political and social issues. An important element is the economic point of view: the UN parliamentarians would receive their salaries directly from the UN. Heinrich is the first to mention this kind of an asset, since financial issues are relevant, also in the case of the UNPA. The selection of representatives would most equally happen through secret ballot, thus preventing the domination of a single party. Another question concerns the participation of representatives from non-democratic states. These could either be excluded or included in the participation of the UNPA work. If the UNPA was of consultative nature, a large number of representatives would not serve further purposes. But non-democratic states could be under collegian persuasion and this way the democratic states could contribute to the democratic development in other countries.

Heinrich states that the UNPA with consultative status would not possess formal powers but its existence would have a moral influence on states similar to today's General Assembly resolutions. Heinrich also discusses the composition of UNPA members. It would be, at least in the beginning, unwise to divide the amount of representatives by the share of population because then the population-wise largest non-democratic states would gain disproportionate power (20% of the total representative forces). "Alternatively members could be apportioned on a sliding scale with ever larger increments of population needed for each additional representative from a state. The smallest countries might have one, the largest 10 to 20." (Ibid., 73) Heinrich concludes that the creation of the UNPA would eventually save governments' financial resources seen as a moral global investment and help to solve problems in advance. (Ibid.)

Joseph E. Schwartzberg (2003, 81-84) continues with similar interest points as Heinrich. Schwartzberg uses the term World Parliamentary Assembly (WPA) instead of the UNPA. He examines several assumptions on how to proceed towards a UNPA. These include areas to be represented, number of chambers (including a list of states given specific shares of representation), population size and territorial extent of constituencies as well as the size of assembly and population per representative. Schwartzberg emphasizes the importance of creating a professional Election Commission (EC) in the UN to supervise the election of representatives impartially and to establish rules of fairness for the candidates. The EC would possess the authority to determine how fair the election

of candidates is and it could nullify or reschedule dishonest elections. In order to establish a truly global assembly, certain requirements are needed:

- a) At least 20 nations must agree to the conditions established for the WPA and provide credible evidence of their ability to fulfill those conditions.
- b) Nations from at least four (or, arguably, five) continents must be included.
- c) The participating nations must account for at least 15% of the world's population.
- d) The participating nations must account for at least 15% of the UN's budget. (Ibid., 88)

The pressure arising from the WPA could account for the spread of interest in its activities. Schwartzberg raises the question in what extent the WPA should be granted powers. Opinions vary from ones emphasizing the influence of the WPA as a forum for expressing popular sentiments to ones discussing possible legislative powers and advisory status holder. (Ibid., 88-89) When looking at the representative suggestions presented under (a) to (d), the WPA might lose its significance if the numbers and percentages are to be taken by the minimum. Schwartzberg acknowledges that the goal to achieve the WPA is not easy but worth striving for. However, he does not account for the fact how the WPA is eventually achieved and how the endorsement is maintained. He is examining the facts after the approval of the WPA has been announced and studying the reasons for the measures and questions concerning representative issues. Although he states (ibid., 89) that many other proposals ignore practical issues concerning the ways and forms of a WPA, he does not present any solutions either. Perhaps he thinks that it is not even the purpose, since the proposals' main task is to vitalize the discussion on the WPA/UNPA and thereby strive for popular support.

In his mathematical model, Schwartzberg offers (2004, VII-VIII) the following formula to calculate the seats each country gets allocated in the UNGA: $WV = (P + C + M)/3^{13}$. According to him, an empowered UNGA would have several benefits. It would function as an incentive for countries to pay their assessed dues, result in a rough balance between the power of the world's major economic blocs, the OECD and the so-called "Group of 77", necessitating creative bargaining and compromise between the two groups, and substantially increase the voting strength of the relatively free nations.

[I]f you start from the premise of possessive individualism, you end up arguing from a supranational basis; and if you start with supranationalism, you end up recognizing the implications of possessive individualism; i.e. actual state practices. (Patomäki 2007, 384)

Heikki Patomäki (ibid., 375-380) conceptualizes his thoughts about the world parliament with as much enthusiasm as Falk & Strauss and Bummel and, in comparison to the

¹³ **WV** here represents a nation's weighted vote, the average of; **P**, its percentage share of the total population of all UN members; **C**, its financial contribution as a percentage of the total UN budget; and **M**, its share of the total UN membership (i.e., 1/191, or 0.524%). This formula embodies three fundamental principles: democratic/demographic, economic, and legal (the sovereign equality of nations).

most proposals, with sufficient amount of detailed information. Patomäki underlines the importance to establish a global system of realistic and feasible strategies for the further democratization of the globe. This means offering realistic accounts both in the short and long run, and one has to find a balance between a gradual process and the process as an end itself. What is lacking at the moment on the global level are the social conditions that would enable large scale reforms. According to Patomäki, this specifically applies to those considerations that in the end desire global federalism or a centralized world state, and proposals that grant a world parliament real powers. He stresses that in the present conditions, the most important task is to enable those conditions “for a pluralist and global security community. (...) The building of a security community is a long and complicated process of institutionalization of mutual acceptance, and trust, procedures and practices of peaceful change. [A]n effectively functional world parliament would also enable peaceful conflict transformations and changes.” (Ibid., 377) A solution to test the lack of social conditions is to organize a global proto-referendum. In his account, Patomäki sees a world parliament as a solution to the deep problem of international law in its indeterminacy. The UN system and in particular the Bretton Woods institutions are almost impossible to democratize. WTO on the other hand offers a more fruitful organization for reform, since the body is based on the one country/one vote principle. But, as the WTO deals with a limited scope of global affairs, i.e. with trade issues, it will not be given further attention here.

Patomäki (ibid., 381-387) introduces a third way to deal with the world parliament discourse. In the longer run, the world parliament could function as a coordinating body with globally elected representatives in an assembly, with limited and relational powers. It would be relative in the sense that the assembly could offer selective opportunities for its members, meaning that not every rule or principle should be followed by each and everyone. The most realistic way to reach a world parliament is to make use of spill-over effects: gradually the boundaries of sovereign territorial states could be overcome. “Logically, what would emerge is a non-centralized, non-territorial and non-exclusive system of complex global governance with manifold treaties, rules of law, and sets of regulations. To an extent, this is the situation already. The problem is that these laws and regulations may be not only overlapping but also mutually (or in themselves) contradictory and thus indeterminate in various ways.” (Ibid., 383) After considering global democracy in *A Possible World: Democratic Transformation of Global Institutions* (2004) together with Teivo Teivainen, Patomäki comes to the conclusion that a strategy of global democratization must be put on the agenda for very essential matters.

On the practical essence of a world parliament, Patomäki (*ibid.*, 387-393) argues that direct global elections would give the legitimization to the body, but the parliament should not be conceived as a world's Supreme Court because its essential role would be to act according to the will-formation of citizens and not as the highest possible legal expert. However, the parliament would not be able to function as part of a centralized world state, and it could not have the powers or the machinery to enforce issues on its agenda. Instead, a world parliament would establish itself as a public opinion of the world community.

Something, or somebody, should ensure that the first set of interpretative constraints – legal materials – remains essential to the formation of democratic and legitimate public opinion in the world parliament. One possibility is a world parliament of two chambers, with the second chamber given limited veto powers, following well-specified procedures. Whereas the first chamber would be a directly elected body of citizens' representatives, the small second chamber could consist of legal experts who would determine whether the decisions of the first chamber are reasonably based on the existing body of law (...). The second chamber may be nominated by (i) states, (ii) existing international courts and (iii) law schools of various universities representing different parts of the world. (*Ibid.*, 387-388)

By being established in this manner, the parliament would avoid clinging to the problems and risks of world federalism. The lawmaking infrastructure would remain in the hands of sovereign states, but gradually other actors, such as national parliamentarians and civil society organizations, could be included in the machinery of the parliament. With time, the new organization could merge with the UN and evolve into a world organization replacing the UN system. Another version of the world parliament is to establish it by like-minded states, like the International Criminal Court (ICC) was formed in the 1990's. Still, a truly global parliament is the ultimate goal of the project. Although the parliament would not be a sovereign legislative body, it would still possess real powers through the principle of majority voting. The second chamber would check if the decisions made by the first chamber fit into the frame of legal reasonability. One important challenge remains, however, namely the definition of the procedure of taking cases to the world parliament. "Some kind of principle of subsidiary is probably needed: whenever law can be reasonably determined elsewhere, the world parliament should not be involved. [T]he world parliament should also have the right to initiate a process of scrutinizing legal rules, principles, priorities and applications. [To avoid too often changing legal interpretations and uncertainty], [o]ne possibility is to develop rules and principles to limit how often a case can be opened. The terms of office of the world parliament could also be made relatively long, from six to eight years." (*Ibid.*, 389) Another essential element of the world parliament is to not confine its duties or powers only to legal disputes. The parliament could coordinate global economic policies and different functional organizations. Funding and revenue resources must be given appropriate

space, since it is not inexpensive to establish large scale global bodies. Patomäki recommends among other things following mechanisms for collecting revenue for the parliament: global taxes (such as the currency transactions tax, CTT) including pollution taxes, arms sales tax, travel tax, proceeds from mining the seabed, and a fractional tax on the day's telecommunications. On the other hand, other sources of revenue could be formed from world lottery, a percentage of proceeds earned through national lotteries, a credit card under the control of the world parliament, and a dedication to a special fund of the proceeds from one day's sale of stamps by the world's post offices every year. The funding should remain independent. (Ibid., 388-393)

Patomäki is worried about the role the parliament may adopt in the eyes of the global public. It should overcome the challenge faced by the EP that is not exciting enough as a political body to keep the Europeans on track of its whereabouts. Another tough challenge is to decide on the global voting districts. He does not recommend strictly proportional districts, since individuals are drawn to different identity groups and boundaries, therefore the districts may need to imply compromises. Thus, identity could be a better common denominator than territorial location. Patomäki suggests that the process towards a world parliament should remain most of all experimental and evolutionary. A world state is not desirable. A gradual process brings the best outcome, so the workings and potential reform ideas can be better understood and implemented with a reformed version of the parliament. (Ibid., 390-393)

According to Robert C. Johansen (2007, 320-325), democracy at the national level is inadequate, but the global level suffers from democracy deficit. The UN reaches the closest point of organizing an arena for the global interest but it often faces dogmatic resistance by governments. Next to the democratic deficit lies the action deficit. "Major decisions are urgently needed to address global problems, such as reliable rules to govern weapons of mass destruction, to deter terrorism and crimes against humanity, and to protect the atmosphere against greenhouse gases before more time and opportunities slip away." (Ibid., 322-323) The action deficit is eminent for the international system built to sustain the Westphalian system. These deficits are only a few, Johansen also names a chronic resource deficit, due to which emergency response e.g. to end hunger, reduce poverty, provide education for children, environmental protection, UN financing and challenges with the peace-keeping system are not met. The global arena seldom meets the promises given in the rhetoric, so the globe also suffers from a vision deficit, a poverty of moral imagination. Johansen states that self-governance in nation-states no longer helps to solve matters of life and death. Therefore, individuals must press for a

more complex global manifestation of democracy, or they will face the degeneration of global democracy. What Johansen suggests is for citizens to grasp the leading role in the development of democracy, as of according to the conclusion of the Commission on Global Governance in 1995. The Commission recommended an assembly of the peoples to complement the UNGA. Although this has not yet occurred, the Internet has provided useful tools of global communication, commerce and governance. This possibility eventually led to the creation of the e-Parliament¹⁴ in 2001.

The long-term mission of the e-Parliament is to encourage representative self-government so that every person on Earth may exercise an equal opportunity to be represented in decisions that affect their lives. (...) The immediate purpose of the e-Parliament is to enable all those legislators throughout the world who have been democratically elected to national (or regional) legislatures to deliberate with one another, primarily over the Internet, and to engage with citizens in a joint search for effective solutions to global problems. (...) In its first phase, the e-Parliament provides an opportunity for members of parliaments (MPs) and congresses to communicate ideas and best practices (...) and then to develop common ground for model legislation that subsequently could be introduced in many national legislatures. (...) As the e-Parliament gains experience and the numbers of MPs participating increases, it could, over the years, evolve into a global body with more authority. (Ibid., 325-326)

Johansen (ibid., 327-343) notes that NGO's provide expertise to the MP's interested in the workings of the e-Parliament. He also takes up the issue of persons living in non-democratic societies. The e-Parliament Council has come to the conclusion that legislators from non-democratically elected parliaments should not be allowed to participate in the voting activities of the e-Parliament. What is interesting is that the e-Parliament was established as a not-for-profit organization without the need to resort to any formal treaty process. In various consultations, the e-Parliament has been positively approached throughout the world, and the e-Parliament is, according to Johansen, feasible in the sense that it was started as a small organization by persons familiar with national parliamentary systems and able to give the e-Parliament sustainable growth opportunities. Since the e-Parliament is already there, critics have been able to pose challenging questions on the nature of the Parliament. "On the left, some argue that the e-Parliament could be elitist and confer an undesirable global legitimacy on national legislators who already are negatively bound by inertia and vested interests. On the right, people fear that its democratic emphasis might alter perceptions of legitimacy, giving too much weight to representation that is proportional to population." (Ibid., 334) The e-Parliament has created an Idea Bank for legislators to resort to when seeking information. In the long run, proponents of the e-Parliament hope to see their Parliament evolve according to the example of the EP into a body with more actual powers.

¹⁴ The e-Parliament opened its website in 2006. More recently, the e-Parliament has established a Climate Parliament to combat climate change. See Johansen 2007 on the structure and governance of the current e-Parliament. Johansen is a member of the current e-Parliament Council.

3.2.4 Critical, skeptical and realist arguments

This chapter examines the scenarios by Laurenti, Roche, Franck, Kennedy and Baxi. Jeffrey Laurenti (2003, 119-120) regards the world federalists as a small but determined group aiming at establishing a world parliament. He does not clearly oppose the UNPA as such but the proposals or imaginings made on it. They have not been able to satisfactorily answer questions on how a UNPA could possibly be established. Until the questions remain unanswered, the global assembly must remain a theoretical probability. Laurenti considers three features in the proposals, “the proposed parliament’s inclusivity, its authority and its efficiency”. (Ibid., 120) He begins with the inclusivity and questions the accountability of a UNPA in consideration of a large proportion of people living under non-democratic governments. He asks whether the proposals are eager to accept a tradeoff between a democratic legitimacy and inclusiveness. The Community of Democracies, constituted in 2000, is used as an example of exclusivity. The aim was to include non-Western governments as members but many countries, for instance a number of Arab countries and two-thirds of Africa were left outside, which Laurenti finds peculiar, since such a body could not have a consultative oversight role. (Ibid., 121-122)

The second point Laurenti emphasizes is the authority issue. “The central conundrum facing an imagined international parliamentary assembly is the apparent impossibility of reconciling its mandate and its appeal to prospective parliamentarians. What powers would such an institution have? If it has no authority over the activities of even the scarecrow agencies of the United Nations, why should serious politicians invest serious time in it?” (Ibid., 122) He refers to the proposals that have suggested a legislative status for the assembly, including the power to make law on a global scale. Laurenti doubts that the proposals could hardly attract the attention of the press, public and politicians with such an ambitious program. Global decision-making and resources would find strong resistance among the public. Although the resistance has been mostly American, Laurenti mentions that federal ideas have for the most part not found enough proponents in other countries either to fulfill their goals. As a reference tool, he only uses dissolutions of federal states which are not equivalent to regional federalisms. The international community is in its birth stage and not yet able to work globally. Laurenti acknowledges that the EU works as a counter-example where progress towards federalism has positively proceeded in its common identity. However, the immigration issues prohibit the Europe to become a fully existing forum. He encourages the people to realize that a world parliamentary assembly with law-making functions does not cohere

with the reality. Even the smallest steps towards a UNPA-like body demand the acceptance of politicians. Laurenti (*ibid.*, 122-124) is partly right in stating that the UNPA project is not eased as long as the decision-making process of the UN remains non-transparent. The problems he illustrates deserve to be presented because they contain noteworthy criticism towards the functioning mechanism of the UN.

The last point Laurenti examines is the efficiency of persuasion. The proponents of an assembly must convince the people of the desirability of a new system compared to the currently existing one. Diplomats sent abroad on missions by their governments tend to be internationally oriented and eager to understand foreign cultures. The diplomats at the UN level, whether they are from developing or developed countries, have adopted a common language and global thinking, sharing liberal internationalist values. Laurenti is of the opinion that this mechanism of international cooperation has proved functioning. Why should it thus be altered? In reference to the democracy deficit, he states that the audience for international affairs is rather small. (*Ibid.*, 125-129)

Douglas Roche states that the idea for the UNPA has a long history, dating back to the origins of the UN, but only recently has the movement made progress. However, one can at this moment draw outlines for the future, since the achievement of the goal lies far away. The achievement can be fastened, since there is need for a reformed UN. According to Roche, “a parliamentary assembly implies democracy. The first [possibility] is to provide transparency, added legitimacy and – presumably – more effectiveness to UN operations themselves. The second would be to address more general issues of global governance that stem from perceptions and conclusions about globalisation. A third reason is linked closely to the desire by some to address a central question of international security: the role that sovereignty and sovereign states may play in preventing universal solutions to questions of basic human rights, peace and security.” (Roche 2003, 31-32) Thereby, Roche rejects the idea of the UNPA becoming a world parliament. According to his definition, the term ‘governance’ is aimed at picturing the regulation of complex and interconnected relations between states, societies, the business world, individuals and the academic communities. The discussion on the UNPA becomes interconnected not only with the UN but at the same time with the entire world and its communities. There are several levels that the UNPA project touches. (*Ibid.*, 32-33)

Since the project is a creation of the UN, it is simultaneously for the UN, as Roche puts it. “It would therefore reflect those structural biases of the United Nations that reinforce national sovereignty and the power of states.” (*Ibid.*, 38) States would be members

in the assembly; Roche thus emphasizes the parliamentary assembly. According to him, the UN strengthens the role of the states in international relations. This is an interesting thought, which he clarifies by the assumption that the UN heavily relies on the power of large states, mostly on the United States. The UN was originally planned to reassure the American public, so the UN must fit this frame of reference. (Ibid.)

Roche attracts the attention to collective security of states and great power issues in UN circumstances. War and peace constitute the initial framework for the UN main field. (Ibid., 39) He considers that there are in reality only two possible ways to constitute the future UNPA, “a parliamentary assembly comprising national parliamentarians or a parliamentary assembly that is selected independently. Which type is chosen will affect what a UNPA might potentially become.” (Ibid., 40) For the first proposition, using existing national parliamentarians, he mentions among others the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council (PACE), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the parliamentary assembly of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as examples. These are referred to as IPI’s, Inter-Parliamentary Institutions. This is a pragmatic solution, since national parliamentarians already exist. The way the members are chosen must have the democratic credibility to last in the long run. The importance of the UNPA must rise from the moral weight, since it will otherwise have restricted powers. A positive feature for already existing parliamentarians is the fact that they embrace the approval in themselves. They are also experts on their own field which can be an advantage on the international arena as well. The second option illustrated shortly above indicates an independently selected UNPA. The criteria and methods for selection must be carefully reflected. Roche states that detailed questions on the membership issues must be answered, otherwise the UNPA could fail in its credibility. If having direct representatives, this would add to a more democratically governed UN, since national parliamentarians are nonetheless more nationally inclined. These independent ones would devote more time to the UNPA than national ones, clearly a positive sign. (Ibid., 40-47)

Roche is interested in the technical aspects of the solution to the UNPA challenge. All the questions ‘how?’, ‘what?’, ‘when?’, ‘where?’ and also ‘who?’ need to find an answer. He illustrates that the result of the UNPA might be unintentionally different and affected by political power as was initially planned. Roche suggests a non-permanent UNPA and sees it in the light of a consultative rather than legislative body. The UNGA would remain the initial legislator and the UNPA would report of actions directly to the UNGA, giving credibility to the UNPA as well. The suggestion is to establish UNPA

committees in the fashion of current committees in other international parliamentary assemblies. There would be the usual committees, such as Political and Social, Economic, Human Rights, Technology and Science, but also others, such as Refugee and Environmental committees. Another approach would be to credit the UNPA with programmatic committees having oversight obligations. There could be a UN budget committee and one on the Security Council. Roche's view on the UNPA remains on the schematic structure. He states that "[t]here is currently a disjuncture in traditional, liberal-democratic political decision-making between the international and the domestic level. Inter-parliamentary institutions of various types offer a good solution to [global governance] and perhaps the most prominent international organization lacking an IPI is the United Nations. (...) If there is to be a UNPA, there needs to be a recognition that choices on how it becomes institutionalized may have subtle, but important long-term affects on how much a UNPA comes to represent a UN legislature." (Ibid., 47-50)

Thomas Franck (2007, 371-374) sees the project of establishing a global democratic political space as important, but it faces enormous difficulties. What Franck calls tribal nationalism is on the rise, the ethos to close oneself off from others. According to him, in a "globally elected parliament, national interest groups would tend to disaggregate and reform in new, transnational configurations. (...) In an elected global assembly, people who are elected from the various member countries will find that in order to advance their agenda (...) [they] would need to combine forces, not solely with other people from [sic!] their own states, but also with like minded persons from other nations who are pursuing the same ends." (Ibid., 372) Franck views the proposal for the establishment of a world parliament from a safe distance. He states that a powerful global parliament is not going to be formed and he sees it too easily dismissed, since it sacrifices national sovereignty in too large a share. The institution on the other hand deserves more thought: Once the institution is there, it will function as a pressure mechanism "to attract power in accordance with its perceived legitimacy". (Ibid.) The framework of democratic governance will gradually expand. The power should remain in the hands of governments, and the steps towards a global institution should proceed slowly. Franck suggests to form a directly elected second body of the UNGA. The impression that this body would harm the legitimacy of the UNSC should be avoided.

David Kennedy (2007, 395-399) is a skeptic from the very beginning of his speech. According to him, the proposals on the WP do not meet with the underlying problem. Kennedy is mainly skeptical of the parliamentary idea not "at all because it's unrealistic – to remake the political order, we must sometimes think unrealistically. [His] worry is

that the image of politics embedded in the proposal for a global parliament seems outmoded, even part of the problem.” (Ibid., 395) Kennedy is concerned of the national public capacity to fulfill the needs of the national challenges (e.g. the US government’s response to hurricane Katrina in 2005), not to mention the global level. Institutional arrangements outside the realm of states are not up to date, and because the international arena has no center, it is suffering from the erosion of capacity. By this he means that focused decisions are not done, and that instead of building a global parliament, the attention should be directed towards encroaching semi-autonomous systems embracing economic, cultural and other kinds of systems. He draws his view on the legislative purpose of a parliament which he sees as outmoded. He thinks that legislation no longer serves the purpose, since the background institutions make the actual decisions, and therefore a global parliament simply does not meet up with the demands of the current times. Universal decisions are outdated, and the world needs heterogeneity, interaction and ethical pluralism to deal with the challenges of the plurality of life choices. According to Kennedy, a modest reform that the proponents of the world parliament promote is not the solution. The whole idea behind a world parliament is too sincere and practical for him. So, the demands and needs for the near future do not face up to the different “truths” out there.

Upendra Baxi (2007, 408-418) poses critical questions for the GPA debate. He tries to overcome the Western perspective (in his words the nightmare of the universalization of the Western model of democracy) and embrace a more inclusive approach. Inclusion always implies exclusion as the counter pole, Baxi notes. He does not offer a comprehensive infrastructure on how the GPA should be accomplished, but according to him, “the GPA discourse needs to more specifically address the construction of a new global ‘level playing field’ for the voices of the world’s dispossessed, deprived, and the disadvantaged peoples.” (Ibid., 416) Therefore, the concept of democratic inclusion should be ripped off of any romanticized versions of global representation. Instead of emphasizing the ahistorical construction of global citizens, direct and effective representation should be granted to various wounded communities, vulnerable and suffering peoples and persons living in exploiting circumstances. The project on the GPA should embrace just freedom for all instead of only covering practices of freedom.

4. Feasibility and desirability of the models

Now that all the models have been presented in detail, I will consider their feasibility and desirability. However, I shall begin by making summarizing comments about the proposals and move on to analyze the feasibility aspects in the latter part of the chapter. There is a clear division of models into two main groups, the first group viewing a global assembly or world parliament as the solution to the crisis of global democracy, the second group being portrayed by persons that are rather skeptical or even critical of any global bodies. Another division concerns the concept of scenario and model. Until now, the proposals have been mainly referred to as models, in the sense of using an overall category. As mentioned shortly in the introduction, not all models or proposals are scenarios but all scenarios include models as the models offer a general perspective but they might not include a causal reasoning eminent in futures scenarios. Scenarios imply procedural points in the accounts, and therefore they are, at least in this context, lengthier and more detailed than general remarks on the nature of international democracy or on the need for a global parliament. Their feasibility is easier to assess than the one of general models. Some of the proposals are either even more optimistic than the ones that were examined in the group of global governance, or are realistic and potentially lacking a certain level of imagination when considering new forms of governance at the global scene. The models are all unique and their extent varies from proposal to proposal. Unfortunately some of the shorter models covered here do not take a stand on the practicalities and the infrastructure of a world parliament, but state a critical or skeptical view without envisioning a better model themselves. International democracy deficit and the lack of a citizen's voice is one common denominator for the proposals being optimistic about a world parliament or a UNPA. Another dominant feature is the allocated power given to sovereign states or parliamentary representatives arising from the state system. Only critical models take a stand on the retreat of the state paradox.

Almost all of the proposals take a stand on the relationships of different levels of governance – the international, national and local – and between actors who are involved in the transformative process. A relevant question is the degree in which the individuals are becoming more internationally oriented. Freedom and independence of national constraints are often understood in the context of freedom of speech and assembly. How can freedom be achieved, since many individuals are either not familiar or are not used to democracy in the first place? If the individual level is ignorant of transformations occurring in the current world, the upper levels – politicians and other lead-

ers – might use this as a tool to decide for the local and individual level. Common for the most scenarios is that a gradual change is the best solution to the problems democracy faces: changes do not occur over night, they need time and patience. Human beings are usually regionally or locally adjusted and the majority of issues they are concerned with consist of regional matters, not global challenges or problems. Why would the people desire a project such as the WP? What would they gain from it and what could they lose? These are important questions because the WP is unrealizable if it does not have the support of citizens. In this regard, the scenarios may seem far reaching and unrealistic. Some do give detailed information about the way the WP or the UNPA is best accomplished, some proposals are mainly concerned with the reasons or the need for the assembly. In this thesis the emphasis of the scenarios is thus, at least considering the majority of them, on why rather than on how – how implying the why but the why does not necessarily include the how. This is an unfortunate fact but luckily the most thorough scenarios imply both the how and the why.

Another interesting feature is the difference between the WP and the UNPA. The latter could be seen as the forerunner of the former. The UNPA proponents have organized themselves effectively in the social media – on an actively updated webpage and on Twitter and Facebook – and several parliaments, such as the EP including pan-European political groups, and other parliaments such as the Pan-African and the Latin American Parliament, have adopted supportive resolutions in favor of the UNPA. As of early February 2011, the UNPA campaign is supported by 3855 individuals from 145 countries, 280 NGO's from 66 countries (among them 21 international organizations), 770 MP's from 98 countries and 196 former parliamentarians from 46 countries.¹⁵ The figures concerning the parliamentarians' interest in the project is remarkable. The support is channeled for a UNPA within the UN system, an already existing global institution; therefore its support is more eminent than the one of the world parliament. We can think of feasible elements in terms of what is easy versus what should be striven for. It is hard to get the EP support the WP instead of the UNPA, now that the support is already there. But as the UNPA could be a pioneer for a new tryout for global citizen representation, this impact should not be neglected. Therefore, both institutions do not exclude each other but can be regarded as different sides of the same coin. As the EP has often been referred to as the most successful regional parliamentary assembly in the world, it is valuable to pay attention to its historical elements.

¹⁵ The Steering Committee of the UNPA is a group of NGO's and networks (KDUN, Democracia Global, Society for Threatened Peoples International, World Federalist Movement and 2020*Vision Ltd.). More information on the International Campaign for the Establishment of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly at www.unpacampaign.org.

Besides the influence of the European Parliament based on its legal rights, the EP has also significantly shaped the European agenda in a political way. In some instances, it was even a catalyst for significant change. Thus, in the middle of the so-called 'eurosclerosis' in 1984, the EP courageously presented a draft constitution for a federal EU with a genuine parliament, which brought the EU out of its paralysis, revived the reform process, and concurrently also led to an increase in its own powers. (...) In one of the first cases under the new arrangement, the EP refused in February 2010 to rubber-stamp the interim SWIFT agreement between the EU and the US on the transfer of citizens' financial data to prevent terrorist attacks, dealing a blow to both EU governments and US authorities. The EP has thus acquired a considerably strengthened position with regard to some international questions in which the EU is involved, for example in world trade or climate policy. (Claudia Kissling 2011, 46-47)

With the introduction of direct elections in 1979, the European national parliaments lost their direct link to the structure of the EU and gradually the EP has managed to expand its original remit. Although the EP has a great legislative competence in comparison to IPI's and other regional parliaments, it still only has co-decision rights with the Council of Ministers. "Since the changes made by the Lisbon Treaty, the EP has the right to co-decide on the EU budget as submitted by the EU Commission in its entirety together with the EU Council." (Ibid., 43) According to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU will need the consent of the EP to conclude international agreements, so in this instance the EP holds important strings in its possession. Kissling also favors the formation of a UNPA first with limited competence and eventually the scope of the assembly could be further extended. (Ibid., 10 and 41-53)

In the long-run, the campaign to establish a people's assembly or a UNPA envisages the evolvement into a real world parliament, the concept 'real' including the definition of a body with legislative decision-based powers. This suggests that the transformation is having a final goal, a radical one in the sense that it concretely abolishes the traditional state system by creating a mechanism emphasizing the power of the citizens. This does not imply that the Westphalian system would wither away after the establishment of a true WP, but it puts the traditional state system under a gradual change. It is highly consequential to review the case of the WP from a broad perspective with long-term goals and desires, and to carefully examine the transformative feature its establishment would suggest. The creation of a WP can only be achieved through small steps, each of them contributing a small share to the larger picture. It is surreal to imagine the world parliament being created over a couple of years, even thirty years seems short. The establishment must be in relation with the adjustment of individuals, groups and states. The network on the UNPA and the e-Parliament website show that appearance and media coverage are important. However, both of the websites have so far remained invisible for the majority of citizens. This puts them under serious criticism, and someone might argue that they are intended for the parliamentarians and other prominent figures rather than individual citizens, making the project seem elitist. The individuals and par-

liamentarians worldwide must be involved, otherwise the democracy deficit remains intact. Several proposals saw parliamentarians as initiators of a democratic change, since they already have adopted the parliamentary dialogue, procedural matters and the cooperation on the national level. A theoretical analysis is relevant but in itself not enough, since the practice advances the concrete project. However, if the individuals are aware of the theoretical debates between differing ontological questions of the shape of the world, their adjustment to the contextual discussion is easier. Future considerations of inventions and scientific breakthrough in the area of the natural sciences reach the individuals more directly than abstract scenarios on political and societal changes. Abstract WP proposals must be made accessible to the wider public and their content must be understandable at grassroots level.

Another assumption about feasibility is that it only concerns part of the models because in order to offer feasible aspects, they would have to consist of enough considerable material in the first place. Of the 17 original and colorful models only approximately the half can be included in the section of potentially feasible proposals. The aspect of feasibility will only be applied to the 17 models under surveillance here, and not to other articles or publications the authors of the scenarios might have given out. The critical and skeptical scenarios are not considered based on their feasibility but on their account and critical focal points that help to examine the feasibility of the more WP-positive models. As a summarizing comment, it goes without saying that most of the scenarios advocating a gradual move towards a WP are feasible. The next step is to consider whether the gradual element will affect short or long-term causalities. A normative approach defines in which degree something is viewed as feasible. It is important to remind oneself of the concept of feasibility itself: for whom is something plausible and why, i.e. for what ends should a WP be established? Since I have adopted a normative approach in futures studies, the concept of feasibility is closely linked with the term desirability. The question 'for whom' implies a degree of desirability, since normativity is linked to the matters that should be rather than what currently is available. A world parliament is at least feasible for those who see that the crisis of democracy needs lasting solutions and avoids the inefficiency of the UN stalemate born in the post World War II circumstances. In the 21st century, we are free of the burden of any world war stigma, we can forget both the war winners and losers. In this chapter, feasibility will be considered in terms of solutions to the global political crisis; the impact of the economic or financial crisis will be neglected.

The next challenge concerns the issue of institutional relevance. Not all of the proposals consider a world parliament, but an institution with a different name, be it a people's assembly or an e-Parliament. Some of them directly examine the UN reform, and their input only concerns ways of renewing the UN system, not of building a new global organization. My initial hypothesis is that the UN cannot be considered as a good solution of establishing a world parliament because the system has proved itself as very hard to reform, and the system works still in the aftermath constellation of the World War II happenings. As became evident in several models, amendments to the UN Charter are hard to make, and so far they have not gained much support among the UN member states. The question what is feasible is more uniquely understood in the sense of a new organization because that way old dilemmas, stalemate circumstances and inefficiency, as experienced throughout the UN system when real decision-making powers are concerned, can be avoided and history can be made by turning a new page. Another issue is the difficult relationship between state-based organizations, such as the UN, and citizen activities. The UN has a steady establishment and it relies heavily on the sovereignty of states. Therefore, involving NGO's, prominent individuals and direct suffrage hardly seems feasible in connection to the world organization. Matters concerning non-democratic states also face challenges in the UN system which is a club for all, no matter the degree of democracy and human rights for the citizens in authoritarian or totalitarian states. Taking these issues into consideration, I will examine the models as objectively as possible, i.e. considering proposals on a UNPA and a world parliament with equal footing, but the previous examination is intended for chapter 5 where a new scenario is built. Sometimes the reader has to resort to interpretation when examining scenarios; the meaning and purpose of the content might not be self-evident, therefore at times, measures of "reading between the lines" must be adopted. I will now consider the feasibility of the 17 models from a more general perspective in comparison to the level of analysis in the coming chapter.

4.1 Assessment of the individual models and scenarios

Bummel (2010), a prominent proponent of the UNPA campaign, emphasizes the pragmatic and realistic start in the process towards a UNPA. As he states, the whole process needs a change in consciousness and a deep understanding of world politics. This is more theoretical than concrete. Several issues must be taken into account in transformation processes and in the enhancement of democracy at the supranational level. Bummel sees the relationship between global institutions as problematic since the global repre-

sentatives are at the moment accountable to their national governments rather than national citizens. The emphasis is overtly on the allocation procedure of distributing seats to countries according to different models. Although his models offer viable sources for the mathematical consideration, the basic evaluation and core thought is missing. What purpose would the UNPA have according to his reasoning? Each country would be represented in the UNPA, also the autocratic and non-democratic ones, so his account does not offer anything we would not already have witnessed in the current UN institutions. However, in that sense his model is feasible. My interest is normative, and the emphasis of democracy receives considerable attention. Bummel does not take into account the content of the UNPA workings. What powers would his institution bear, how would it benefit democracy and most of all, how could it complement the UN system with something new? If also non-democratic states were involved, what would the normative value of this instance be, if some? Bummel's model has feasible elements for the UN reform but there are serious blank spots in the causal reasoning between the overall need of a UNPA and the link to its realization at the practical level. For this reason, his account remains a model, since he does not examine the comprehensive dimension of the UNPA after it would have been realized and the powers it would be granted.

In their analysis on the UNPA, Falk and Strauss (2003) refer to a lack of direct democracy in a globalizing world. The role of the states is rejected, since the genuine forum consisting of civil society representatives can surmount the difficulties the UN is now experiencing. However, neglecting the role of the states in the working field of the assembly indicates a different purpose of the future UN. The dilemma rises from the actual bypassing of the states. How can it be technically and concretely possible to overrule the power of the states, now so powerfully represented in the UN decision-making process? For example, states still hold the power in the Security Council and in other UN bodies. According to Falk and Strauss, the current ad hoc system in international relations will at some point, due to globalization, be called into question. This happening will intensify the need for democratization and gradual evolvement of an assembly. Although civil society has gained more ground, its domination is not comparable with the one of sovereign states. Falk and Strauss realize this problem by asking whether it is possible to create such an assembly without states and business interests. The EU is used as an example of how it is tenable to launch an inter-regional forum. The UN assembly has potential in involving the civil society and thus, gradually, the entire society. In spite of this, the business representatives are unlikely getting excited about an assembly with civil society stigma. Falk and Strauss are quite naïve on the cooperation be-

tween civil society and corporations. They are inclined to think that the political potential will not suffice in order to attain the legitimacy for the assembly. They trust in the liberal system emphasizing the grassroots level and its impact on the new form of world practice. In reference to their theory, the hardest step is the first one. How do academic circles that first get in touch with reform initials convince the general public of the necessity and emergency of change? Few theories are concerned with the initial step of the transformation, partly due to the difficulty and the belief in the victory of the individuals. One general deficiency concerning especially the proposals for the UNPA is that they begin from the phase where the trust of the people has already been established. There is pressure for an evolutionary social process in the democracy initiatives but this must involve a scenario with a clear causal relationship between argumentations for the need of change at the global level, practical and plausible solutions on how to establish a functioning global body and also long-term aspects of the body once it has been established and ways of improvement in the long run.

In their 2007 accounts, Strauss and Falk give a more feasible analysis on a GPA. It is indeed true that the global arena lacks citizen representation, so any proposal giving appropriate space for global individuals is feasible if the proposal is also practical and examines all or most of the points previously mentioned. It seems plausible that a gradual development from an initially advisory body to direct elections is the road to choose, but the advisory body must be invested with powers that it can later monopolize. In the case of the UN Charter, when a body is established with general guidelines, the global body might fail in the long run if the Charter defends status quo mechanisms and is hard to amend. The original plan must therefore be included in the draft for the future global parliament. Otherwise it might suffer from stagnation and remain advisory for ever, until new bodies are established. The more feasible a world parliament is in the long run the more thorough the original plan and execution should be, implying both short and long-term expectations. The draft must be cleared of too radical elements since it might scare the majority of persons, but at the same time it must be semi-radical in the sense that within a certain time frame a real legislative body will be established, with direct suffrage and citizenship participation, and potentially the right to interfere if international law, human and social rights, environmental standards have been violated.

The most difficult part of considering the world parliament is inclusion versus exclusion. The EU serves as a relevant example: in the 1950's, when the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was initiated it embraced only six states. Nonetheless, nowadays the former European Community (EC) is a European Union of 27 countries

that have each had the desire to be a member of the European project. Similarly, as the EC was an economic community but has shifted more towards a political union during the EU, the world parliament could equally evolve from its original element towards a body of legislative rights similar to the jurisdiction of national parliaments. Thus, as the case of inclusion in the case of the UN and of exclusion in the case of the EC shows, using existing examples of inclusion and exclusion one can conclude that exclusion pays off. This is measured against efficiency and practical success.

In many models, the EU and especially the EP have been portrayed as a success story, although some proposals criticize the actual significance of the EP in the eyes of the public. There is still a huge difference between the importance of national parliaments and supra-national ones. Citizens do not follow the discussions and reports submitted by the EP in the extent that would be expectable of an important parliament. Exclusion, then again, implies heavy machinery of advertisement and lobbying, otherwise the community, union or any other club remains limited in numbers. In this instance, the EP has failed to keep the EU citizens on track and excited about the common European identity manifested in the commonly shared parliamentary institution. The proposal of Strauss (and Falk) to eventually merge the advisory body with the UNGA and the thereby establishment of a bicameral legislative system implying powers is feasible. Falk and Strauss are the personification of the world parliament concept but they must avoid being overtly subtle and good-hearted. Their 2007 scenario has improved from the one made in 2003 as it offers detailed information and normative ideals. Their scenario is probably the most feasible of the 17 models, since it is not overtly normative but rather practical and humble.

Archibugi¹⁶ (2007) – a congenial soul of Held – is a strong proponent of cosmopolitanism and his model is a good exponent of a world parliament. His 2007 account is mysterious since it leaves too many practical details unattached, but the use of democracy export can prove to be essential when bringing about a world parliament. Therefore its feasibility is difficult to measure. Archibugi names post-World War II nations, Germany and Italy, as examples of progressive democratization. Details that were not covered earlier when his model was presented include the following list of learned lessons that may help when establishing a world parliament:

1. *The internal context.* The level of support enjoyed by the existing regime is a crucial factor. Unfortunately, not all authoritarian regimes are equally opposed by their populations. (...) Wanting to impose democracy against the will of the same people is simply nonsense.

¹⁶ Archibugi has enthusiastically published cosmopolitan and democracy-related articles and books. E.g. see Archibugi, Daniele (2008): *The Global Commonwealth of Citizens. Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy*. Princeton & Oxford.

2. *Restoration is easier.* It is much easier to reintroduce democracy than to introduce it for the first time.
3. *Aggression is counterproductive.* The efficacy of the regime change after the Second World War was a result of the fact that the war was begun by the fascist regimes.
4. *Acceptance of the transitional administration.* (...) Due to concerns about being colonized, the local populations are generally hostile when they confront a transitional administration, which can become permanent and overbearing. (Archibugi 2007, 286-287)

These suggestions are not to be interpreted literally, since their original impact concerns the war in Iraq and concrete examples of bringing in democracy in authoritarian states. For the consideration of world parliament scenarios, points 1, 2 and 3 are crucial. The gradual path of the world parliament must be advertised to the individuals around the globe in an honest fashion: the citizens must be kept on track, and they should be promised that the project does not impose heavy cosmopolitan federalism overnight, that it is directed towards developing global democracy and the efficiency of global governance. Concrete proposals with step-to-step advice on how to reach a common goal keep the individuals interested and do not scare them away. The 2007 model of Archibugi unfortunately fails to offer this kind of a solution; his proposal is too vague in its format. The reader is left perplexed and cannot follow the practical road towards a world parliament in the fashion Archibugi might have intended. The same criticism applies to the model of Baxi (2007) as well: his account offers no practical suggestions. Baxi is a proponent of an assembly for peoples but his fear of the exploitation and abuse of the world's vulnerable peoples leaves other relevant points untouched. As if he was there to offer his worries for others, not that he himself could offer a feasible solution on how to support inclusion and a pluralistic view of global democracy. His model is turned upside down: instead of recommending a practical solution to establish a GPA, he assumes that it will be established, no matter under which regulations and charter amendments and other viable routes. It would seem plausible to proceed in a different order than Baxi suggests: first to create a GPA and then place the protection of dispossessed persons and groups under the jurisdiction of the assembly.

By avoiding too radical elements the scenarios receive positive attention by a large public which is very important in the early days of a world parliament. World federalism might be plausible at some point in the distant future and it might be the ultimate solution to the problems nationalism, regional and ethnic wars, religions and ideologies have caused, by embracing the common denominator all humans share – namely humanity and peaceful approach to earthly dilemmas. But, as of yet the current world system and the citizens do not deserve world federalism. The project to wipe territorial states is not an issue of the 21st century. Aiming at cosmopolitan federalism in the post-Cold War era is like taking too many steps at the same time, or as the saying goes one

should not count one's chickens before they are hatched, endangering the ultimate goal of peaceful living on this planet.

This detour takes us back to the federalists – mainly Levi, Onesta and Marchetti – and their models. Their accounts are heavily normative but also unpractical. They fail in adequately illustrating the actual structure or the gradual proceeding of a world parliament or a UNPA. They speak of the ends as if the means were already present. Otherwise Levi's (2003) model has many plausible elements: he is among the few to name political parties as the initiators of change and direct elections of parliament fit well with the other models. Marchetti (2006) on the other hand presents a multifaceted program of idealistic cosmo-federalism and cosmopolitan governance which sounds promising, but his plan is too general and it loses the comprehensive perspective. Most of the states are not federations so the cooperation between federative communities could only reach a few states, no matter how crucial these states would be. Onesta's (2010) model is too modest to add any new elements to the discussion that would not be there already (e.g. refer to Strauss and Falk). Giving the UNPA that Onesta examines indirect powers in the beginning according to the example of the EP might further deteriorate the stalemate at the UN, something the body was designed to solve. For the above mentioned reasons, these three models do not count as scenarios although they have feasible elements.

Levi assumes that the problems of the nation-state have been solved by federalism. The theory in itself is not so far from the reality as it sounds. The EU, the closest model of regional federalism and motor in the background, entered a phase of stagnation in the early years of the 21st century. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, under debate in 2002-2003, did not yet exist. The Lisbon Treaty has been ratified by all the EU member states but the union is far from being a political community of like-minded states. The EU enlargement during the previous decade have dramatically changed the nature of the EU: before the 2004 enlargement the Union was a league of Western European states as received according to Cold War standards. Due to the enlargement the common goals that were before more or less centered have diversified. However, the enlargement can also be seen in a positive light, since the unification is a process towards a goal, not a step behind. Levi focuses on the democratic reform of the globalization but he fails to recognize the relevant steps needed after the establishment of a world parliament. He states that it would gain legislative legitimacy but for what purposes would it be established. He is for the creation of world federalism but how is the federalist project to be proceeded from the level of the EU. The traces of transformation are

not presented and several questions are left unanswered. The role of the UNPA is nearly untouched and the one of the world parliament is inadequately elaborated. In Levi's terms, a world parliament poses a contradiction between globalization and the lacking democratic international means. He calls for the World Federalist Movement to lead the coalition of NGO's for a UN parliament. Thus, an assembly does not completely fulfill the desires set by civil society. A coalition emphasizing peace, protection for the environment and human rights, and the importance of international justice must be established. National governments are both the means and the hindering mechanism in reaching for the European federation, as Levi quotes Altiero Spinelli. The political parties can enhance the world parliament becoming a true global actor.

Heinrich (2003), Schwartzberg (2003-2004), Patomäki (2007), Franck (2007) and Johansen (2007) are interesting counterparts for the models of Bummel, Falk & Strauss, and Archibugi. One of the crucial points of Heinrich, although his input is rather limited, is the fact that UN parliamentarians would receive their salaries directly from the UN, thereby diminishing the influence of national governments over representatives, and increasing the independence of a new global institution. This can be regarded as highly feasible for the long-term goals of a WP. Heinrich's pragmatic model on the UNPA stands somewhere between idealism and realism: his effort to examine the role of non-democratic states is relevant because they must be included in changing the working mechanisms of the UN and for control over the stability of the democratic UN system. In that sense, considering the share of representatives from the countries in question, partly undemocratic means must be adopted, so that the system stays in a democratic balance. This thought should be kept separate of the analysis of a WP where exclusion could be a more feasible solution than the inclusion of non-democratic states.

Schwartzberg, a keen sympathizer of the idea of a WPA, underlines the importance to reform other UN bodies even more urgently than the UNGA. The UNGA should adopt a more realistic and representative decision-making process and possess the right to binding decisions. Accordingly, the UNSC should be reformed to apply to the representative nature of the world. He does not see an active participation of individuals and civil society, sovereign states being the main initiators of the highly mathematical change of the UN system. His model does not call the sovereignty of states into question. Therefore, the power balance of sovereignty must not be touched. His criticism is aimed at many activists who are proponents of the assembly but withdraw their support because they are convinced of the practical difficulties to establish an assembly. They thus believe that the project cannot be achieved during their lifetime. As appears in

Strauss (2007), the process to amend the UN Charter is a nearly impossible mission, thus Schwartzberg's account, no matter how just it would be concerning the UN reform, is not feasible. His proposal does not improve the state of global democracy but makes alterations to existing institutions, thereby neglecting any considerations of global citizenship and the enhancement of democracy. His model does not include a comprehensive continuum as is here expected of a reasonable scenario but Schwartzberg rather aims at making the UN system more just in terms of the number of seats. Concerning a WP, Schwartzberg does not offer more than cosmetic changes.

Franck mentions a global polis, fascinating as a concept, where the directly elected members in the global parliament come to find common ideals. In order to advance their agenda, the members of the parliament develop unique ways to reach their ends, emphasizing thus transnational elements. In a normative sense, this is positively feasible, since it predicts ways of governance that would be circular in a good way. By combining individuals, they will form a common identity, thus empowering them to further develop global democracy and participation. Franck's model is hesitant and he is careful in stating that one should aim low, and one should not aim at establishing a powerful global parliament. Johansen's model is one of the most challenging ones, since he speaks for the established e-Parliament that combines parliamentarians and individuals to solve global issues on various topics. The practice has shown that the loosely led e-Parliament has not succeeded in attractive measures: the e-Parliament is directed towards parliamentarians, i.e. only a small number of global citizens and the project has not been visible although the e-Parliament is accessible in the virtual world. Presently, it seems, the e-Parliament is focusing on climate issues, which might be eminent for e-organizations: the initial idea aims high but the concrete results circulate around specific topics and excite experts in specific field of academics and NGO's.

Patomäki offers a realistic and pragmatic description of a world parliament by touching the important topic of international law and its indeterminacy. Together with Strauss & Falk (2007), Patomäki's detailed account is highly feasible. All three propose a gradual system towards a directly elected body by including different actors from parliamentarians to civil society organizations. Both scenarios assume a degree of exclusion: Patomäki suggests in his second version a group of like-minded nations establishing a body of two chambers, whereas Strauss emphasizes the importance of progressive states in the creation of a WP/GPA. Neither Falk and Strauss nor Patomäki give any attention to the development of global or at least regional political parties. Europe has already, to some extent, seen the evolvement of supra-national political groups (e.g. the

earlier mentioned LI, or party groupings in the EP), although they still lack relevance when compared to national political parties. National parties have long cooperated with their sister parties in other countries, so the final evolvement into single global parties not consisting of national parties is not far-fetched. Patomäki's recommendation of including legal experts reminds of Plato's philosopher kings. Their impact and necessity has not been utilized to the maximum at the national or global level. Many of the scenarios that propose a second chamber to the world parliament leave the purpose and functions of this institution untouched. Patomäki makes his scenario feasible by giving his second chamber a plausible role to play, namely the upper control organization in a milder sense than what the connotation of 'control' usually implies. A single-chamber world parliament can fall into the trap of being its own supervisor and end up causing democratic problems it was initially aimed at solving. The idea behind a second chamber is to organize an independent body to oversee the activities and decisions made in the first chamber. I return to the issue of chambers and global political parties in detail in chapter 5.

What remains are the critical and/or skeptical models. Their purpose was shortly mentioned earlier in this chapter. The fact that those proposals critically neglect any form of a world parliament or a UNPA are not feasible because the status quo is already there, one cannot hide from it. But the current conditions are inefficient in terms of the democracy deficit and the lack of citizen-based organization. But in a thesis where the feasibility of world parliament scenarios and models is examined, ideas that do not see any relevance in such a global institution cannot be labeled feasible. Therefore, their impact is considered in the latter half of this chapter. Kennedy (2007) is one of the biggest skeptics among the models. In his perspective, the sincere projects to alter institutional arrangements do not meet with the needs of the present time. He criticizes legislative systems as such since the decisions are made in other institutions. The reader is left confused; it is not quite clear what Kennedy sees as relevant in all the criticism. It is true that legislation is not enough as such, even at the global level, but maybe it is precisely the fact that the global sphere lacks a center that many problems have arisen. His keen focus on the national level and the challenges to tackle national problems deserves attention but how long should those interested in reforming the global level wait until improvements at the national level are made successfully. Could the challenges not be handled at the same time, since global and national challenges are not exclusive. Kennedy fails to acknowledge the comprehensive view that the national and global levels are inter-linked and that by reforming the one the other is enhanced as well.

Roche (2003) writes with a technical-realist perspective when examining the UNPA. He accentuates that world federalism and the end of the state apparatus are not part of the mainstream political agendas of the present day UN aims. The emphasis is on issues of international governance which are similar to current UN objectives. He evaluates the rumors on Kantian models of world federalism as not being relevant in the present world. Interpreted against the retreat of the state theory, he stresses that the assembly does not try to replace the existing states, which is in discrepancy with the civil society model proposed by Falk and Strauss (2003). Roche argues that the fact that the civil society could rise and beat the large states is based on wishful thinking rather than on facts. He brings the discussion around the UNPA to the current international field and the main players. The USA, Russia and China would presumably not be interested in extending the powers of non-state actors. The Europeans, on their part, share the experience by the European integration. According to Roche, the emphasis placed on the influence of civil society actors might be a European dream. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that the UNPA would not only enhance democracy in the UN but also promote and increase democracy, civil society and good governance in the wider world. He does not present ideas but attainable goals that are probable in current world politics. In any event, he does not understand the idealism that is often behind transformation theories. The question is whether realistic views actually undermine the possible development paths that could take place in the future. Does skepticism delay positive development?

The majority of the interest towards the WP project arises from liberalism or liberal values. However, other political, ideological or theoretical approaches exist which criticize the world parliament or a UNPA. Laurenti (2003) neglects the power of the individual and civil society. Politicians undoubtedly possess relevant expertise on democracy enhancement but Laurenti ignores the possibility of cooperation between government representatives, the corporate world and the public sector, including the citizens and NGO's. His view of a parliamentary assembly is pessimistic. His account shows how realist policies still influence the current world, and he does see the state-centric view being questioned but regards it as absolute, unchanging and normal in the sense that all attempts are considered secondary to the prevailing conditions. Apart from some Americans, the majority of individuals in other countries as well might be uninterested in global news and discussions. It seems as if only the American public matters in constituting a parliamentary assembly when one reads Laurenti's views. A clear lack of understanding is the attitude towards dissenters from his perspective. He is so devoted to the status quo in the present institutional boundaries that he does not give other ideas

any chance. The global peace and justice movement requires a vision of the future. A global institution would enable direct participation of individuals and other actors in political processes encompassing the world. The state-centric world order can only be challenged when individuals are included in building international institutions. Once a world parliament is established, it would gradually gain in influence and reputation. After the establishment, citizen groups should begin exercising pressure on the governments to join in the process. Eventually, authoritarian governments would not be able to afford staying outside the process. The evolutionary process of the global parliament and democracy would probably take decades. During this phase, the parliament should adopt a moral duty to continue the work of civil society.

4.2 Beyond the models towards postmodern statehood

A world state has been the ultimate goal of many globalist thinkers. Before reaching this high goal, diplomacy is regarded as the intermediate phase or means before the ultimate ends. Nuclear weapons are the tools of this phase because they balance out the current system, as many IR theorists would point out. Traditional forms of foreign policy and diplomacy have also been linked to the principle of self-determination, an important part of inter-state relations. Critics of global parliamentary scenarios spotlight the very self-determination when changes to current paradigms are proposed. Their criticism is not directed to the theory of the retreat of the state but to the very concept of self-determination which is ultimately the point where a nation-state begins and ends. Symbolic institutions do not question self-determination in the extent that draw the attention of WP critics but everything standing out the conceptualization of symbolic bodies receives their concern. A feasible WP scenario must acknowledge the principle of self-determination and the hierarchies of power – from symbolic to radical – in the analysis because to state that the retreat of the state is a true fact would be misleading. Although many are willing to grant NGO's and individuals more power, the actual global world is still based on international relations in a literal sense of the concept.

With the establishment of a world parliament, the transformation towards a postmodern statehood would be inescapable and there would be transformation of the state when states give part of their jurisdiction to a global organization. This does neither suggest a retreat of the states but only diminished forms of state powers. In the instance of a WP, all three levels of the postmodern state – government, nationhood and economy – would be accomplished and each of them would have transformed. There is no doubt that even in present conditions, the modern statehood no longer exists, at least in

the developed world (refer to Sørensen). Some of the preconditions of postmodern state and multi-level governance already exist in the EU and other regional systems. What is missing at the global level is cosmopolitanism: it is among the few political projects that were launched thousands of years ago without ever being actually constituted. The models and scenarios in the previous chapters demonstrate that modesty and gradual approach bear the most signifying results. If modesty is combined with goal-oriented planning, the idea of a world parliament could be realized in the future.

In the theoretical framework, several peculiar termini – weak signs, *here be dragons* and the Black Swan – appeared that can now be interpreted in a new light. The first concept, weak signs (Hiltunen 2008), consists of the two elements, first symptoms and early information. First symptoms signify an unaccustomed change that makes the future look uncertain, since it is not sure what the change means. Early information, on the other hand, shows a low correspondence level between previous information, so the sign is hard to interpret. *Dragons* also lurk in the corners of the present day mental maps. Global governance still bears unrecognized spots due to challenges in the human desire to be in control and to find order in a chaotic world. The third concept, the Black Swan (Elahi 2010), signifies unpredictable events that massively affect the status quo. These summarizing comments on the three concepts can all be interpreted in the face of a world parliament. A WP can be any of those signs, although *here be dragons* and the Black Swan come closest to the nature of the world parliament as perceived in 2011. If the world parliament is constituted during this century, it diminishes the space left for the final frontier. A feasible world parliament would dramatically change the governance humans have ever invented and would bring global cooperation and peaceful measures to tackle common issues to a new level. Global democracy and international law would considerably gain added value. Without being too serious, this tremendous transformation would make something previously considered dystopian into utopian, without the utopia remaining unaccomplished. In the following chapter I examine whether this constellation is feasible within the next thirty years.

Without being too harsh, all of the 17 models contained possible features but only a few complete scenarios were both feasible and probable according to the standards of futures studies. The most deciding elements are how power shifts from states to the global level and how the argumentation follows from this towards suggestions of a world parliament. Another point is the dimension of legislative powers: what does it mean if a WP has operative legislative rights? What is the practical value of desirability, feasibility and credibility? All three concepts are very abstract but their input must be

linked to the practical level, otherwise scenarios remain unrealized. Before examining the scenario in chapter 5, Table 4 shows the analysis results based on the 17 models. The accounts were examined with five questions that were shortly introduced in the beginning of chapter 3.1. The table only acknowledges the main elements of each model.

Table 4. Summary on the dimensions of the models

| Author/s | Proponent of world parliament? | Why need for global change? | Main initiators of change/world parliament? | How to establish a world parliament? | Approach or methodology? |
|---|---|--|---|--|--|
| Falk, Richard & Strauss, Andrew (2003) | Yes for a UNPA | More direct democracy, global citizenship as a goal | Civil society, individuals, business representatives (neglects the role of the states) | Through a formal treaty or a public relations campaign, combination with the UNGA | Gradual perspective, idealistic, liberal |
| Heinrich, Dieter (2003) | Yes for a UNPA | A new world order; a moral duty; freedom from governmental control; discusses problems with non-democratic states | Citizens, individuals, former parliamentarians | Salaries from the UNPA directly (diminishes national influence); no consultative status | Pragmatic |
| Laurenti, Jeffrey (2003) | No to world federalism, world parliament and a UNPA | Current system better than the one proposed by world parliament enthusiasts | Diplomats and state representatives have the knowhow to deal with international issues | By overcoming the problem of inclusivity and exclusivity | Skeptical, anti-idealistic |
| Levi, Lucio (2003) | Yes, but does not adequately illustrate the form and purpose of the UNPA | New forms of statehood at the global level; need to control globalization through federalism; importance of law | Political parties, federalist states, the EU, NGO's | Direct elections of parliamentarians in cooperation with NGO's; world parliament | Gradual perspective, federalist, long-term goals |
| Roche, Douglas (2003) | No, rejects the idea of a world parliament and objects world federalism | Transparency, effectiveness of the UN, building democracy | States, parliamentarians | The UNPA as an Inter-Parliamentary Institution (IPI), consultative status, the UNGA as legislator | Technical-realist, pragmatic, skeptical |
| Schwartzberg, Joseph E. (2003 and 2004) | Yes for a UNPA; does not elaborate the share of individuals and civil society | World Parliamentary Assembly (WPA); reform of the UNSC and other organs important | Sovereign states | Professional Election Commission (EC); reform of the UN budget system; no deep solutions | Pragmatic, careful examination |
| Bummel, Andreas (2010a and 2010b) | Yes for a UNPA, no for world parliament | Change through present conditions, change of consciousness and understanding of world politics; lack to tackle important issues in the current UN system | Individuals, parliamentarians; parliamentarians; autonomous delegates according to "degressive proportionality" | Subsidiary body of the UN, later a main body; not a world parliament; gradual change, direct elections to be considered after the transition phase | Pragmatic, realistic, mathematical |
| Archibugi, Daniele (2007) | Yes | In order to defend and renovate the state of democracy in the aftermath of the war in Iraq | Democratic states, governments and citizens | By exporting democracy as an ends | Neutral, careful about the means to reach the end result |
| Baxi, Upendra (2007) | Yes for a GPA (in terms of an Assembly for Peoples) | To form a more pluralistic view of global democracy and to ensure a truly civil society rather than ahistorical global citizenry, emphasis on inclusion | World's dispossessed, deprived, and the disadvantaged peoples | No account of the practical steps towards a WP | Directed towards a special share of the WP |

| | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|---|--|---|---|
| Falk, Richard (2007) | Yes for a GPA | Normative changes for practical challenges | See <i>Strauss 2007</i> | See <i>Strauss 2007</i> | Pedagogic, educating, feasible |
| Franck, Thomas (2007) | A gradual and hesitant yes | To pass tribal nationalism and for enhancing developmental issues | World's governments | A directly elected second body of the UNGA | Gradual perspective, careful, concerned about the potential harmed role of the UNSC |
| Kennedy, David (2007) | No, skeptical of a world parliament | Current challenges are best solved by heterogeneity, interaction and ethical pluralism; erosion of capacity | Background institutions, not legislative bodies | Instead of legislative global bodies, the globe needs semi-autonomous systems | Skeptical, ironic |
| Patomäki, Heikki (2007) | Yes, based on a gradual process | As a strategy of global democratization, in order to overcome the indeterminacy of international law | A gradual process, including legal experts and sovereign states | Directly elected representatives (incl. national parliamentarians, civil society organizations); 2) a grouping of like-minded states. / Two chambers: first chamber for the directly elected citizen's representatives, the second chamber for legal experts (states, international courts, law school representatives) | Pragmatic, thorough, realistic, feasible |
| Strauss, Andrew (2007) | Yes for a GPA | The global arena lacks an authority representing world's citizens; moral need; to improve effective global governance | Interstate stand-alone treaty process between willing pioneers, i.e. internationally progressive states | Initially an advisory body, gradually direct elections; cooperation with the UNGA, eventually together with the UNGA a truly bicameral legislative system (legislative powers) | Thorough, systematic, gradual perspective, feasible |
| Johansen, Robert C. (2007) | Yes for an e-Parliament | Need for global democracy due to a democratic deficit, action deficit, resource deficit, vision deficit | Parliamentarians | By the participation of parliamentarians and individuals in the virtual decision-making on global issues | Gradual perspective, technical |
| Marchetti, Raffaele (2006) | Yes | The international political system is based on exclusion (moral unaccountability); need for cosmopolitan federalism | The rulers and the ruled; individuals (global citizenship); states would give part of their sovereignty to a global assembly | Through cosmofederalism: UN reform, establishing a central power and federative communities (double loyalty and subsidiarity); eventually goaling for a world government (global Charter) | Idealistic, gradual perspective, federalist, cosmopolitan, complex |
| Onesta, Gérard (2010) | Yes for UN-PA, but the account does not adequately illustrate practical considerations | To solve the diplomatic stalemate at the UN level and challenges in intergovernmental systems | National delegates (parliamentarians) | EP chronology in the background; goaling for direct universal suffrage; initially indirect powers, gradually proportional representation | Optimistic, general, federalist |

5. New scenario on the world parliament

A whole history remains to be written of spaces – which would at the same time be the history of powers (both of these terms in the plural) – from the great strategies of geopolitics to the little tactics of the habitat. (Michel Foucault, adopted from Murphy 1996, 81)

The concept of time and space alter with history. With the conclusion of the Cold War, we are facing a new global chapter in need of rewriting. With mental ‘spaces’ or maps, we can orienteer in futures through sceneries never seen before. The current multi-polar world is full of opportunities, both feasible and non-feasible. The idea of changing mental ‘spaces’ brings a new approach to the development of a new world order, either stressing retreat or state-centrism. The idea of a world parliament offers a new space, clearing room for global citizens. The space of sovereign states is narrowing down as it is not self-explanatory anymore. The opportunity of a transformation makes futures scenarios the more interesting and fascinating.

This chapter considers a new scenario, based on the consideration of the proposals made in chapters 4.1 and 4.2. In the end of the chapter, Table 5 displays a listed summary of the gradual transformation to a world parliament. Most of the examination in this chapter is devoted to a thorough analysis and impact-consideration, but issues concerning the building of cooperative circles of interested individuals, parliamentarians, NGO’s and business partners, and empowering international political parties as well as getting fundraising started are also considered. The scenario reaching the 2040’s cannot be detailed in the sense that each year is filled with tasks and objectives. The time frame of thirty years is relative and flexible. I will borrow feasible aspects from the other scenarios and models and try to build a world parliament that is plausible both in the short and long run. The aim is to write one normative scenario, because by avoiding several proposals I can avoid speculative what-if questions arising from the comparison between two or more scenarios. As scenario writing includes personal elements, the scenario might not please some readers, and one has to bear in mind that a longer time frame would have accomplished a different scenario altogether. Thirty years is naturally not enough, but the shorter the time frame, the more realistic and feasible it can be. A scenario reaching into the last decades of the 21st century goes too far; the technological and mental development concerning how future humans conceive their surroundings might have altered in a high altitude, making current scenarios look ridiculous.

The positioning of this thesis is that the present-day world is chaotic enough in order to need another catastrophe – be it nuclear or totalitarian – in the future. The aim is to offer a peaceful solution to the problems of global and parliamentary democracy. The

ideal world parliament should possess the following characteristics: sustainable democracy, cosmopolitan ideals, secularity, expertise in global events, goal-orientation, executive powers to act (when solving global problems) and actual conflict-solving mechanisms. Desirably, a world parliament should be invested with uncorrupted methods and a second instance should control its decision-making. This leads to further problematization if control institutions need to be “invented” in order of the main ship being able to sail. All of the elements cannot be reached in the next thirty years. What I can alter at this point, before moving on to the actual scenario, is the issue of cosmopolitanism and executive powers of the parliament. Cosmopolitan ideals form the background philosophy but they cannot be included in the short-term objectives, since they would change the nature of the world parliament by making drastic amendments to global governance. Therefore, cosmopolitanism can only be considered a long-term goal of peaceful governance. It provides the thin red line but it cannot be implemented on the practical agenda, i.e. all references to any form of cosmo-federalism are neglected at this point because global federalism is not feasible in 2011. On the note of executive powers, they should not be considered in connection to a world parliament, since they are a matter of a potential world government.

The future is formed of the consequences adopted in the past, thus future events always imply the significance they had in the past. When considering scenarios, ethical value judgments are made of the future, although the context of the judgments is based on the present resonance. Within time, ethical boundaries may shift, as does the degree of normality. During the late medieval times, the city states were at the time normal, and nation-states seemed unnatural for the solutions of organizing humans into social groups. This illustration has the purpose of shaking customary concepts. The scenario adopted here concerns a world parliament built outside the UN system. As the examples of the 17 models demonstrate, and especially the most feasible ones, a gradual change in the form of a new body is most desirable, not the least due to the difficulty of amending the UN Charter and finding approval among the UN members. The problem of examining a world parliament in the UN context is the level of relevance submitted to sovereign states. As the Westphalian state system is transforming, a flexible WP outside the UN has relatively more room for maneuver than what a reformed UNGA would have.

There are signs already supporting the fact that state sovereignty is loosing its grip on the information society and especially in economic matters. The UN, and in some terms the EU as well, serves as a good example of what might be established and what should be avoided. The UN is both an encouraging and a warning mechanism. The aim

is to avoid inefficient bodies in the long run: the new world parliament must have the means in the short run to accomplish them in the long run. Otherwise it becomes yet another platform for inefficient resolutions and discussions that have no actual effect on the future of the global arena. If the WP turns out to be a magnificent global institution with effective means and result-oriented status, it might put the future of the UNGA if not the whole UN system at stake in the long run. This does not exclude the fact that the WP, the UNGA and other UN bodies could cooperate on certain issues, such as delegating and deciding on the peace-keeping forces. An effective WP could have the effect of accelerating the UN reforms and thereby improving the old global organization where the membership basis is more inclusive. If the WP and UNGA were to cooperate, the division of their reciprocal relations and functions is left for future consideration.

This scenario is based on a step-by-step process. Each single step presupposes that the previous step has been taken, i.e. that the preconditions are already there for the next step. The order of the steps is not predetermined so the individual steps may occur within a flexible timeframe. For the closer consideration of a scenario, the 6-point list of Davis (2003) in the end of Appendix 3 helps to consider relevant issues for a world parliament and the actual process of setting up a global body. Davis' list examines what roadmaps and signposts one has to consider when creating a feasible pathway for a new institution. The third point on the list concerns a World Constitution. Such a framework or a world charter is needed. A Charter could be drafted by legal experts in international law from various instances. It would include detailed elements, in contrast to the general nature of the UN Charter, on how to act on the legislation of the parliament, how to respond to international disputes and crises, how to solve economic issues, how to organize global elections (including the election districts and the activities of the WP Secretariat), how to supervise the second chamber and how to react to violations of the Charter. These are exemplary issues so further content may be added to the list. The Charter or the Constitution could follow the example of national legal texts and national constitutions. It is important to draft the charter as inclusive as possible, as in the case of national laws, so that the legal interpretation is not all-you-can-eat, but sets a strict framework with agreed boundaries. The Charter should, however, withhold the right for new interpretation and set the conditions and rules for amending the Charter in the future.

Inclusion versus exclusion and in this instance especially the problem of strictness versus acceptance (concerning membership selection) should be discussed. The world parliament would not be all-inclusive. As the UNGA evidence shows, a club for all is hardly efficient and risks of being exploited by corrupted and authoritarian means for

undemocratic ends. A gradual “universal” suffrage is one of the important ends but the means must be more exclusive. Organizing global elections for citizens residing in authoritarian or totalitarian states is hardly feasible. The WP must stand firm on this: any forms of approaching undemocratic states in a forgiving manner proves counter-productive. The elections must be fair and free. The fact that the initial WP only comprises of democratic states (e.g. based on the results of independent sources; the results submitted by institutions such as the Freedom House might not be the best solution) hopefully stirs pressure by citizens in non-democratic states. This is highly speculative but it is an element that many of the scenarios refer to, so it might bear some truth. The negative counterpart of this speculation is that the statement is not true and that a closed circle of so-called “suitable” states has the effect of a dead-end. The states left outside the WP, as might happen to the big majority of the G77 states, might establish an organization of their own to show a counter actor against “elitist, Western democracies”. In order to avoid a future stalemate of the WP, anticipatory measures could be taken. This applies to the significance of popular support. As with the online UNPA campaign launched in 2007, the proponents and WP activists could organize themselves with persons from the IT and advertisement branch and set up a modern website presenting the future of the WP and its jurisdiction. As the UNPA project can be supported by anyone around the globe, polls and appeals could be organized to the extent citizens pursue the WP, in which format they would see the WP best fitted, and concerning the legislative powers of the parliament. The citizens could freely express their opinion, and these advisory views could be used for the architecture of the WP. The online campaign could interest NGO’s, inter-governmental organizations, global networks, regional groupings etc. Social networks should not be neglected, since they reach millions of persons.

On the question of networks, elections and jurisdiction, following remarks can be made. The first step to organize the establishment of a WP concerns the building of a network of WP enthusiasts around the globe. This group could include legal experts, parliamentarians, individuals from academic circles, the corporate world, NGO’s and governmental representatives with similar motives and desires for a WP. The group could then call a meeting for all interested in the project and draft a preliminary version of the WP Charter. The meeting could be organized for all interested, in the manner of the UNPA campaign, and not only for those from democratic countries. At this point, the discussion should remain general and the objective would be to build a larger network, chart guidelines, find agreements and disagreements, and make preparations for further steps towards a WP. On the national level, political parties and individual volun-

teers favoring deeper federalism could join the efforts. In the next thirty years, the aim is to constitute an advisory body for the coalition of the willing consisting of democratically elected states, individuals, NGO's, experts from legal and IR scholars etc. Later aims concern a body with full legislative powers and competence to make binding decisions. However, at the present moment, legal issues restrict the option of binding legislative powers of a supra-national body that does not yet exist. Once the group of like-minded persons is established, later steps are easier to take. Elections and competence are bound by the legal framework. Presently, only states can sign treaties with each other or existing international organizations. Therefore, the initial WP cannot possess competence that it does not legally have in the first place. Feasibility is in this case balancing between normative ideals and legal boundaries.

Fundraising cannot be considered an obvious mechanism, since the advertisement measures must bear real fruit. If the citizens do not support the WP due to failing advertisement measures, inadequate online campaigns or the lack of clearness in the portrayal of the nature and purpose of the WP (e.g. on the website), then the WP will be an organization without means. The World Parliament Secretariat (WPS), to be established during the first step (see Table 5) of the scenario, could organize advertisement activities intended for all layers of the population in the capitals of the potential member states, open a bank account for donations, employ face-to-face fundraising measures in big cities and employ other modern high-tech measures when making the WP campaign visible. The WPS does not need to be a large organization in the beginning but it cannot solely rely on volunteers. Employed staff should also be hired. Patomäki mentioned several options for collecting revenue and taxes to cover the expenses of the WP. These included the environmental taxes, proceeds from mining the seabed, travel taxes, global lottery, a global credit card, postal contributions etc. They could all be feasible, except for the arms sales tax. The relationship between the WP and taxes collected from morally questionable sources should be next to a minimum. Taxes from arms sales should be, if anything, directed to benevolent sources, but bringing in revenue from arms sale for the WP could harm the independent moral and ethical role of the WP. Legislative measures of the WP could in the long run include further measures to restrict and forbid arms sale, but at the same time the parliament would be dependent on its revenue, thus the danger lies in its moral dimension and potential circular resources. Therefore, the WP should refrain from receiving taxes from arms sale in the first place.

At this point, universal suffrage is excluded, since global membership is not included either. The suffrage will be, when the WP is established, given to the democratic

member states and their citizens. In a later phase the parliament, as has been agreed in the Charter or the Constitution, decides on legislative matters just like a national parliament does. The legislative functions of the first chamber of the WP could include economic, welfare-related and environmental issues, decisions concerning other global bodies (at a later point institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, UNGA etc., although this is still highly premature at this point), and other legislative matters in the fashion of national parliaments. Cooperation with the World Bank (WB) and the IMF would indicate that the WP has expertise in financial matters. The legislative powers would be binding on the members, and the WP could also issue sanctioning measures on those MP's and states not obeying to the common rules set by the Charter of the WP.

As to the structure of the world parliament, the WP would embrace two individual and independent chambers. In the beginning, both of the chambers would be advisory. In the future, the first chamber would extend its legislative rights and the second would be a legal institution with a more restricted number of members than the first one. The first chamber would be invested with minor oversight powers in regard to the second chamber and its righteous actions, so it could resort to the legal interpretation of the WP Charter. However, the second chamber is the actual body with oversight functions. The members of the chambers could be participants in one chamber only, so dual membership is excluded, since it could harm the daily work of the chambers. The first chamber would be more political, whereas the members of the second chamber need not be experts in policy-making, but rather experts in e.g. international law, human rights, international political economy, environmental issues and global governance. The experts in international law would require knowledge of punitive structures as well, through their expertise on the ICC, ICJ or the European court systems. At this point, the number of members in the first chamber influence the number of the entire chamber in the first place, so any calculations on the total number of first chamber MP's cannot be made at this point. However, as a mathematical exercise, we can speculate. If the first chamber comprised individual members of e.g. 40 member states, then the number of MP's would amount to approximately 250 members in total, as the number of MP's found in some medium-sized European state. The number of MP's from single states must be accountable to proportionality in terms of population. But, since the WP empowers global democracy, the structure of the parliament could be calculated based on several features making up to the total number of MP's. Population, the Human Development Index (HDI), level of corruption and transparency and the extent of the rule of law could

be used as indicators. As mentioned before, besides MP's from different states, the WP would embrace individual MP's from NGO's and other groups.

The issue of jurisdiction returns us to the problem of legitimacy. If the WP gained legislative powers and had its members elected through suffrage, then which instance would grant these large powers to the WP? Since sovereign states hold the strings of international politics, they would have to surrender part of their powers to the supra-national level. In order for something as radical as a WP to take considerable ground, power must shift from somewhere else, in this case presumably from both sovereign states and/or other global organizations. The new power structure cannot be created overnight from nothing. Therefore expert panel discussions, expert opinion-making, mathematical calculations and advertisement have to be made for the WP. The dilemma has its sides: the democratic sovereign states lose part of their powers, but they also gain new legislation by being members of a global institution. Here, the meaning of partial retreat of the state would be materialized, although the postmodern state would return in a new format. Although a world parliament is in the sense misleading that it would not be a WORLD parliament in its literal sense, at least in the beginning, the status of a real WP would be added in a later development phase. As the example of the EU suggests, regional forums can be created successfully and states can be willing to give part of their jurisdiction to the global level. More than anything, the WP is a process: to put the euro as a currency into practice took more than a decade after stage one of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe in the early 1990's.

What remains is the impact of other members than individual MP's. Often regional federations or unions are compared when global institutional architecture is under scrutiny. As the UN has observer members (international organizations, entities, and non-member states), the WP could employ indirect membership measures as well. This would then apply to regional organizations, such as the EU or the African Union (AU), entities such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the IPU and other organizations with non-member status, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization in the UNGA. The permanent and non-permanent observers would not be allowed to vote in the WP, but the observer status would lend more global credibility to a world parliament. As the original members – states and non-governmental organizations – could make binding decisions on the future criteria of membership selection, new members would have to fulfill the required criteria, as in the case of the EU enlargement procedure. The issue of specific criteria is too detailed and dependent on multiple issues, so they will not be covered in this thesis.

Before the summary table, the final contextual examination concerns supra-national parties. Unique parties beyond the national level are a good goal when citizen involvement is concerned. Individuals are political animals and the establishment of single-handedly regional or global parties could excite the citizens to do follow-up at the supra-national level. Currently, the European parties represented in the EP are extended national parties that only in theory have common denominators although the national MEP's are divided according to party divisions and not according to countries in the EP. Still, as long as the suffrage methods are not changed, real European parties cannot be formed. Reaching political parties is not among the hardest tasks of the WP. Using the EP as an example, the European parliament could organize its elections in the manner of party politics. Politicians could have dual party membership and they could be members of national parties and of new regional parties that candidate in the EP elections. MEP's could only get elected through supra-national parties; i.e. they could not be EP candidates in national parties. Slowly a new identity would be created, clearing room for the further development of global parties.

Table 5. Summary of the time frame of the scenario

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|---------------------------|--|
| 1. step: 2011-2020 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Open-minded advertisement campaigns and global polls for the support of the WP: use of social networks and other internet channels. Advertisement directed to the citizen level, for parliamentarians, NGO's and prominent societal figures. Establishing a WP website. b) Global lottery, face-to-face actions, short-term employed personnel in big cities around the globe. Other revenue and taxing resources. c) Establishment of global/regional political parties. d) "Collecting" a database of legal and political experts from law schools, universities, national ministries and other institutions, international and national courts etc. e) Organizing fundraising; setting up of a donation pool for the future benefit of the WP. f) Setting up the union of democratic states, international organizations and regional groups and/or organizations willing to establish a world parliament. g) Setting up of the World Parliament Secretariat (WPS), recruiting employees and researchers (scientific studies and reports on feasible measures of the WP). h) Draft of the WP Charter/Constitution according to results of meetings. |
| 2. step: 2020-2030 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Experts and parliamentarians (e.g. MEP's with international experiences) organize a Model WP Conference to consider practical issues and potential problems. b) Report and monitoring of the results based on the model conference, improvement of the previous standards. c) Decision on the election districts, membership selection (total number of members in the 1st and 2nd chambers, number of national and regional members), selection criteria for observer members. WSP to prepare for the execution of the coming elections. e) Review of the WP Charter/Constitution. |
| 3. step: 2030-2040 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Direct elections (around 2032) in the member states and organizations of the advisory WP. Election of the expert members of the 2nd chamber. b) Agenda setting of the new elected WP. c) Beginning of the daily work of the WP. d) Decision on the selection criteria for future members. |

| | |
|---|---|
| | e) Monitoring of potential cooperation mechanisms with other global, regional and national institutions and organizations (e.g. UNGA, IMF, WB). f) Independent reports on the success and failing issues of the WP. |
| 4. step: 2040's until late 2090's (speculative)? | a) <i>Extension of the jurisdiction and legal powers of the WP chambers from an advisory to a legislative status. Potential change in the election system (towards supra-national suffrage and regional – non-national – election districts.</i> b) <i>Enlargement of the membership of the WP.</i> c) <i>Increasing number of democratic states at the global level.</i> d) <i>Potential EU federalism and intensification of other regional communities.</i> |

In the first 2032 elections, the representatives would not be selected from non-national regional districts but the states would set up a candidate list for their citizens. Also non-governmental organizations accepted as permanent members of the WP would have a certain number of seats in the parliament, according to the size of the organization. Little by little the suffrage could be extended beyond the national scope, depending on the development of non-national political parties. The elections would be executed every eight years, a frame long enough to support the efficiency of the parliament. The UN would not be able to participate as a member of the WP, since the WP needs to remain an independent body outside the UN system.

As Table 5 indicates, not all of the aspects under each step must be taken, and the practical choices may be different, when the time is there. The individual points under each step and time frame are meant to be simultaneous, i.e. they take place within one decade. Step 4 in the table reveals the time frame beyond the experiment of futures studies which was intended here. The space devoted to further examination includes thoughts for the further development of this subject. The time spectrum tends to favor both drastic and short gradual changes in the international arena. The WP must remain a moral authority at all times, embracing the development of democratic standards, universal understanding of human rights (without the violation of cultural differences, as long as individuals are not harmed) and the equal worth of all citizens no matter of nationality, gender, age, cultural and religious or social background etc. The WP must embrace secularism in its actions and in print: the WP Charter cannot have any elements of religious signs (refer to the discussion on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and the desire of some parties to include the significance of the common Christian background in Europe). By avoiding any discriminatory measures, the WP remains an organization with a bright future.

The scenario is intended to show a possible route towards a WP. Issues regarding revenue need further specification, as do the definition of democracy, legislative rules, functions and thematic topics. The main task of the WP, before its legislative powers

are extended, is to offer advisory opinion on legal, political, economic and other matters. At the time of the Charter amendment, the WP must acknowledge existing international laws and treaties as well as national legislation that could affect its powers. To be honest, this scenario is very optimistic in regard to the level of achievement in the 2040's. In order for all the steps to be taken according to the time frame presented, the world parliament is very lucky. Some of the aspects of the step-by-step process are intended as recommendable features, but usually the practice shows that best solutions are found outside the original plan. The intention is to normatively contribute to the discussion on global parliamentary assemblies and democracy deficit in world politics.

In the introduction, ten research questions were outlined. They have been answered throughout chapters 3 to 5, but short summarizing answers will be given to each question. The time of thirty years was chosen because both the preparatory and actual steps concerning the establishment of a world parliament demand several decades. In regard to revenues and funding, the selection of members in the both chambers of the world parliament, the constituting of the WPS and the founding of real global parties need implementation, planning and executive measures. These are among the steps to be taken during the first phase of implementation, so the actual organization of elections, drafting the Charter and revising previous plans on jurisdiction, legislation and the legal boundaries demand more time. Therefore, twenty to thirty years are the absolute minimum for any desirable world parliament.

Question (1) concerned feasibility, credibility and desirability. A world parliament that fulfills all three elements is constituted gradually by implying democratic and legal measures for members from exclusively democratic states and groups. A feasible WP is in the short run advisory but legislative in the longer perspective and it can cooperate with and advice other international organizations. On the question (2), the world parliament should adopt a cosmopolitan philosophy to guide its workings, but any considerations of global federalism should be neglected both in the short and long term. If regional entities embrace federalism and it becomes a feasible option at the global level, then cosmopolitanism could be reconsidered. Question (3) referred to the causal relationship between the world parliament and sovereign entities and the delegation of powers from the latter to the former. Only a feasible world parliament that has pre-designed jurisdiction and legal boundaries can attract sovereign states and other organizations. As the body would be a coalition of the willing, the members of the WP would lose some of their powers at the global level but they would also gain more symbolic

powers in the coalition. The WP enthusiasts must make a visible campaign so that the sovereign states can enter into a new relationship with a global parliament.

Question (4) implied structural elements. The main objective of the WP would be to safeguard peace and international law and offer legal and political advice in cases when international law has been violated. An advisory world parliament can adopt measures to pressure anti-democratic states and a legislative WP could influence national policy-making and attract new members in the manner of the current EP. Question (5) discussed possible future challenges of the WP and the role of international law. A severe problem is the situation in which the WP evolution stops at a crucial point before its true powers are acquired or that it remains a closed circle of a small number of members. It is similarly problematic if the WP is overrun by another organization or that its legal framework bears no efficient impact on the national or global decision-making structure. The fact that international law already influences global decision-making is a crucial asset than enables the functions of the WP. International law helps to maintain the important status of human rights and it can sanction violations.

Currently, there is not an international body that considers the role and the rights of global citizens (question 6). By representing citizens, the dimension of global democracy gains new ground and proves to be a vital element of promoting peace. In reference to question (7), citizens would have the right to vote for MP's. The WP would have national quotas for persons but also for NGO's and non-permanent members. As any legal framework, the Charter of the WP sets out the restrictive rules and mechanisms of the WP and decides on the election procedure. Question (8) is connected to question (3). The colorful members of the world parliament would invest their expertise in the WP because modern statehood has transformed and global decision-making is becoming more important. Sovereign states are the strong force behind the success of a WP, therefore the retreat of the state theory in question (9) is still irrelevant at this point. However, a new statehood has replaced the realist vision of world politics: states can cooperate with other global actors. Finally on the question (10), sovereign states that sign treaties, should realize that the postmodern statehood has become factual and understand the new rules of the game. The Westphalian system is a construction and it can be replaced by new forms of governance and imply democratic measures and efficiently maintain peace on Earth.

6. Conclusions

What happens when you find – if you find – an animal believed extinct? (...) It happened so seldom. Something about a star of honor from the UN and a stipend. A reward running into millions of dollars. (Dick 2009, 187-188)

What one faces here is a familiar dilemma for humans. In the science fiction novel *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* by Philip K. Dick, the World War Terminus has filled Earth with dust. The UN has encouraged humans to emigrate to off-world colonies. Humans remaining on Earth cling to Empathy Boxes linking them to a collective consciousness based on the religion of Mercerism. Fake or real animals are the true objects of human empathy and they raise one's status in the dystopian society. The protagonist in the novel manages to purchase a real goat that is killed by an android. After the loss of the goat, the protagonist almost finds an animal believed extinct. Animals with the label 'extinct' are like lottery prizes that are rewarded so seldom that the quest becomes a never-ending adventure. Establishing a world parliament after a long hour of stagnation in the Westphalian state system signifies a change in both scope and space. It might seem unlikely to establish a world parliament but many feasible elements speak in its favor. The parenthesis of a goat and a world parliament is not too far-fetched: cosmopolitan thinkers cling to the idea of a world parliament like the protagonist to his goat. There has never been anything of the multitude that a global legislative body would bring about. Initially, it might not seem as mentality-changing as it seems, but the fact that an initially advisory global institution would make binding decisions on political, economic and legal affairs in the long run is revolutionary. Transformation always anticipates gradual movement: the scope and space of the procedural steps make the change relevant. However, if we consider a time span from 2011 into early 2040's, too broad calculations cannot be made. The time span of thirty years is very short for ground-breaking inventions and interventions.

In a dispersed multi-polar world, new solutions are needed as soon as possible. Cosmopolitan ideals have been on the philosophical agenda for several millennia. However, after the fixed establishment of the Westphalian state system, nationalistic policies, political games fought between states and economic competition have come to interfere and often hinder global decision-making. Democracy deficit and the weakness of international law have caused many academics to develop ways of better global policy-making. Hence, we arrive at the discussion on the parliamentary assemblies, world parliament and in some cases, even world government. Are the normative models doomed for failure, as has been the case with cosmopolitan theories so far? The sovereign state

does not date back but a few hundred years but it has invented a tradition, hard to amend and challenge. Sovereignty is a settled form of state execution because it is rooted in several international treaties, organizations and inter-state relations. The questioning of its legitimacy requires adequate and well-thought measures. However, democracy stands for representation of the peoples and this cannot be expunged from the individuals. Civil society actions, although they are mostly based in certain states, have the ability to cross state boundaries and find networks outside the borders. With the awareness of the individuals of their own powers and opportunities, the knowledge of civil society movements, groups and relations develop and bridge the gap between different peoples around the globe. Globalization, though it includes negative side effects, contains positive features in networking skills that people increasingly adopt, regardless of distance.

What will happen with the WP campaign? Definitively, the impact and future of the world parliament or parliamentary assemblies cannot find an ultimate answer here, although each contribution adds a new slice to the global cake. The process has begun at the ideational level, thus suggesting a transformation in the perspective to consider improved global decision-making. The sovereign states are not wished to wither away, therefore the theory of the retreat of the state is premature. Most of the models agree that transformation has partially taken place, nonetheless a discussion on the retreat of the state is too early at the moment, since the nation-states are strongly holding on to their sovereignty. This cannot be neglected over a short period of time but sovereignty can eventually change its nature. Along the argumentation by Sørensen, transformation of the states is more factual than fictional. The question remains which one is more important, the states or the individual rights and human justice. Cosmopolitan democratic models, cosmopolitan philosophy in general and theories on world parliament tend to be of Western origin, and projects originating in the developed world pose a severe problem of universality. It is a matter of a long lasting rivalry between state-bound realism, Western liberalism and a third factor standing for the theories of the developing world. Europe has been under constant observation with its struggle over the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE). The current economic and fiscal crisis is not contributing to a brighter future either. Many WP and UNPA proponents have put great faith in the development of the political development at the EU level (including the practical establishment of the Lisbon Treaty), relieving the further progress of universal regional entities and eventually the finalization of the world parliament project.

Futures studies is a unique opportunity to consider possible and probable events in the future. It can be either normative or forewarning in nature, depending on the ultimate perspective. In reference to Bell in Appendix 2, prospective thinking can improve human life on Earth. Futurists are interested in causal relationships and actions that lead to change. Probable futures are multiple, conditional and uncertain. We can give possible accounts on how the global policy and citizenship representation should best be organized, or we can give exemplary signs of how it should definitively not be done. The past teaches us lessons and the present is formed through experiences in the past. We can ask ourselves whether we can continue to make humble offers on the possible future path. The plan can be persuasive and epic, but we have to offer humble gradual steps regarding the practical execution of the master plan. Global networks and the social media are successful in engaging the citizen level and bringing the information of the various reform proposals concerning global institutions to those interested in global affairs. It is vital to realize that the WP project needs the support of individuals before it can proceed to the first concrete step towards the establishment of a real parliament. The project is doomed to fail if it is only driven from above by persons themselves engaged in political processes and democracy.

The European Parliament, other regional parliaments and NGO level organizations have become proponents of the UNPA campaign. Multiple signs are in favor of the UNPA campaign as the most feasible option to carry out a parliamentary assembly. Other regional communities are rather weak in comparison to the EP but they could get involved by the example of the Parliament. Individuals need feasible solutions, and by offering these the general public may find interest in institutional projects outside the UN realm. As has been suggested on many occasions in this thesis, the changes to reform the UNGA or amend the UN Charter are minor. Therefore, the WP manages to avoid heavy bureaucracy and the burden of inefficient decision-making at the UN level.

One should not be overtly pessimistic if the world parliament is not established in thirty years. The constitution of large global institutions is slow but the biggest steps are taken in the development phase. After the ideational phase is bypassed, practical matters follow smoother. Gradually the comprehensive bigger picture is acquired, and after the first step, others are significantly easier to take. After the future establishment of a WP, the concept of sovereignty should be reconsidered. The global parliament could exercise global control over regions and states, dependent on the form of states at the time, which would enable the supervision of democratic actions. If such a mechanism was undertaken, the individuals would suffer less from political persecution as in the current

situation, since the sovereignty paradigm prohibits partial interference in intra-state affairs. With the building of a world parliament the importance of international law and global judicial institutions would increase. E.g. the ICC could become a major player in international law after the establishment of the WP.

Problems remain to be answered and further considerations can be made for future purposes. One question concerns a potential UNPA. How reasonably can a global parliament absorb anti-democratic fanatic groups that do not accept the legitimacy of enhanced democratic global institutions? The presence of the global parliament would affect the power of anti-democratic forces and diminish their influence. The originally exclusive nature of the world parliament can easier answer the question than the all-inclusive UN. The campaign on the UNPA is generally speaking a liberal project, accentuating secular visions and common understanding between different cultures, policies and ideologies. In the exclusive form, the WP would equally be, at least in the beginning, a community of progressive states and organizations. Liberalism is not a traditional political ideology but it is nonetheless a strand of thought not welcomed by all. It can be criticized and praised for the same reasons: it is perceived as Western and, in regard to world parliamentary proposals, in some sense cosmopolitan, these two sometimes going hand in hand. Cosmopolitanism rarely finds support in non-Western regions. However, there are also proponents of the WP in the non-Western world who can contribute to the establishing of a world parliamentary assembly and destroy the illusions that the WP would only be intended for certain progressive Western states and groups. The future of global democracy would also have to find a compromise between conservative and transformative proposals, that is, between the adhering to the current systems and the change paradigm. The second issue is linked to the current UN institutions that have undergone a process of downsizing, neo-liberalization and demoralization during the 21st century. These elements combined with the current euro crisis and economic catastrophes in single European countries exacerbate the benign UN and EU projects. In these circumstances, the world parliament could strike foot.

The aim of this thesis was to consider feasible aspects of models and to establish a new scenario based on the plausible elements in the analysis and to develop new measures to constitute a world parliament. The dissenting and critical opinions also gave insight into the range and scale of the issue. A thorough assessment of the proposals provides for the possibility to find a quintessence between the different lines of thought. One must be realist in the sense that the project towards the world parliament demands a long-term plan with gradual steps. Compromises have to be accepted, otherwise the ad-

vancement of the process will be hindered. As Held conveniently put it, advocating cosmopolitanism possesses no guarantees but it embodies a determinacy to strive for the reform. The excitement of uncertainty keeps the reformer alert and in the state of readiness. At the same time, futures studies helps to face the uncertainties with probable and possible solutions.

The topic of the thesis could be further developed by implementing a deeper examination of the relationship between cosmopolitan models and state sovereignty by analyzing for example Sørensen's, Held's and Archibugi's theories with a new perspective. A progress of the WP project gives clues on how to compare state sovereignty against cosmopolitan projects. With new scenarios and models being published, new feasible elements can be collected and compared with the potential level of practical advance towards a WP. The significance of academia is powerful when the academic forces are combined with legal and political experts in the policy-making world.

The academics in social sciences have elaborated the idea of returning hegemonies similar to the Roman Empire or to the Middle Ages when several centers of hegemony reigned the world. The empires have usually not been connected with sovereign states. However, large empires seldom represent themselves as proponents of a power center above them. The USA serves as a conceivable candidate for an empire and hence forms a threat to the campaign for the parliamentary assembly where the long-term goals aim at a diminished role for states. Adapting the original idea of Francis Fukuyama, the global sphere might some day experience a victory of value liberalism and the end of American neo-liberalism striven for by the United States. Empires have usually expired at some point in history, therefore, sovereignty and the institutionalized power of states cannot be regarded as sacred either. A probable alternative for the sovereign states are the city states – called a *polis* during the antique world. Scenarios that speak for the establishment of a world parliament often see regional areas coming into a closer cooperation at the expense of states. What the world parliament could do is to gradually undermine the role of states by favoring cooperation with other entities as well. In order to safeguard peace and avoid war, peaceful nations could see the world parliament as an opportunity in a similar manner and time as when the European Coal and Steel Community was established. These elements would signify the return to history, to the birth time of cosmopolitan thinking, sprung into life by the Cynic movement in Ancient Greece. In the end, one remains in the hope that establishing a world parliament would not be as hard as discovering a thought-to-be-extinct animal species and have the UN grant a reward for it.

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Appendices

Appendix 1

The cosmopolitan model of democracy (Held 1995, 271-272.)

1. The global order consists of multiple and overlapping networks of power involving the body, welfare, culture, civic associations, the economy, coercive relations and organized violence, and regulatory and legal relations. The case for cosmopolitan democracy arises from these diverse networks.
2. All groups and associations are assumed to have a capacity for self-determination which can be specified by a commitment to the principle of autonomy and specific clusters of rights and obligations. These clusters cut across each network of power and are subsumed under the following categories: health, social, cultural, civic, economic, pacific and political. Together, they form the basis of an empowering legal order – a cosmopolitan democratic law.
3. Legal principles are adopted which delimit the form and scope of individual and collective action within the organizations and associations of state, economy and civil society. Certain standards are specified for the treatment of all, which no political regime or association can legitimately violate.
4. Law-making and law enforcement can be developed within this framework at a variety of locations and levels, along with an expansion of the influence of regional and international courts to monitor and check political and social authority.
5. The defence of self-determination, the creation of a common structure of political action and the preservation of the democratic good are the overall collective priorities; the commitment to democratic autonomy creates both an agenda of long-term change and a programme of urgent priorities, focused on transforming the conditions of those whose circumstances fall radically short of equal membership in the public realm.
6. Determinate principles of social justice follow: the modus operandi of the production, distribution and the exploitation of resources must be conducive to, and compatible with, the democratic process and a common structure of political action.
7. The principle of non-coercive relations governs the settlement of disputes, though the use of force must remain a collective option of last resort in the face of clear attacks to eradicate cosmopolitan democratic law. Cosmopolitan democracy might justify the deployment of force, after all other forms of negotiation and sanction have been exhausted, in the context of a threat to international democracy and a denial of democratic rights and obligations by tyrannical regimes, or by circumstances which spiral beyond the control of particular peoples and agents (such as the disintegration of a state).
8. People can enjoy membership in the diverse communities which significantly affect them and, accordingly, access to a variety of forms of political participation. Citizenship would be extended, in principle, to membership in all cross-cutting political communities, from the local to the global.

Appendix 2

Nine major tasks of futures studies (Bell 1997, 75-97 and 111-113)¹⁷

1. **The study of possible futures:** Looking at the present in new and different ways, often deliberately breaking out of the strait-jacket of conventional, orthodox, or traditional thinking and taking unusual, even unpopular, perspectives. It involves expanding human choice. Present possibilities for the future are real, and present capabilities for change and development are factual. The potential for future development and growth exists in the present and, thus, can be investigated.
2. **The study of probable futures:** Focus on the question of what the most likely future of some specified phenomenon would be within some stated time period and under specified contingencies. The phenomenon may be nearly anything imaginable. One question is, what would the most probable future of some specified phenomenon be if things simply continue as they are? If the phenomenon whose future is under consideration is influenced by human actions, then the question can be rephrased, what would the most probable future be if we humans continue to behave as we do? Both questions invite the study of the present in order to have a base from which to forecast. They also invite the study of past trends up to the present. Scenarios make different assumptions about conditions and then calculate probable consequences for the future. This requires knowledge, and the futurists are interested in cause-and-effect relationships.
3. **The study of images of the future:** A basic concern of futurists. Most futurists share several important conceptual and theoretical commitments. One is the concept of “image of the future”, or some nearly equivalent idea such as “developmental construct”, “expectations”, “anticipations”, “hopes” and “fears”. Another is the theoretical proposition that images of the future help share the historical actions that people take, i.e. futurists see images of the future as being among the causes of present behavior, as people either try to adapt to what they see coming or try to act in ways to create the future they want. Images of the future are among the causes of the future as it becomes the present.
4. **The study of the knowledge foundations of futures studies:** Any field of knowledge faces the question of how it knows what it claims to know, of stating and justifying its epistemological foundations. Another purpose of the futures field is to provide philosophical grounds for the knowledge.
5. **The study of the ethical foundations of futures studies:** Follows directly from the futurist purpose of exploring *preferable* futures. In order to assess the desirability of alternative futures, futurists must study, evaluate, and apply human goals and values. They may also investigate human nature, the larger natural world, and even the cosmos in search of the meanings and purposes of life in order to find justifications for their value standards. It includes the exploration of people’s value judgments underlying their notions of the good society. The study and fostering of deep caring about the freedom and welfare of future generations are among the most important purposes of futures studies.
6. **Interpreting the past and orientating the present:** We use the past to guide our present behavior and to help construct our images of the future. Our beliefs about the past can help shape our beliefs about the future. To decide what to do *now* is largely what futures thinking is all about. Futures thinking is both indispensable to and consequential for (1) interpreting the past, (2) understanding the present, (3) deciding and acting in the present, and (4) balancing the use of present and future resources.
7. **Integrating knowledge and values for designing social action:** Futurists must organize and focus a great deal of disparate knowledge and critically examine the relevance of many different values. Action, unlike research, is not granular, reductionist, and analytic. Things cannot be held constant, separated into small bits for investigation out of their context and function, nor can “other things” assumed to be equal. Action is holistic and synthetic. Values other than those defining the intended goals of action may be af-

¹⁷ This appendix consists for the most part of direct quotations but some sentences have been shortened.

fect, perhaps negatively, and they must be taken into account in decision making. Images of the future are involved in designing social action. They provide the goals and the motivation. Policymaking and decision making themselves always involve social science knowledge, since they are social processes.

8. **Increasing democratic participation in imaging and designing the future:** Most futurists include among the purposes of futures studies the goal of increasing democratic participation in the processes of imaging and designing the future. There is considerable evidence that such democracy contributes toward human betterment more than authoritarianism.
9. **Communicating and advocating a particular image of the future:** Some futurists aim at overarching visions that have transcendent elements. They may include speculative and creative images of “the other” perfect society, contradictions of the present, discontinuous futures that foretell the coming of new and different worlds. They aim to surpass the limits of the now, the limits of present understanding, and the limits of past experience. Drastic social change is sometimes envisioned. Futurists may be involved in all three – as well as imaginative visioning – as they disseminate particular images of the future, evaluate them as desirable or undesirable, and then advocate, more or less explicitly, practical social actions either to bring them into reality or to prevent them from occurring. They may construct and communicate images of global overshoot and collapse, while advocating policies to prevent such images from becoming reality. Such futurists become part of the political dialogue, since futurists are not imprisoned in an ivory tower. Futurists aim to contribute to human betterment by translating knowledge and values into action.

Conclusion: The overriding purpose of futures studies is to maintain or improve human well-being and the life-sustaining capacities of the Earth, the futurist’s distinctive contribution being *prospective thinking*. Futurists seek to know what causes change and seek to determine what anticipated changes may have to be accepted because they are, temporarily, that is, at a given time and place, or intrinsically and always, beyond human control. They also seek to determine what can be changed by human actions, what trends can be accelerated or prevented, or what phenomena are amenable to individual or collective human action. Additionally, futurists are concerned with prediction in the general sense of making assertions or statements about the future. Although prediction is a necessary aspect of futures studies, futurists seldom predict a single, unconditional, and certain future. Rather, futurists’ predictions are usually multiple, conditional, contingent, corrigible, and uncertain. Finally, futurists have no intention of trying to monopolize futures studies. Nearly every discipline and field can include, if it doesn’t already, a future and future conditional tense.

Key assumptions of futures studies (Bell 1997, 140-157)

1. **The meaning of time:** Time is continuous, linear, unidirectional and irreversible. Events occur in time before or after other events and the continuum of time defines the past, present and future. Human conceptions of time rest in part on cosmology which is, after all, about the secrets of the universe.
2. **The possible singularity of the future:** Not everything that will exist has existed or does exist. Past time may not be a good sample of all time. If we are not continually re-living past time, nor always facing again the exact events that have occurred before, and if we are not moving in circular, repetitive time, then the future as it becomes the present contains some events, happenings, processes, structures that have never occurred or existed before. Without social change, of course, societies and the repetitive patterns of social behavior that define them remain nearly the same, subject only to random variations and errors in behavior that more or less average out around a norm and, perhaps, leave no permanent mark. Even when there is change, if it is slow enough, people may not notice the minor adaptations that they make and how their present customs slowly drift away from their past behavior. Without rapid social change, our cog-

nitive maps of the past and present work reasonably well for the future, since the future is similar to the past, or at least is similar enough (...). But with rapid change, our cognitive maps of the past and present may be so out of date that they no longer are accurate or even recognizable representations of the future as it becomes present reality. When that happens, we need to construct new maps that correspond to the changed world, if we wish to act effectively. The awareness of the disjunction and the process of such construction obviously raise doubts about the moral bases of society and invite both social criticism and the effort to justify traditions in the face of new ways of doing things. In this way, crises of legitimacy of authority occur.

3. **Futures thinking and action:** Futures thinking is essential for human action. Action requires anticipation. People have reasons to act. In this sense, action is explained by its final cause, its goal.
4. **The most useful knowledge:** In making our way in the world, both individually and collectively, the most useful knowledge is 'knowledge of the future'. We steer ourselves through time, as well as through physical and social space, according to our goals, our expectations of future happenings, and our anticipations of the possible and probable future time trajectories of other people. The more we know about the possibilities and probabilities of the coming events of the future, the better able we are to plan the actions that create our lives. Whether we are remembering or forgetting the past, the most useful knowledge for the design of effective action is 'knowledge of the future'.
5. **Future facts?:** The future is nonevidential and cannot be observed; therefore there are no facts about the future. This assumption may be one of the few things on which almost all futurists are in agreement. The concept of future means something 'not yet and nowhere'. The future is a domain of uncertainty. It is problematic. As cognizant beings and as researchers of the future, we face considerable trouble from this fact. Thus, we do the best we can, formulating assertions about the future – usually a range of alternative futures – on which we can act *as if they were true*. Yet there are some things about the future that appear to be so certain that for all practical purposes we can rely on them. The sun will surely appear to rise tomorrow morning. Death still looms as our individual destiny, although we don't know how, when, or where it will happen. These and many other future events appear to be sure bets. Yet, no matter how sure, they are still bets. What we can do in order to increase the effectiveness of our actions is to increase the probabilities that our statements about future happenings are *presumptively* true at the time we assert them. Assertions about the future can never be accepted as absolutely certain. They are not facts. But, if they pass objective and rational tests, they are conjectural knowledge, that is, presumptively true, and can be used to design action *as if* they were true.
6. **An open future:** The future is not totally predetermined. Futurists do not think of the future as fixed and existing out there in time bearing down on us in some inevitable way. The future offers opportunity and contingency. Thus, we don't "discover" the future, because there is no pre-existing future "out there" to discover. Within the limits of the possible, the future is open, and the domain of liberty and power. Liberty because people are free to conceive that something which does not now exist will exist in the future. And power because people have some power to validate their conception through their willful actions. Some aspects of the future are more open than others. The future from this point of view is an assemblage of different possibilities, contingencies, near certainties and uncertainties, constraints and opportunities, some more probable than others. This raises the question of free will versus determinism.
7. **Humans make themselves:** To a greater or lesser degree future outcomes can be influenced by individual and collective action. This is one of the fundamental tenets of futures studies: we ourselves help to create the future with our own present decisions and actions. We seek not only to know the future, but also to control it. One has to determine how much of the contingent future is subject to human will and how much is not. What can be changed with what degree of likelihood and with what amount of human effort and what cannot be changed? One bias that must be guarded against is focusing too much on producing change and overcoming the status quo. This is not to say that "overcoming the status quo" is excluded from the futurist agenda. Quite the contrary is the case. But one option is to ask what parts of the present are of value and should be

preserved. Also, planned change often must be selective and carried out within a context of maintaining and using some things in order to improve others. Although futurists generally believe that it is possible to create better worlds than existing ones, they temper – or ought to temper – their general enthusiasm for change by reminding themselves and others that it is quite possible to create worse ones as well.

8. **Interdependence and holism:** The interdependence in the world invites a holistic perspective and a transdisciplinary approach, both in the organization of knowledge for decision making and in social action. Futurists view the world as so interrelated that no system or unit can be viewed as totally isolated. One implication of the interrelatedness in the world is that a holistic, all-encompassing perspective is necessary for adequate decision making and social action.
9. **Better futures:** Obviously, if futurists propose and critically assess preferable futures, they must believe that: Some futures are better than others. People judge outcomes as being more or less preferable. If this were not true, if any outcome were just as good as any other, then it would hardly be necessary to be concerned about the future and to work for one kind of future rather than another. Futurists accept, as part of their tasks, helping people to assess alternatives, to explicate value judgments, and to examine critically the basis on which such value judgments are made.

General assumptions of futures studies (Bell 1997, 157-164)

1. **People and their projects:** People are creative project pursuers; they are acting, purposeful and goal-directed beings.
2. **Society as expectation and decision:** Society consists of the persistent patterns of repetitive social interaction and the emergent routines of human behavior that are organized by time and space, expectations, hopes and fears for the future, and decisions.
3. **The existence and knowledge of external reality:** An external past reality did exist and a present reality does exist, apart from the human knowing of them, and in principle they can be objectively known by humans more or less accurately. Additionally, futurists assume that a future reality will exist, apart from the human consciousness of it, and that in principle assertions can be made about it that can be objectively warranted more or less accurately.

Appendix 3

A Conceptual Framework to Evaluate World Parliament Proposals (excerpted) (Davis 2003)

The footing of the objective lies in peaceful means only. “Our basic principles must attempt to encompass all of human behavior and to cover potential future scenarios. We would want to avoid, and would disavow, any violent actions undertaken as a pretext of establishing a WP, such as those from a lone terrorist, any terrorist groups, or any nation or group of nations seeking global hegemony.” (Davis 2003, 130) The replacement of executive branches by legislative decision-making will help to avoid global risks. Today’s diplomacy, unable to handle issues of peace and justice, could be replaced by the global parliament, more ready to deal with global crises. An important embodiment of the world parliament would be the fact that it represents the possibility of a deep dialogue in politics. Politics is rather seen as a tool of discussion than as a fight paradigm. As the final step, Davis emphasizes the importance to define the ‘we’, since the Charter of the United Nations begins with the reference “we the peoples of the United Nations” (see United Nations 1945). The methodology is no less important because it is helpful for the evaluation. Further on, an inventory should be made of all the proposals for analysis, form an ideal group of proposals and begin discussing about the world parliament. The discussion is aimed to unite the individuals from anti-globalization protesters to the multi-national corporate world and to the individuals in general across the globe. (Davis 2003, 131-135)

Proposals for Basic Design Principles

1. Ultimate political sovereignty resides in the people and any institutional sovereignty is derived from them. Therefore, public bodies must yield if the people decide on institutional change.
2. The collective sovereignty of the people must be expressed through direct or representative democracy. The degree or extent of direct versus representative will depend on the scale of the body and the mix of checks and balances.
3. The rule of law must be implemented as developed and approved, as opposed to the rule by specific individuals such as monarchs or dictators; this prevents arbitrariness and puts the rule of law above special interests.
4. Implementation of the subsidiary principle, which means that local decisions are taken at a local level, and, concomitantly, that the World Parliament addresses only global problems. This principle is a constitutional principle of the European Union and is a refinement of a principle of federalism. The local levels will be defined and agreed upon as the WP develops.
5. The transparency principle: complete institutional and procedural transparency is needed, as this is the only way to create the necessary trust and to prevent corruption.
6. Use of peaceful means to build such an entity.
7. Non-discrimination in accordance with Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
8. Universal participation or inclusivity in the WP, to create a sense of ownership by the people. No person or persons should be excluded from participation in or knowledge of proceedings.

The origin of every single one of these principles is derived from the philosophical and pragmatic recognition that in today’s world, only a global body that is respected and trusted by the people will have the necessary moral authority to enforce its decisions. In order to earn the trust and participation of the world’s people, each of the above eight (8) principles must be implemented.

Indicators of Evaluation for World Parliament Proposals

What are the problems to avoid?

a. Those that sometimes occur in national parliaments

- i. Top-down
- ii. Far away from citizens, no sense of ownership
- iii. Perceived as corrupt
- iv. Not independent: perceived as instruments of executive or financial powers

b. Those inherent to the scale

- i. An escalation of the problems of national parliaments
- ii. An exacerbation of language and cultural differences
- iii. Could be viewed as a threat by national governments

c. Those inherent in the lack of precedent

- i. Resistance to new ideas - particularly visionary ones
- ii. How can we actually begin?
- iii. Differences of opinion on basic structure and operation

d. Lessons: only existing concrete example -the European Parliament

- i. Citizens do not emotionally connect – do not have a sense of ownership
- ii. Created in top-down way by governments, not inclusive of public opinion
- iii. Genesis in a succession of inter-governmental treaties rather than an innovative constitutional beginning

Examples of some questions to be asked of a World Parliament-type body that can be used to create a useful evaluation framework:

External relationship factors:

How representative is it?
 How accountable is it to the people of the world?
 How well does it succeed in creating (actual and practical rather than formal and theoretical) accountability to itself from other global bodies?
 How independent of existing institutions is it?
 How does it communicate with the peoples of the world?
 How does it maintain the trust of the citizens of the world?
 How close is it to the people? What is the accessibility factor?
 How efficiently does it impact global public opinion and do its decisions get carried out on the ground?

Endogenous dynamic factors:

How quickly can it respond to change? How can it avoid institutional crystallization?
 How can we build into it a corrective and evolutionary mechanism to improve its performance?

Endogenous structural factors:

How transparent is it?
 How well does it succeed in creating an environment of dialogue and trust among the representatives?
 How well does it embody itself the basic principles that it seeks to defend?
 How inclusive is it of the world's population, of different political points of view, etc.?

Process factors:

How practical is it to establish?
 How quickly can it be established?
 How much public support can it be expected to muster in the process of its establishment?
 What might it cost to be established and what is the cost versus benefit ratio?
 How should location be established (fixed, rotating, floating seat)?
 How can the process of its creation avoid being tainted by the historical baggage of existing institutions?

Not all of those factors are equally important, so we must weigh them accordingly.

Finally, we can also **list issues** to consider for the actual process of creation of a World Parliament:

1. What are all the possible scenarios by which it can be created?
2. Which among these are the ones that best suit the principles and conditions previously decided upon?
3. Do we need a World Constitution, and if so, how do we create it?
4. What are the roadmaps and signposts that could lead to a WP?
5. What are the pros and cons of each scenario according to our evaluation scheme?
6. Is it necessary to obtain the “authorization” of nation-states, or is the expressed wish of the people enough?

Appendix 4

Developing International Democracy – For a Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations. A Strategy Paper of the Committee for a Democratic U.N. (Bummel 2010b, 7-9)

The UNPA project is based on the following conclusions of the Committee's strategy paper on international democracy:

1. Mankind faces the task of ensuring the survival and well-being of future generations as well as the preservation of the natural foundations of life on Earth. The inclusion of the people into the institutional structure and into the decision-making mechanisms of the international system thereby has essential importance.
2. The populations of the UN member states have to be better and more directly included into the activities of the United Nations and its international organizations. They must be allowed to participate in order to prevent growing discontent, to secure acceptance and legitimacy of the United Nations and international co-operation as well as to strengthen the United Nations' capacity to act. The Committee for a Democratic UN (KDUN) conceives the establishment of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) as a decisive step towards the introduction of a new quality, a new impetus and a stronger representation of citizens into the international system.
3. A Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations would not simply be a new institution. As the voice of citizens, taking a global view in the common international interest, the Assembly would be the manifestation and vehicle of a changed consciousness and understanding of international politics. To bring about such a change is of major importance in coping with the existential challenges facing humanity.
4. The UNPA is to be regarded and designed as a parliamentary umbrella and parliamentary focal point of international cooperation. The commissions of the UNPA should regularly include national parliamentarians, who are not members of the UNPA, but are experts belonging to the respective commissions of their national parliaments. Delegations of the UNPA should be directly admitted to international governmental conferences.
5. Addressing the possibilities and concepts for reforming the United Nations and the UN system should be one of the thematic main tasks of the United Nations Parliamentary Assembly. As a unique and institutionalized hinge between parliaments, civil society, the United Nations and governments, the UNPA could become a political catalyst for further development of the international system and of international law.
6. As a first step, the Committee for a Democratic UN recommends the creation of a Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations as new institution which is established as consultative, semi-autonomous secondary body to the UN General Assembly through a vote of the General Assembly under Article 22 of the UN Charter. Alternatively to that, as far as the Inter-Parliamentary Union is ready and fulfills the preconditions, the Inter-Parliamentary Union could be transformed into a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly in form of a secondary body or alternatively a special organization on the basis of a decision under Article 22 or on the basis of a cooperation agreement on the mutual relations with the United Nations. Both options are open for development.
7. The Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations should be open to all member states of the United Nations which are provided with a constitutionally embodied parliament.

8. The Committee for a Democratic UN recommends that in the first development stage, the delegates of the Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations are uniformly elected from the midst of the parliaments of the participating countries.

9. The determination of the number of delegates per country in the UNPA should be left to the political negotiations of the governments during the preparatory process. Basis of the negotiations should be a commitment to a graduation oriented according to population size, corresponding, in principle, to existing parliamentary assemblies. Before entering into the negotiations on the actual distribution it is recommended that an upper limit for the total number of delegates be defined. This number probably lies between 700 and 900.

10. The actual financial need for the first step can only be quantified if it is clear how the UNPA is to be designed, for example composition, voting procedure, participating states and legal basis. A first rough total estimate on the basis of the conclusions of the Committee for a Democratic UN comes to 100 to 120 million Euro [sic!] per year. This figure is based on the assumption that all UN member states participate which possess a constitutionally elected parliament.

11. According to the example of the European Parliament, the initially only consulting Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations should, within further stages of development, step by step be provided with genuine rights of information, participation and control.

12. The establishment of a directly elected world parliament with political competences is the most far-reaching concept of global democracy. The Committee for a Democratic UN supports the idea of such a world parliament. Efforts for a democratisation of the international system, however, are inextricably linked with comprehensive questions of human development. The Committee for a Democratic UN explicitly supports the initiative of the Global Marshall Plan for a world-wide eco-social market economy, since it identifies in the surmounting of extreme poverty and of the prosperity gap in the world one of the conditions for a far-reaching democratisation of international relations.

13. Under existing conditions, a world parliament cannot be realized from one day to the other. There is need for realistic and pragmatic alternatives which, however, are open for further development. In order to achieve the vision of a world parliament, a long-term development strategy has to be striven for. Manifestation and vehicle of this strategy is the UNPA.